Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 11
... ATTACK As far as major war is concerned , the incentive to initiate a pre- meditated attack is akin to the incentive towards pre - emptive at- tack . The reason is that with thermonuclear weapons on both sides , there might be little ...
... ATTACK As far as major war is concerned , the incentive to initiate a pre- meditated attack is akin to the incentive towards pre - emptive at- tack . The reason is that with thermonuclear weapons on both sides , there might be little ...
Pagina 12
... attack , might be an important supplement to the meas- ures that we undertake unilaterally to assure our strategic forces against attack . First , there may be measures that , taken jointly , would reduce the likelihood that the ...
... attack , might be an important supplement to the meas- ures that we undertake unilaterally to assure our strategic forces against attack . First , there may be measures that , taken jointly , would reduce the likelihood that the ...
Pagina 13
... attack ? For several reasons the answer can be " yes . " It may be that neither side intends to attack but is uneasy about the other's in- tentions . It is thus obliged to develop military forces and to de- ploy them in a way that ...
... attack ? For several reasons the answer can be " yes . " It may be that neither side intends to attack but is uneasy about the other's in- tentions . It is thus obliged to develop military forces and to de- ploy them in a way that ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems