Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 1
... avoiding the kind of threat that may pro- voke desperate , preventive , or irrational military action on the part of other countries . It is the responsibility of military policies and postures to avoid the false alarms and ...
... avoiding the kind of threat that may pro- voke desperate , preventive , or irrational military action on the part of other countries . It is the responsibility of military policies and postures to avoid the false alarms and ...
Pagina 3
... avoid the need for precipitant decisions , to avoid accidents or the mistaken decisions that they might cause and to INTRODUCTION 3.
... avoid the need for precipitant decisions , to avoid accidents or the mistaken decisions that they might cause and to INTRODUCTION 3.
Pagina 95
... avoid- ing nominal evidence of suspicious behavior . Even in our own anal- ysis we want to avoid believing that violation has occurred if it has not . It will be expensive for us if we are continually preparing for the consequences of ...
... avoid- ing nominal evidence of suspicious behavior . Even in our own anal- ysis we want to avoid believing that violation has occurred if it has not . It will be expensive for us if we are continually preparing for the consequences of ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems