Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 27
... keeping nuclear weapons out of limited war may help to make it possible for rational decisions to keep up with events . It has also been suggested that a ban on missiles might be evaluated partly in terms of the desirability of making ...
... keeping nuclear weapons out of limited war may help to make it possible for rational decisions to keep up with events . It has also been suggested that a ban on missiles might be evaluated partly in terms of the desirability of making ...
Pagina 30
... keep local wars limited , because of the contribution that they would make to the stability of the strategic balance . Arms understandings can also contribute to keeping local wars limited by facilitating the process of arriving at ...
... keep local wars limited , because of the contribution that they would make to the stability of the strategic balance . Arms understandings can also contribute to keeping local wars limited by facilitating the process of arriving at ...
Pagina 112
... keep hidden missiles in good condition than to keep hid- den crews in good condition , a nation that wishes either to violate the agreement or to be prepared for a breakdown of the agreement may wish to keep an excess of crews relative ...
... keep hidden missiles in good condition than to keep hid- den crews in good condition , a nation that wishes either to violate the agreement or to be prepared for a breakdown of the agreement may wish to keep an excess of crews relative ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems