Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 17
... DESTRUCTION Arms limitations might reduce the capability for destruction so that , in the event of a thermonuclear American - Soviet exchange , no matter how the war gets out of hand , the damage is less than it would have been ...
... DESTRUCTION Arms limitations might reduce the capability for destruction so that , in the event of a thermonuclear American - Soviet exchange , no matter how the war gets out of hand , the damage is less than it would have been ...
Pagina 19
... destruction and more at the survival of each country and its further military security . Furthermore , even if a nation tries to deter or to intimidate the other with a threat that any war , once it passes some threshold , will know no ...
... destruction and more at the survival of each country and its further military security . Furthermore , even if a nation tries to deter or to intimidate the other with a threat that any war , once it passes some threshold , will know no ...
Pagina 21
... destruction as a by - product of a pre - emptive or an " acci- dental " war initiated by one side or the other in a ... DESTRUCTION We have just discussed the possibility that arms control might help to limit damage in general war in the ...
... destruction as a by - product of a pre - emptive or an " acci- dental " war initiated by one side or the other in a ... DESTRUCTION We have just discussed the possibility that arms control might help to limit damage in general war in the ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems