Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 2
... certain kinds of military force , increases in certain kinds of military force , qualitative changes in weaponry , different modes of deployment , or arrangements superimposed on existing military systems , we prefer to treat as an open ...
... certain kinds of military force , increases in certain kinds of military force , qualitative changes in weaponry , different modes of deployment , or arrangements superimposed on existing military systems , we prefer to treat as an open ...
Pagina 54
... certain nuclear warhead , on station a certain fraction of time , with a certain reaction time de- pending on its communications and its distance from an ideal launching point , admits of no simple obvious comparison with , say , a base ...
... certain nuclear warhead , on station a certain fraction of time , with a certain reaction time de- pending on its communications and its distance from an ideal launching point , admits of no simple obvious comparison with , say , a base ...
Pagina 105
... certain geographical areas , but for their own protection they were not to be under continuous and exhaus- tive surveillance . If , say , a small fraction of the submarine force could be observed each day , or even just on certain days ...
... certain geographical areas , but for their own protection they were not to be under continuous and exhaus- tive surveillance . If , say , a small fraction of the submarine force could be observed each day , or even just on certain days ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems