Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 11
... other's actions or intentions on the brink of war . If cooperative ar- rangements can improve each side's intelligence about the other's preparatory actions , this may ( but also may not ) stabilize expecta- tions . If each is able to ...
... other's actions or intentions on the brink of war . If cooperative ar- rangements can improve each side's intelligence about the other's preparatory actions , this may ( but also may not ) stabilize expecta- tions . If each is able to ...
Pagina 32
... other's communications , jam- ming each other's warning systems , " spoofing " each other's warning systems with mock attacks or the deliberate creation of fake acci- dents ( like " inadvertently " dragging up each other's undersea ca ...
... other's communications , jam- ming each other's warning systems , " spoofing " each other's warning systems with mock attacks or the deliberate creation of fake acci- dents ( like " inadvertently " dragging up each other's undersea ca ...
Pagina 34
... other is doing . Certainly , if it were clear that each participant in- variably exaggerated the other's accomplishments , improving the estimates of what each other is doing could reassure them and slow them down . True , if usual ...
... other is doing . Certainly , if it were clear that each participant in- variably exaggerated the other's accomplishments , improving the estimates of what each other is doing could reassure them and slow them down . True , if usual ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems