Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 25
Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin. Chapter 2 ARMS CONTROL , CRISES AND LIMITED WAR IN a speech on February 18 , 1960 , Secretary of State Christian Herter pointed out that " observers might prove useful , during a major crisis ...
Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin. Chapter 2 ARMS CONTROL , CRISES AND LIMITED WAR IN a speech on February 18 , 1960 , Secretary of State Christian Herter pointed out that " observers might prove useful , during a major crisis ...
Pagina 129
... crisis without severe damage to the arms control itself , or its discontinu- ance , are of strategic significance . They may help to deter aggrava- tion of such a crisis , if some or all of the participants value the arms understanding ...
... crisis without severe damage to the arms control itself , or its discontinu- ance , are of strategic significance . They may help to deter aggrava- tion of such a crisis , if some or all of the participants value the arms understanding ...
Pagina 130
... crisis . It should also be kept in mind that at the height of a crisis , when both sides may perceive themselves near the brink of war , the mo- tives in favor of arms control may become more intense . Obstacles and difficulties that ...
... crisis . It should also be kept in mind that at the height of a crisis , when both sides may perceive themselves near the brink of war , the mo- tives in favor of arms control may become more intense . Obstacles and difficulties that ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems