Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 35
... fact their program were curtailed , presumably ours could be ( and rationally so ) in response . ( The example can be turned around , of course . ) This assumes that the character of the arms race is at least po- tentially stable . If in ...
... fact their program were curtailed , presumably ours could be ( and rationally so ) in response . ( The example can be turned around , of course . ) This assumes that the character of the arms race is at least po- tentially stable . If in ...
Pagina 53
... fact that an enemy submarine can be close to one's own borders unobserved is especially disturbing ; and the dif- ficulties of anti - submarine warfare are viewed with alarm . But there is a growing recognition that the Polaris ...
... fact that an enemy submarine can be close to one's own borders unobserved is especially disturbing ; and the dif- ficulties of anti - submarine warfare are viewed with alarm . But there is a growing recognition that the Polaris ...
Pagina 98
... fact . It is this motivation on which the success of any arms inspection may ultimately rest . If we are in fact complying with an agreement , we badly wish to prove so ; and if the other countries are genuinely complying with the ...
... fact . It is this motivation on which the success of any arms inspection may ultimately rest . If we are in fact complying with an agreement , we badly wish to prove so ; and if the other countries are genuinely complying with the ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems