Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 34
Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin. kinds of arms limitations are possible , particularly the kinds that are possible in the absence of overt political settlements . INTELLIGENCE " Arms race " refers to the interaction between two ...
Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin. kinds of arms limitations are possible , particularly the kinds that are possible in the absence of overt political settlements . INTELLIGENCE " Arms race " refers to the interaction between two ...
Pagina 60
... possible , rearmament is possible , and primitive wars that last long enough may convert themselves by rapid mobilization into very modern warfare . Nor is primitive warfare necessarily a very attractive alternative to the more modern ...
... possible , rearmament is possible , and primitive wars that last long enough may convert themselves by rapid mobilization into very modern warfare . Nor is primitive warfare necessarily a very attractive alternative to the more modern ...
Pagina 121
... possible , with reliable and invulnerable communi- cations , command , and control arrangements , and with safeguards against false alarms or unauthorized actions ; and to pursue modes of deployment that minimize the danger of ...
... possible , with reliable and invulnerable communi- cations , command , and control arrangements , and with safeguards against false alarms or unauthorized actions ; and to pursue modes of deployment that minimize the danger of ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems