Strategy and Arms ControlTwentieth Century Fund, 1961 - 148 pagina's |
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Pagina 12
... advantage of initiative and sur- prise . Collaborative measures to reduce this advantage , and to reduce thereby the incentive that either might have towards pre- meditated attack , might be an important supplement to the meas- ures ...
... advantage of initiative and sur- prise . Collaborative measures to reduce this advantage , and to reduce thereby the incentive that either might have towards pre- meditated attack , might be an important supplement to the meas- ures ...
Pagina 69
... advantages , though significant , may be effective only until others have caught up . During the in- terim the military advantage might be used effectively , particularly against third countries that recognized that they could not count ...
... advantages , though significant , may be effective only until others have caught up . During the in- terim the military advantage might be used effectively , particularly against third countries that recognized that they could not count ...
Pagina 130
... advantage that may arise in such a crisis . It should also be kept in mind that at the height of a crisis , when both sides may perceive themselves near the brink of war , the mo- tives in favor of arms control may become more intense ...
... advantage that may arise in such a crisis . It should also be kept in mind that at the height of a crisis , when both sides may perceive themselves near the brink of war , the mo- tives in favor of arms control may become more intense ...
Inhoudsopgave
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
Arms Control and General War | 9 |
Arms Control Crises and Limited War | 25 |
Copyright | |
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accidental accidents activities advantage agree armaments arms agreement arms arrangements arms control arms limitations arms race balance budget capability cheating civil defense clandestine cold war communication consider costs countries crisis danger decisions defense deployment destruction disarmament discussion Donald G duction effect evaluation evasion event expectations explicit facilities false alarms first-strike formal forms of arms Herman Kahn ICBM implications important improved incentive initiate inspection intelligence interpretation involve kinds of arms less likelihood limited war measures ment military action military forces military policy military services military strategy motives negotiations nuclear weapons nuclear-test other's participants particular political possible potential enemies pre-emptive present problem procedures reason reciprocated reduce relation require response restraint retaliation retaliatory forces secrecy side side's Soviet Soviet Union stabilize deterrence strategic forces strategic weapons submarine surprise attack surveillance targets tegic ternational threat tion tive trol unilateral Univ violation vulnerability weapon systems