Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
Vanuit het boek
Resultaten 1-3 van 31
Pagina 2
... interest in inducing and reciprocating arms restraint . We use the term " arms control " rather than " disarmament . " Our intention is simply to broaden the term . We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between ...
... interest in inducing and reciprocating arms restraint . We use the term " arms control " rather than " disarmament . " Our intention is simply to broaden the term . We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between ...
Pagina 97
... interest in persuasively demonstrating its own compliance . The Positive - Evidence Principle There are two different criteria for judging inspection systems . One is how well the system gets at the truth in spite of the sub- ject's ...
... interest in persuasively demonstrating its own compliance . The Positive - Evidence Principle There are two different criteria for judging inspection systems . One is how well the system gets at the truth in spite of the sub- ject's ...
Pagina 142
... interest in the avoidance of accidental war ; anyone concerned with military policy must be concerned to minimize the danger of accident , false alarm , un- authorized action , or misunderstanding , that might lead to war . Arms control ...
... interest in the avoidance of accidental war ; anyone concerned with military policy must be concerned to minimize the danger of accident , false alarm , un- authorized action , or misunderstanding , that might lead to war . Arms control ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
10 andere gedeelten niet getoond
Overige edities - Alles bekijken
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems