Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 58
... deterrence and too large for the hoped - for benefits of a totally ( or nearly ) disarmed world to compensate for the disap- pearance of mutual deterrence . Stability vs. Disarmament The concept of " stabilized deterrence " has recently ...
... deterrence and too large for the hoped - for benefits of a totally ( or nearly ) disarmed world to compensate for the disap- pearance of mutual deterrence . Stability vs. Disarmament The concept of " stabilized deterrence " has recently ...
Pagina 59
... deterrence , to the extent that it could be achieved , might bet- ter be described as an effort to replace the balance of fear with a " balance of prudence . ” The search for stability has also been criticized , and can justly be ...
... deterrence , to the extent that it could be achieved , might bet- ter be described as an effort to replace the balance of fear with a " balance of prudence . ” The search for stability has also been criticized , and can justly be ...
Pagina 99
... Deterrence of Violation Implicit in any desire to monitor compliance is the notion of de- terrence . Inspection is based on the assumption that countries might violate if they could get away with it ; catching them after the fact is one ...
... Deterrence of Violation Implicit in any desire to monitor compliance is the notion of de- terrence . Inspection is based on the assumption that countries might violate if they could get away with it ; catching them after the fact is one ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems