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have no more doubt that their of events, except in upholding make or constitution is differ- the vast machine which, in the ent, than we have, that their beginning, he had set in motion. passions and affections are so. It is no more inconsistent with In like manner if we sce cause the holy nature of God to ope to conclude from the uniform rate in and by the serpent, than conduct of two persons, for a to operate in and by the dove. course of years, that one loves His agency in and by the two God and his neighbor, and that she-bears out of the wood, which the other loves no being but tare forty and two children who himself, and sensibly hates all mocked Elisha, was as pure, as who stand in his way, we ne-in and by the ravens which fed cessarily conclude, that their natures or constitutions are different, as well as their affections and exercises themselves. So when we observe that an individual from spiteful and malicious becomes uniformly kind and benevolent, we conclude that his nature is changed; not his affections only, but his constitution, in which we seek a reason of the existence of affections of a certain kind in a train.

Should it be said, that holy affections, in the regenerate, are produced by a law of constant divine operation, it will be admitted; but it will be proper to remark, that, for ought appears, all that is meant by nature, in any creature, is a law of constant divine operation by which, certain affections, volitions, actions, or motions, are produced, in a certain stated course and order, so as to bring about the end for which the creature was made. Such an idea of nature in creatures is not seen to be inconsistent with sound philosophy, or divinity. On the contrary, by making God, as it were, visible in every thing and event, it has the advantage of that idea of nature which tends to exclude him from our thoughts, as having little or no agency in the course

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Elijah: or, in and by. the dove which returned to Noah in the ark with the olive leaf. His agency in afflicting Job through the malice of Satan was as holy as it was in and by Job in feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. The divine benignity is impressed on all his works; and every creature of God, either by itself, or in its connection with other things, and in the use to which it is applied by him who filleth all in all, will show forth his praise.

The opinion, that the change in regeneration cannot be phys ical, seems to have originated in the theory, that man could not be to blame for a state of unregeneracy, or for being destitute of a principle of holy love, if a physical change was necessary as the ground of that affection; because, this would imply a natural inability for holy exercise; but that he would be to blame for being in that state, if the new birth were supposed only a moral change; because such a change would imply only a moral inability for holy exercise, consisting in the want of a heart for it. This reasoning goes on the supposition, that natural inability excuses from blame, but that moral inability does not. But this must be understood with limitations. No

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temper, or the affections, are not, nor ever can be the proper object of choice; for they are independent of choice; and the proper ground of it. Our being affected in a certain manner in the perception of particular objects is not the fruit of antecedent choice, nor is it choice itself; but it is by a law of our nature, as sensitive beings. We do not love or hate ob

thing seems necessary to blame-¡ himself and others. Indeed, the
worthiness but that the subject
should be capable of the know-
ledge of God, and should, in fact,
be destitute of love to him and
to his creatures. A creature of
such a character, however he
became such, is worthy of blame
and punishment because he is
hostile to every interest but a
selfish interest. For, the precise
notion of blame-worthiness in
a rational agent is, that he is
wholly selfish, or has no re-jects because we choose to love
gard to the good of others: or,
which is the same thing, is an
enemy to universal being. If
any character can be blame-
worthy it must be that which
prefers a good comparatively
nothing to that which is infinite-
ly great because, such choice
is against reason and the fitness
of things; and such a character
surely deserves punishment,
which is nothing else but the
opposition of the public, or of
him who represents the public,
against such a character, man-
ifested in the infliction of natu-
ral evil upon him. Brutes are
wholly selfish in their actions,
and had they a moral sense by
which they could discriminate
between right and wrong, they
would be sinful creatures, and
the subjects of moral govern-
ment; but being destitute of
such moral sense, their actions
are not moral any more than the
actions of the sun and wind.

The blame of a rational agent does not consist in this that he had power to do otherwise if he had pleased; nor in this, that his evil temper is the fruit of his own choice; but it consists in this, that his temper is, in itself, evil; prompting to a train of volitions and external actions which dishonor God, and injure

or hate them; but because they
appear to us lovely or hateful.
The perception itself of beauty
or deformity in objects is all
the love or hatred we ever ex-
ercise towards them. It is no
matter of choice whether or not
I will be pleased with a beautiful
landscape, a well proportioned
edifice, a fine poem, a beautiful
person, divine truth, the charac-
ter of Christ, or any other object,
in the natural or moral world.
As a sensitive being, susceptible
of pleasure and pain, I am af-
fected by them, and am the sub-
ject of various sensations of de-
light, or the contrary, according
to the state I am in; but the
pleasure or pain I feel is not the
result of choice. Indeed, if we
have affections, the gratification
of which we find is hurtful to us,
we have power, in some cases,
to avoid their objects; and in
that way, indirectly, to diminish
the force of those affections
themselves. Still, it will remain
true, that our affections are not
what they are as a consequence
of our choosing them; but they
are what they are, by a law of
our nature; which is indepen-
dent of our volitions and prior to
them. If it were otherwise, we
should, in a sense, be masters of
cur own destiny; for, as our af

fections, which are nothing more than modifications of pleasure and pain, are the spring of happiness, and misery; or, more properly, are themselves happiness or misery, in proportion to their intensity, if they were the objects of choice, or choice itself, we should never be the subjects of pain or distress in any case. Indeed, the very existence of painful affections which, more or less, we always experience, such as fear, despair, envy, and the like, proves, that the affections are distinct from volition or choice.

delight, they alone will be
sought on their own account, the
whole enquiry will be, who will
shew us any good? If spiritual
objects afford delight, we shall
live a life of faith, which will
be to us the substance of things
hoped for; and the desire of
our souls will be," Lord lift
"thou up the light of thy coun-
" tenance upon us."
no natural man, who has just
speculative views of God, but
knows, that the love of God shed
abroad in the heart would be the
greatest of all blessings; and
he may seek this, in the word,
and other means of grace, as
being essential to his happiness,
in this world, and in the world to

There is

titute of it, and is conscious that he is so. Nor is there any reason to doubt, but sinners, who are thoroughly convinced of their true character and state, would undertake the most painful service imaginable, and would give ten thousand worlds, if they owned them, for the love of God, as a means of escaping hell. Nay, they may be satisfied, that the love of God in the heart would itself be blessed

The view of an approaching evil will excite fear; if seen to be unavoidable, it will produce despair if we love not our neigh-come: while he is wholly desbor, his good, if we covet it, will excite envy; and his opposition to ours, malice. All these affections are modes of pain which the application of their objects will certainly produce, whether we will or not; and the effect is necessary by a natural necessity; for it will exist, notwithstanding any actual or supposable will or endeavor to the contrary. The pleasing affections are equally independent of the will as the painful ones. In view of attaina-ness, and the only proper life of ble good, a man cannot choose the soul, and yet feel nothing but hope, and in the possession but enmity against him. And of it, he cannot choose but re- they might continue in such a joice: and he might be willing, state, and with such views, for in vain, to purchase love at the many years, even to their dying price of all the substance of his day, and in the agonies of death house. Our affections constitute itself, and sink to endless woe us sensitive beings; and they at last. In such a state they are the spring of all our volitions would know for certain," that and outward actions. We seek" it is not of him that willeth, the good, and shun the evil," nor of him that runneth, but of which we find the presence of "God that sheweth mercy." objects around us is calculated to produce; and this occupies the whole of our attention. If the objects of sense alone afford

These views, indeed, commonly prepare the way for the bestowment of mercy; but there is no certain connection between them

ty: I loath the very sight of him: my will has nothing to do with the subject, except to shun an object in itself loathsome : my nature, or the nature of the creature, must be changed before I can love him. The case is the same with respect to moral objects. The wicked are an abomination to the righteous, and the righteous to the wicked. There is an opposition of character; they cannot feel complacency in each other: though the righteous may and do exercise good will towards the wicked, they cannot love their charaeter. Tell a natural man to love Christ, and he will answer, if he speak out his heart, I see no form or comeliness in him, no beauty that I should desire him. Offer him eternal glory if he will love him, and come to him; tell him that Christ is infinitely lovely, the chiefest of ten thousands; that he is the delight of all holy beings; that God himself, whose judgment is perfect, loves him with infinite love; and has highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name; and he will an

and that bestowment. They are not of the nature of holiness, because they imply no sense of the beauty and glory of the divine character; and are wholly selfish. The Saviour says, indeed, ye will not come unto me that ye might have life; and this is the character of every sinner. But coming to Christ is an exercise of that faith which worketh by love; love is pre-supposed, and is most essential in the act of coming to Christ. They can will any thing which does not imply this. But he also says, "No man can come to me, except the Father who hath sent | "me draw him." These words, | in their obvious meaning, imply not only a want of will, but strictly a want of power. The affection of love to God, or, which is the same thing, a perception of his beauty and glory, is wanting. Now it is certain, that the sinner cannot obtain this perception by any possible or supposable volition of his own. The reason is, it is the work of God alone, it is a new creation it infinitely transcends the power of any creature; nor is the production of it connected, in-swer, it may be so; or I believe fallibly, with any thing which the sinner can do, by the promise of God.

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Ask the first man you meet whether he can love a toad or a viper? He will answer, it is impossible. Offer him an estate if he will love and caress the ugly creature; he will feel himself insulted, and will retort, Sir, you know it is impossible. Tell him his inability is nothing else but the want of a will, and that he can love the creature if he pleases. He will rejoin, Sir, I perceive no beauty in the creature: Į perceive nothing but deformi

it is so; and I have no doubt, but if I loved the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, I should be blessed for ever. Yet I must say, as before, I see no beauty in him. Threaten him from God, the God of truth, with eternal torments in hell, if he live and die an enemy to Christ ; and he may reply that he expects to be damned if he continue of his present temper; for he sees no form or comeliness in Christ, and feels that his heart is enmity against him; and that he can no more change his own heart, than he can create a world. Tell him,

as some do, that he can love | who is the sum of moral excel. Christ if he pleases; it will not lence. If knowing him, I love satisfy; for he knows, or may him not, I shew that I am not know, that it depends not at all conformed to him, or like him. on his pleasure, whether the Of consequence, if he is excellove of Christ shall exist in his lent, I am vile; if he is beauti heart, or not; because the scrip- ful, I am deformed. My blame tures testify, that love is of God, for not loving God and my and he that loveth is born of neighbor does not consist in this, God; and it is not of him that that I have power to do it, but willeth, nor of him that runneth, will not but it consists in this, but of God that sheweth mercy. that, knowing God, I am not God has been pleased by a conformed to him, but wholly certain law of his own operation unlike him, who is the sum of to connect certain events or ef- moral excellence and beauty. fects with our volitions: and the Should it be said that to obey or events which we find are con- disobey appertains to the will nected with our volitions are alone, and to no other faculty; said, in common speech, to be the answer is, that to obey or in our power. Thus on willing disobey appertains to the man, to raise my hand to my head, it and not to his faculties. The rises; this event is in my pow-command of God reaches the er on willing to raise a weight state of the soul, as well as its of a thousand pounds, it rises exercises. It requires not only not, this event is not in my pow-those exercises which are eviNow it is certain that the dence of love; but, what is existence of the love of God in most essential, love itself. And the heart is not connected with the external evidence of love any volitions of the natural man, arising from exercise derives its it is therefore not in his power; whole value from that love, of it is not the fruit of his agency; which they are the expression, or it is the fruit of God's agency, supposed to be so. If I feed the and of his alone. hungry and clothe the naked, beIf I am commanded, by one cause I delight in his happiwho has right to command, to nesss, or, in other words, bestretch out my hand, and I do cause I love him, I obey the it not, I am to blame; if to stop command," thou shalt love thy the sun in its course, and "neighbor as thyself." But if though willing, I do it not, I am I do it, that I may have praise not to blame because here is of men, I do not obey the comno defect of moral character. If mand, but violate it; for love, I am commanded to love God and love only, with its genuine with all the heart, and my neigh-fruits and expressions, is, the bor as myself, and I do it not, fulfilling of the law.

er.

I am to blame; though the ef

To say that obedience to the

fect be wholly out of my pow-law consists in exercise, and that er; because there is an essen- love is not an exercise if it betial defect of moral character. long not to the will, is to beg the It is fit and right that, knowing question. All will admit that God, I should love him; for love is the fulfilling of the law: this shews that I am like him, but that love is an exercise, as

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