ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Editor of the Biblical Repertory, feels himself called upon, to state to his subscribers, the reasons of the great delay which has occured in the publication of the late numbers. They are already aware, that the failure of the Printing establishment, threw the April number, upwards of two months too late. This, consequently, put off the July number so late, that Professor Patton, who was at that time particularly engaged, thought it best to let it lie until the Editor should return, and take charge of the work himself. When the Editor reached home, he found that the whole of the July num ber, was yet to be printed; he immediately made arrangements to have the work put to press, and it has been got out as expeditiously as circumstances would permit. The last number for this year is already in press, and will be published with all possible expedition.

It is the intention of the Editor, to commence a new series of the work with the first number of the coming year. The plan will not be essentially changed, but so far modified as to adapt it to a larger class of readers. Arrangements have been made for the regular reception of German, French, and English theological Journals, and other means adopted to secure information on the various departments of theolo gical literature. Mr. Joseph Addison Alexander will hereafter, be associated with the present Editor, in the superintendence of the publication. The qualifications of this gentleman for the task, are such as to secure the confidence of all who have the pleasure of knowing him. To him all communications respecting the Repertory after the completion of the present volume, are to be addressed. All pay ments for the present and previous volumes, are to be made to Messrs. G. & C. Carvill, New-York; but subsequently to Mr. J. A. Alexander, Princeton, New-Jersey.

The subscription price of the work will be reduced from 4 dollars to 3, if paid within the first six months of the year, and forwarded in any way free of expense to Mr. Alexander.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

The intimate connexion between Philosophy and Theology, and the decided influence which the one has always exercised over the other, renders it impossible that those who are interested in the history of the latter, should be indifferent to that of the former. It is with confidence, therefore, that we present our readers with a view, drawn by an able hand, of the Philosophy of Kant. The influence which this system, has had upon religious opinion in Germany, is so obvious, that it forms even for the Theologian one of the most necessary and interesting chapters in the history of the last half century. It is true that this system, reared with so much labor, pronounced perfect and indestructible by its author and advocates, now lies in ruins. From one end of Germany to the other, there is scarcely a man of eminence to be found, who will acknowledge himself a disciple of Kant. It is in its general influence and in its scattered principles, which have worked their way into the public mind, that its real effect is now to be sought. The view given of this system by Professor Stapfer, is perhaps more favourable, than the pious and distinguished author would, at this day present. He doubtless, however, considers it as on the whole the most favourable to religion, and the truths of the Gospel, among ali the systems which have hitherto appeared. But the fact that it has made way for, and been at least the indirect means of introducing the pantheistical systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, must create a great distrust as to the soundness of some of its fundamental principles. That any evil can arise in our country from the principles or writings of Kant, there is little reason to apprehend. The obscurity arising from its peculiar terminology, which came well nigh consigning his system to oblivion, in its native land, would of itself constitute

no inconsiderable obstacle to its progress. And besides this, there is such a difference between the German and English character, that what is demonstration for the one, is no proof for the other. The Germans say that the English are deficient in profoundness; and the English, the Germans in sound judgment. And hence a system which may make great progress among the former, may make none at all among the latter. And it would really seem to be a moral impossibility ever to make an Englishman (and of course an American) profound enough to see the truth or reason of many of the systems, more or less prevalent in this country. The Eng lishman is happily, generally willing to stop at the first incomprehensible truth which he comes to, without attempting to deny or explain it. The German undertakes to go further, and explain every difficulty, which only results (at least in the opinion of the Englishman), in his increasing the number.

The reader will see a striking illustration of this remark in what follows. That every effect must have a cause, is for Reid, a primary truth: he says, he cannot help believing it, the constitution of our nature forcing us to admit it. But Kant will explain, and denies that this appeal to consciousness, is a sufficient answer to the sceptic who denies the truth in question. For this purpose, he has recourse to a theory, which involves the denial of what every man, who is not a philosopher, holds to be true; and at last in his turn comes to an ultimate fact, which he is forced to admit on its own evidence. It is not wonderful, therefore, that Fichte should say to Kant, what Kant says to Reid, you have no right to assume as an ultimate fact, what you cannot prove, you cannot stop short in your career, it is the philosopher's business to explain every thing. Reid would say that the constitution of our nature forces us to believe, that external things are not only real existences, but that they exist in forms independent of our manner of perceiving them. Kant says, this is stopping

too soon; the ultimate fact is merely that things exist, their forms, are only our manner of perception. Fichte says the same to Kant, and maintains that the things themselves as well as their forms exist only in our minds, his ultimate fact is that the infinite all comprehending principle exists, and stops no where until he arrives at absolute pantheistical Idealism, and even here, it would seem, that he is on precisely the same ground with the Scottish philosopher, whom he has left so far behind. For how does he know that the infinite (das Unendliche) the wav or ov, or by whatever name it may be called, has a real existence. He can certainly give no other answer, than that he cannot help believing it, that the constitution of his nature forces him to it, that the contrary is absurd, but this is precisely what the unphilisophical Reid says at the outset, in behalf of common sense. Little danger can be expected from any system which calls upon us to deny a fact of consciousness, it is impossible that it should succeed in stemming the stream of the whole world. There is another safeguard in the English character, against the prevalence of systems which of late have had more or less sway in Germany, and which may be assumed without exposing ourselves to the charge of undue national partiality, and that is, that the English have greater reverence for moral truth. They prefer being inconsequent, rather than denying the first principles of morals, and hence are not likely to admit principles, which have led so many German philosophers to maintain that sin is not a moral evil, that it is mere limitation, a necessary con- . dition, &c.; and that every thing which is, is morally good. No one will suppose, we mean to give a general remark, an universal individual application. There are thousands of Germans to whom such principles are an abhorrence, and there are thousands of Englishmen, who, perhaps would find no difficulty in admitting them. Still the characteristic dif ference exists, and is indeed admitted by the Germans themselves.

The view of the Philosophy of Kant, which is here presented, is much the most simple and intelligible, which we have seen, and will easily be understood by an attentive reader. He may, indeed, take offence at some terms, which are used in rather an unusual sense; but this difficulty could not well be avoided. The style in the original (and much more perhaps in the translation) is somewhat involved. Professor Stapfer is a native of one of the German cantons of Switzerland, and hence his French has something of a German character. But as his ideas are perspicuous, and have passed completely through his own mind, it is hoped, that even under the disadvantage of a translation, he will be easily understood.

Berlin, Feb. 1828,