Egeria, Madame Krudener, ended in complete failure. It was fortunate that it did so. Success would have stereotyped despotic forms of government. It would have condemned Greece and the Balkan States to remain under the heel of Turkish misrule. It would have been fatal to the legitimate national aspirations of Italy, and had it not been prevented by the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine from crossing the Atlantic, it would have kept the South American Republics under the uncongenial sway of Spain. The sturdy common-sense of the Duke of Wellington and the statesmanship of Castlereagh, which has now received tardy and posthumous recognition from his countrymen, at once pierced through the fallacious reasoning on which the Holy Alliance was based. Great Britain very wisely decided to take no part in the Conference held at Troppau.

The Emperor of Russia, alarmed by the revolutionary tendencies of the age and, as it is generally thought, startled by the assassination of the German Kotzebue, became reactionary. The Alliance received its final coup de grâce in 1822 at the Congress of Verona. It is as well to remember these facts, for although it is certain that none of the existing democracies of the world will for a moment favor the idea of reviving the principles of the Holy Alliance, nevertheless, as I shall presently show, some of the proposals now put forward run perilously, though unwittingly, near to advocacy of international arrangements replete with defects not altogether dissimilar from those which doomed that Alliance to failure.

The question of concluding some international arrangement which will mitigate the risk of war now presents itself under very different auspices from those which obtained a century ago. During the interval democracy has advanced with giant strides. What

ever other charges can be brought against the democratic rule, it certainly cannot be said that it discourages idealism. Mr. Urquhart, in an essay on "The Causes of Modern Wars," says with great truth that although political leaders may still be moved by ambition or influenced by motives of expediency, "it is among the rank and file that the wholehearted, uncompromising idealist is to be found." There is no serious risk, at all events in this country, that the popular imagination will fail to grasp the nobility of the ideal involved in the establishment of a reign of universal peace. The danger rather lies in an opposite direction. It may well be that an exaggerated idealism will not take sufficient account of hard facts, and will thus lull the nation into a sense of false security. However this may be, the feeling is universal, both amongst theorists and practical men, that at the close of this War an earnest endeavor should be made to ensure a durable and permanent peace. Mr. Urquhart thinks that Europe should be provided with a Court of Arbitration and an European Directorate. Professor Grant, in a most instructive essay entitled "War and Peace Since 1815," bids us not to be discouraged by the failures of the past and to persevere in our endeavors to secure peace and unity. Mr. Lowes Dickinson lays down the principles which should, in his opinion, dominate the international relations of the future:

First, the nations must submit to law and to right in the settlement of their disputes.

Secondly, they must reserve force for the coercion of the law-breaker, and that implies that they should construct rules to determine who the law-breaker is.

Mr. Lowes Dickinson adds, with an optimism which I cannot but think is somewhere excessive. "In con

structing machinery of this kind there

is no intellectual difficulty greater

than that which has confronted every attempt every where to substitute order for force." The intellectual difficulty may not be very great, but the subsequent remarks made by Mr. Lowes Dickinson to the effect that "the difficulty is moral, and lies in the habits, passions, and wills of men" suffices to show that the problem to be solved is not mainly intellectual. These are but instances which indicate the views now current amongst political thinkers on this all-important question. It would be easy to multiply them.

In dealing with the practical issues involved in the solution of this problem, it must not be forgotten that, simultaneously with an approach to the international treatment of political questions, a strong sympathy for the enforcement of the principle of Nationality has been evoked in all democratic countries. The question at once arises whether the two principles are antagonistic or the reverse. The answer depends largely on the circumstances connected with each specific case. It is clear that in some cases they may be made to harmonize, neither would it appear that in any case they are necessarily and irretrievably antagonistic. It is true, as has often been pointed out, that nationalities may be as ambitious and as despotic as dynastic rulers. The present relations between the German people and their rulers testify to the truth of this statement. Both, so far as can be judged, are equally aggressive and beilicose. At the same time, inasmuch as many of the wars of the past have been caused by the assertion of the nationalistic principle, it would appear probable that the general recognition and acceptance of that principle would make for peace. The difficulty lies in the application. When John Stuart Mill laid down that "It is in general a

necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of Governments should coincide in the main with those of nationality," he was obviously far from covering the whole ground. Professor Grant is justified in saying that "Nationalist movements cut right across State boundaries. . . . There must be States which do not correspond with the boundaries of any one nationality.” Mr. Urquhart adds that the National Principle "cannot provide a final solution of international problems." Mr. Urquhart's view will probably be found to hold good even if the National Principle is diluted by Federalism, which is the remedy now generally proposed, and which, if I rightly understand what appears to me the somewhat involved and obscure reasoning of Lord Acton, also found favor with that high authority on historical and political questions.

Various suggestions have recently been put forward with a view to securing the maintenance of that peace for which the whole world, with the possible exception of the Prussian Junkers, is yearning. That the whole subject will have to be seriously discussed at the close of the present War is certain. Not only every moralist and avowed pacificist, but every reasonable man who can scarcely be comprised in either of these two categories, calls loudly on the combined statesmanship of Europe and America to consider whether some plan cannot be devised to guarantee the world against the recurrence of any such catastrophe as that of which we are now spectators. As a preliminary to the discussion which must eventually ensue, it will be profitable to consider briefly the merits and demerits of the various remedies to which public attention has been drawn. If, in the following remarks, I appear to criticise rather than to propose any alternative plan, I beg that it will not be assumed that I am lukewarm

in the cause of peace, or that I do not recognize the validity of many of the general principles which have been advocated. But the mere assertion of general principles will not carry us far. It is essential to consider the possibility of their application. It is only by allowing full weight to the obstacles which militate against success, that some real progress towards the desired end may possibly be made.

In the first place, attention may be drawn to a proposal advanced in a very able article which appeared in the June number of the Round Table. It is to the following effect:

The essential thing is not the creation of a World-Parliament or a WorldGovernment, but obedience to clearly defined principles of justice which should govern the conduct of States to one another, and the establishment of such principles can be begun by co-operative means. If all the civilized nations were willing to define the elementary rights of nations, to embody them in a series of treaties, to meet from time to time to amend them to suit changing conditions, and to bind themselves not only to respect the law as established by treaties themselves, but to use their whole strength against any people which forcibly infringed it without submitting its case to the review of the International Conference itself, the root of Armageddon would have been destroyed and the foundations of a new world would have been laid.

The first part of this proposalnamely, the suggestion that the civilized nations should meet together and define the elementary rights of nations, is manifestly reasonable and, in spite of the enormous difficulties which the solution of this question presents, possibly practical. It is an essential preliminary which must precede the adoption of any further measures. Some advantage would, indeed, be gained if nothing more than this were

done. If the civilized Powers of the world could agree with something approaching to precision as to what elementary rights nations possess, a first step would be taken to reconstitute the now almost lifeless body of International Law, and some standard would be erected, by which it would be possible to judge whether that law had been violated, and who was responsible for its violation. A further step would have been taken if it were found possible to embody these elementary rights in a series of treaties. But the real difficulty of dealing with the matter arises when it is proposed that all the treaty Powers should use "their whole strength" against the convicted violator or violators. It will be observed that the writer in the Round Table only proposes that coercion should be applied if an infringement of treaty rights takes place without the case having been previously "submitted to the review of the International Conference." He does not state what is to happen if, after the Conference has pronounced its judgment, one or other of the contending parties refuses to abide by its decision, and this contingency may not improbably occur. Moreover, an important variant of this proposal is advocated by others. It has been frequently suggested that the Conference or Court of Arbitration should have an International army and navy placed at its disposal in order to enforce respect for its decisions. This, in fact, is the logical outcome of any scheme having for its object the complete assertion of international supremacy over national tendencies and aspirations.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the serious nature of the obstacles which will have to be encountered before practical effect can be given to this program. In the first place, it involves the adoption of the wholly novel principle that, in dealing with