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MORE GERMAN PROMISES TO AMERICA.

Influenced by a desire to keep America out of the war, an unshakable conscious or subconscious belief that the Allies cannot be beaten, and the hope of giving neutral aid at some time and in some manner to a movement towards peace, President Wilson and his advisers have again given Germany the benefit of the doubt. On April 19th the United States Government, through the American Ambassador in Berlin, delivered to the German Government what was in effect an ultimatum. The American Note was a severe indictment not only of the methods pursued by German submarines, but of the honesty and good faith of the German Government in its diplomatic exchanges with Washington. The ultimatum carried by the American Note was contained in the last paragraph and read as follows: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."

The German reply to the above was not long in forthcoming. Exception was taken to many of the charges made by the United States, but it was agreed by the German Government that in the future submarine warfare against merchant vessels would be conducted in the same manner as if such submarines were cruisers, or, in other words, under the rules of international usage as agreed upon and practised by all civilized nations in the past. The

German reply intimated that such had been the conduct of German submarines in the past when attacks upon merchant vessels took place outside of the warzone of the seas, but that now, out of high consideration for American opinion, recognized international law and the dictates of humanity would prevail even within the war-zone. This "concession" was, however, considered by Germany to entitle her to fresh effort on the part of America to induce England to modify her blockade of Germany. This was not actually made a condition, but it was stated that if America did not succeed in mitigating the severity of the English blockade the German Government reserved the right to a further consideration of the American demands with a view to a possible revision of the decision now made.

The American Government made prompt reply to this suggestion as follows: "To avoid any possible misunderstanding the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, the suggestion that respect by the German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way, or in the slightest degree, be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government as affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. The responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

The German Government has made no further reply direct to Washington. There have been "conversations" with the American Ambassador in Berlin, but no official statement has been given out as to the result, and there probably will be none. Germany has agreed to the American demand in order to pre

vent the severance of relations between the two countries. An attempt was made to impose conditions. America accepted the agreement and ignored the conditions. As the latter were suggested by Germany more for home consumption than in any expectation they would be considered by the United States nothing more may be heard of them. In view of the agreement by Germany the American Government can now do nothing except await results. If no more American lives are lost upon non-combatant merchant ships destroyed by German submarines the most serious phase of this particular controversy has passed. Should a German submarine make another "mistake," however, as in the case of the Sussex, the President could do nothing less than carry into effect at once and without further correspondence the ultimatum set forth in the Note of April 19th. If he fails to do this his critics, past and present, will be fully justified in their attacks upon him, and the best American opinion will not tolerate what could only be considered as an expedient, not to say cowardly, retreat.

Germany does not want a break with America. This is most emphatically shown in her every word of the past few months. It is believed in Berlin that if America ranges herself openly with the Allies several other now neutral countries will immediately follow suit. This would hasten the end of the war and render that end an even greater disaster than what is to happen to Germany in the course of the inevitable. Such a disaster would extend its effects over many years to come, and postpone indefinitely the re-creation of Germany's foreign commerce, the impressive foundation for which lies ready to hand as soon as the war is over and is to be found in the carrying capacity of the German steamships now interned in American harbors. It is also reported that the German Chancellor informed

the Reichstag that all hope of "starv ing" England by means of submarines must be given up, hence the sacrifice made to America did not possess the significance given to it by some German publicists.

From nearly every point of view President Wilson could not do otherwise than accept the German reply as satisfactory to America. The agree

ment to do what America required was there. The verbiage that surrounded that agreement and the conditions implied were not so linked with the main point at issue as to make them part and parcel thereof. It was quite possible to ignore all else but the compliance, especially as the United States Government, in a separate statement, reiterated its intention not to allow Germany to dictate the course of negotiations with other countries. It is also important and interesting to note that the arbitration treaty entered into by the British and American Governments has brought its first fruits, for Mr. Lansing, the American Secretary of State, has called attention to the not generally appreciated fact that no controversy has yet arisen between England and the United States which, under existing Anglo-American treaty obligations, would not have to be settled by arbitration should diplomatic exchanges fail to bring about an agreement. The same form of treaty was offered to Germany by America before the war, but, as has been the course with the German Government for some years past, an arrangement was declined. As Mr. Lansing says, the question of the wilful murder of American citizens would not have given rise to the exercise of the terms of such an arbitration treaty even had one existed with Germany, and as no such question is involved in AngloAmerican controversies the questions at issue are far removed from those which have given rise to the crisis in German-American affairs.

President Wilson had the almost unanimous support of American public opinion in his ultimatum to Germany. He did not receive as unanimous support for his acceptance of the German reply as being satisfactory. The German reply was regarded as equivocal in substance, insolent in tone, and contain ng small promise of a continuance of future acceptable behavior, or, rather, a complete reform in her methods of submarine warfare. Diverted by an acute crisis in Mexican affairs, however, public clamor against the acceptance of the German reply soon died away, and the situation now awaits new developments to bring it to the fore again. Since the reply to America German submarines have sunk peaceful merchantmen allegedly without warning, but the details of these disasters are not at hand in sufficiently authenticated form to decide whether or not they constitute direct and unquestioned violation of German promises. There are many loopholes in the German position expressly provided for exit from tight corners. If a vessel is armed beyond the not yet determined limit allowed to a non-belligerent merchantman, if it attempts to defend itself with such armament as it has, or if it attempts escape there is room for German argument with the neutral country affected. So far as is known at this time no American rights have been invaded on the high seas by Germany since the reply to the American ultimatum, and the Washington Government is evidently agreeable to a "watchful waiting" policy. at the same time hoping most earnestly that Germany will keep within bounds sufficiently to allow of no further action.

There are other matters affecting the future relations of the two countries that are not settled. The seizure of important papers from the New York office of an agent of the German Embassy has furnished those permitted to see them with some most interesting

reading. Details of many plots against American and Canadian industry, plans for a German mobilization in America in case of war, full details of the arrangements made for German co-operation in Ireland, and other data of the liveliest interest to a half dozen Governments. As these papers were direct proof of violation of American neutrality the Washington Government has, it is understood, notified the Allied Governments of any dangers that might come to them from the plots so revealed. President Wilson is accused of warning Great Britain of the German plans for an invasion of Ireland, and is getting a large share of lively abuse from German and Irish sources, but the country as a whole is more concerned with these attempts to misuse American hospitality than with the assistance derived by the Allies from these disclosures. The German Ambassador in Washington has protested against the seizure and demanded the return of the papers on the ground that the office of this German agent in New York was a branch of the German Embassy and thus immune from invasion. Mr. Lansing has grimly asked the German Ambassador to specify any papers of which he demands the return, but no bill of particulars has yet been handed in, nor is it likely there will be, for all the most important documents are proof of pernicious activity on the part of German diplomatic officials, and to claim them would be an acknowledgment of a responsibility which is as yet denied. The end of this affair is not yet, and it is generally believed that the final outcome will be the recall of some of the minor German officials now in Washington. It has even been predicted that it will end in the recall of the Ambassador himself, but this is less probable. Count Bernstorff has weathered successfully many serious diplomatic gales in Washington since the war began, and it now looks as though the only

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