sense. And it is self-acting. And this difference is in the very respect which is the ground of controversy. We think, therefore, that all arguments and illustrations drawn from the analogy between action and motion should be abandoned where the discussion is upon that point where the analogy fails.

The chapter in Mr. Bledsoe's book on the connection of the foreknowledge of God with necessity, has been termed by the writer in the Princeton Review, to whom we have already alluded, as a "curiosity." If by this epithet it is meant that the chapter referred to contains new and important views on the subject of necessity, we agree with the writer. But if anything disrespectful, either to Mr. Bledsoe or his views, is intended, we differ from the reviewer entirely.

Let us then look into the argument of Edwards and the reply of Mr. Bledsoe. The former proves, by the most irresistible reasoning, that the foreknowledge of any future event proves the necessity of that event. In other words, an event cannot be foreknown unless it be actually and necessarily certain that the event will take place. Because if the event were not certain, the foreknowledge of it would not be certain, and to that extent would not, in a proper sense, be foreknowledge. Against this reasoning nothing can be urged successfully. Up to this point Mr. Bledsoe and President Edwards agree. But the latter proceeds further. After stating the different ways in which things may be necessary, as either necessary in themselves, or necessary by consequence, &c., he infers that unless an event is caused by something which is not contingent, the event itself would be contingent; if contingent, then it might or might not happen, and that foreknowledge predicated on it would be uncertain and contingent. To this Mr. Bledsoe has answered, that foreknowledge implies the necessity of the event; but implies nothing as to its cause. He considers the foreknowledge of a future event, as in the same condition as present knowledge of a present event; that as present knowledge of a present event can exist without any reference to the cause of that event, so divine foreknowledge of a future event may exist without any reference to its cause.

This idea is worthy of being followed into greater detail. Edwards takes it for granted that foreknowledge cannot subsist without evidence or proof: that there can be no evidence of a future event which is contingent, and consequently no foreknowledge of that event. But as foreknowledge is supposed, and that foreknowledge must be grounded on evidence, and the cause which produces an event is the only proper evidence of such future event, therefore

the cause must itself be certain. Now, the fundamental error here is in supposing that the divine foreknowledge is founded in evidence or proof. It is in taking for granted that the prescience of the Deity is arrived at in the same way, and by the same means, as what we may, perhaps, call the foreknowledge of man: that it is a conclusion derived from reasoning. If, for instance, I know that in the year 1854 there will be an eclipse of the sun, I know it, not because the fact is now present to my view, but because it is the necessary consequence of an unbroken of mathematical process reasoning. To my knowledge of this future event, the reasoning of Edwards is perfectly applicable. But to God all things, past, present, or to come, are distinctly in view. To him the knowledge of the eclipse is not the result of a process of reasoning. The event itself is before him. To be sure, the causes and connections are also present to his omniscient sight, but not as the ground of foreknowledge of the event with which they are connected; but simply because the Almighty sees all things "in presenti." It is idle to say that He cannot foreknow without evidence, if by evidence is meant anything else than a full view of the event itself, without any reference whatever to its cause. God sees the thing itself in futurity, just as we see that which is before us. It is not faith, but sight. It is not inference, but experience.

But we think that the reasoning of President Edwards on this subject is obnoxious to one of two very serious objections. It either reduces volitions to the quality of divine decrees, or else it is liable to Edwards' favorite objection of an infinite number of causes. His argument is, that no contingent event (that is, no event which has not a cause) can be foreknown, because its contingency implies a possibility that it might not happen; which is against the supposi tion that it is foreknown. If then the event is necessary, the cause is necessary; for, as Edwards says, that which necessarily connected with something else which is necessary, must itself be necessary. The cause then is necessary. But if the cause is necessary, that cannot be contingent, but must itself be caused by something else which is also necessary. And so on for an infinite series of causes, unless we arrive at the first cause emanating from the bosom of the Deity. Now, without going further, and inquiring whether Edwards' theory of infinite causes could be still further applied to the volitions of the Almighty, (which we think would be the case,) we have the objection to offer, that the doctrine would comprehend the most rigid system of fatalism. A volition of the Deity is the producing cause of an event, which is itself the cause of something else, and so on; every successive step in which succession

of events is fixed, certain, necessary, until we reach the produced volitions of man. The last link in the chain is dependent on that which preceded it; and without it could never have had existence, or at least necessary, and therefore certain, existence: that event in its turn is dependent on another going before, until you come to the great first cause, in the mind of God, upon which this whole chain depends and without which, and without its being just such as it is, no one of the successive effects would have been the same! Would the event be more certain, would the volition have been less free, if the same voice that said, "Let there be light, and light was," had called forth that volition without the intermediate steps which we have supposed? Could fatalism bind more rigidly the will, the actions, the destiny, of man?

But the writer from whom we have quoted proceeds still further, and says: "He (Mr. Bledsoe) acknowledges the absolute certainty of all events, as foreknown, and admits that there is some kind of necessity that they should come to pass. And Edwards' argument requires nothing more. The unfortunate use of the word 'necessity,' by Edwards and his followers, has done more to prejudice the minds of sensible men against his system, than all other causes. According to the proper usage of language, liberty and necessity are diametrically opposite; and to say a thing is necessary, and at the same time free, is a contradiction in terms. Certainty and necessity are not the same; for, although everything necessary is certain, everything certain is not necessary. Volitions, in certain given circumstances, may be as certain as any physical effects; but volitions are free, in their very nature. A necessary volition is an absurdity, a thing inconceivable." Now, in this passage the writer concedes everything that the views of Mr. Bledsoe demand, though we think that they do not properly represent the views of President Edwards. It is true that the former" acknowledges the absolute certainty of all events, as foreknown;" but it is not true, we humbly conceive, that "Edwards' argument requires nothing more." The latter certainly goes much further, and infers FROM the certainty of foreknown events, that they must be NECESSARY, in the strictest sense of the word. For (as we have before seen) he contends that "it is impossible for a thing to be certainly foreknown to any intellect, without evidence ;"-that "no understandevidence;"—that ing can see evidence where there is none;"—that "if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely without evidence." Now, in what sense is the phrase, "without all necessity," here used? Not to signify the certainty of the happening of the event;

for that would make nonsense. That would be to make President Edwards mean that an event which was not certain, could not be foreknown to be certain, WITHOUT EVIDENCE. Such was not the meaning of Edwards. He meant this-and the reasoning would be perfectly sound so far as human foreknowledge, if we may so speak, is concerned—that admitting the event to be certain, it could not be foreknown to be certain, without evidence. And if the event. did not depend on something else as a cause, and this cause did not appear to the prescient, then there was no evidence to him upon which to found foreknowledge of the event, notwithstanding it might be certain.

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We might extend this article to a much greater length, but that it would be tedious to those who have not read the "Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry," and useless to those who have. We would, however, take the opportunity of making a remark or two on the use which Mr. Edwards makes of the terms, "ground," reason of," "occasion," &c. For instance: "Nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause or some antecedent ground or reason why it then begins to be." "Nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is," &c. The terms here used are perfectly familiar to us, and we have a perfectly distinct idea of the proposition into which they are introduced. And yet there is fallacy in the use that is made of them in President Edwards' Inquiry, and more especially in the writings of his disciples. If the terms, "ground," "reason," " occasion," &c., are used with reference to matter, they are either most absurdly misapplied, or else must be intended to convey the identical idea contained in the strictest sense of the term "cause." For to say that force is the reason of motion in that which has no reasoning faculty, or the occasion of motion in that which cannot perceive any fitness of opportunity, would be foolishness. And yet such are the only significations in which those terms can be used with meaning, unless we mean by them that force is the "producing cause" of motion. Will it be said that the withdrawal of the sun as the occasion, rather than the cause, of darkness and of cold, would better illustrate the meaning-that by occasion is meant a "negative," rather than a "positive cause?" To this we answer, that we know no such thing in the world as a "negative cause." It is a contradiction in terms. It is a solecism in ideas. The very essence of causality is positiveness. But the very instances adduced do not in the least support the form of expression. Darkness and cold are not effects in the connection, at least, in which they are here used. They are states or conditions of being. The sun, which is a posi

tive cause, produces light and heat. When the cause of light and heat is withdrawn the effects cease; the prior state, or condition, which had been overcome and changed by an active cause, is restored. But we have said that the terms, "reason," "occasion," &c., are misapplied, when used with reference to matter, if they do not contain the strict signification of the term "cause." We now remark that these terms are equally misapplied, when used in relation to intelligent beings, if they do include that signification. There is something in the very terms themselves, and in their applicability only to beings endowed with the power of perception, as well as the ability for action, which would at once seem to denote a difference between a produced effect and an induced act; something which would imply, that the same language that would be proper to designate the connection between material agency and its effects, would not be proper to designate the connection between an act and an inducement to do it, where there is an intermediate agent, viz., the mind; which may perceive the inducement, and then act or not act. For to say that the "reason,' ground," or "occasion," for any particular volition, is strictly the cause of that volition, is the same as to say that the reason or ground why, or the occasion when, a thing should be done, is that which actually does that particular thing. But we are conscious that such is not the case. For it is the mind which wills, and not the ground or reason presented to it. It is the man who acts, and not the occasion which is offered for acting.

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The very idea of a "ground" or "reason" in view of the mind, supposes the mind to take cognizance of it, to weigh it as a ground or reason, to decide upon it, to act upon it. It supposes an agentan umpire. In short, it supposes that very thing to exist, the absence of which would render it necessary to employ the terms, when applied to matter, either with an absurd meaning, or else with the meaning of causality.

The style in which Mr. Bledsoe's book is written must commend itself to all. It is certainly clear, forcible, and without redundancy. The author from beginning to end evidently had his subject, and not its dress and ornaments, in his mind. The consequence is, that his language is made to convey, without any mistiness, his thoughts; and his illustrations, always good, are themselves arguments. Some may, perhaps, think that Mr. Bledsoe's work might have been more condensed without any injury to its effect. It is difficult, however, to fix on any standard, in this respect, for a treatise on a metaphysical topic addressed to men of different mental strength, education, and means of obtaining what may have been previously writ