Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 10
... Pre- emptive war is the term now in use for the case of war initiated in the expectation that attack is imminent . At no time before in modern history did military technology make it so likely that the first moments of general war might ...
... Pre- emptive war is the term now in use for the case of war initiated in the expectation that attack is imminent . At no time before in modern history did military technology make it so likely that the first moments of general war might ...
Pagina 11
... pre - emptive advantage makes a suspicion of war a cause of war . If the actions , false alarms , accidental events , mischief or other occurrences that bring the pre - emptive urge into play can be minimized and damped , by co ...
... pre - emptive advantage makes a suspicion of war a cause of war . If the actions , false alarms , accidental events , mischief or other occurrences that bring the pre - emptive urge into play can be minimized and damped , by co ...
Pagina 13
... pre - emptive " urge in slow motion . The pre - emptive motive is the incentive to attack in the belief that the other is already attacking or is about to ; the " preventive urge " has the same forestalling motives , but with re- spect ...
... pre - emptive " urge in slow motion . The pre - emptive motive is the incentive to attack in the belief that the other is already attacking or is about to ; the " preventive urge " has the same forestalling motives , but with re- spect ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems