Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 30
... discussion might also facilitate the explicit or im- plicit negotiations leading to recognized limits , which would have to take place after war broke out . Unilateral discussion of limited war , such as has been going on in the United ...
... discussion might also facilitate the explicit or im- plicit negotiations leading to recognized limits , which would have to take place after war broke out . Unilateral discussion of limited war , such as has been going on in the United ...
Pagina 49
... discussion suggests that there are but two principal desiderata . The first is that the general level of armaments , some- how measured , be reduced ; the second is that the ratio of strengths of the two blocs ( or relative strengths of ...
... discussion suggests that there are but two principal desiderata . The first is that the general level of armaments , some- how measured , be reduced ; the second is that the ratio of strengths of the two blocs ( or relative strengths of ...
Pagina 83
... discussion " and " political negotiations " in the test- ban and surprise - attack negotiations of the last few years . What- ever the value of the so - called " technical discussions , " it is perfectly clear that their meaning and ...
... discussion " and " political negotiations " in the test- ban and surprise - attack negotiations of the last few years . What- ever the value of the so - called " technical discussions , " it is perfectly clear that their meaning and ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems