Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 16
... means that either side , if it wishes to , can take more time to clear up whether or not the war has already started ; it also means that each can impute less impetuous action to the other , and reduce thereby the need for its own quick ...
... means that either side , if it wishes to , can take more time to clear up whether or not the war has already started ; it also means that each can impute less impetuous action to the other , and reduce thereby the need for its own quick ...
Pagina 37
... means that each side must be prepared to spend a great deal of money ; it also means a constant fear on either side that the other has devel- oped a dominant position , or will do so , or will fear the first to do so , with the ...
... means that each side must be prepared to spend a great deal of money ; it also means a constant fear on either side that the other has devel- oped a dominant position , or will do so , or will fear the first to do so , with the ...
Pagina 137
... means of delivery of nuclear weapons . At the present time there exists some reasonably comprehensive no- tion of what the significant means of delivery are . Missiles , aircraft , surface vessels , etc. , within a certain range of ...
... means of delivery of nuclear weapons . At the present time there exists some reasonably comprehensive no- tion of what the significant means of delivery are . Missiles , aircraft , surface vessels , etc. , within a certain range of ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems