Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 44
... ment , and what it gains by participating for a time and then begin- ning the race anew . For each of these three possibilities - that the agreement works , that it is cheated on , that it breaks down - there are military and political ...
... ment , and what it gains by participating for a time and then begin- ning the race anew . For each of these three possibilities - that the agreement works , that it is cheated on , that it breaks down - there are military and political ...
Pagina 74
... ment one must consider , so to speak , what the balance of forces would be at various intervals after the arms race were resumed , on various assumptions about the degree to which the resumption had been anticipated openly or ...
... ment one must consider , so to speak , what the balance of forces would be at various intervals after the arms race were resumed , on various assumptions about the degree to which the resumption had been anticipated openly or ...
Pagina 113
... ment . But this phasing of new missiles further complicates the issues raised above about productive capacity , pipeline , replace- ment rate , testing , spare parts , and crew training . Interpretation of the Agreement The above ...
... ment . But this phasing of new missiles further complicates the issues raised above about productive capacity , pipeline , replace- ment rate , testing , spare parts , and crew training . Interpretation of the Agreement The above ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems