ment of all the lawful judges, assembled in councils,' and in the opinion of most of the Christian by-standers, yet by his cunning insinuation, he planted such an opinion of his idol's deity and self-sufficiency in the hearts of divers, that to this day it could never be rooted out.

Now after the decease of his Pelagian worshippers, some of the corrupter schoolmen, seeing of him thus from his birth exposed without shelter to wind and weather, to all assaults, out of mere charity and self-love built him a temple, and adorned it with natural lights, merits, uncontrolled independent operations, with many other gay attendances. But in the beginning of the reformation, that fatal time for idolatry and superstition, together with abbeys and monasteries, the zeal and learning of our forefathers, with the help of God's word, demolished this temple, and brake this building down to the ground; in the rubbish whereof we well hoped the idol himself had been so deeply buried, as that his head should never more have been exalted to the trouble of the church of God; until not long since, some curious wits, whose weak stomachs were clogged with manna, and loathed the sincere milk of the word, raking all dunghills for novelties, lighted unhappily upon this idol; and presently, with no less joy than did the mathematician at the discovery of a new geometrical proportion, exclaim, We have found it, we have found it! and without more ado, up they erected a shrine, and until this day continue offering of praise and thanks for all the good they do to this work of their own hands.

And that the idol may be free from ruin, to which in himself they have found by experience that he is subject, they have matched him to contingency, a new goddess of their own creation; who, having proved very fruitful in

• Dixit Pelagius, quis est mihi Augustinus? Universi acclamabant blasphemantem in episcopum, ex cujus ore, dominus universæ Africæ, unitatis indulserit felicitatem, non solum a conventu illo, sed ab omni ecclesia pellendum. Oros. Apologet. pag. 621. de Synod. Palest. Præ omnibus studium gerite libros. S. August. quos ad Prosp. et Hilar. scripsit, memoratis fratribus legendos ingerere, &c. Epist. Synod. Byzac..

Imo noverunt, non solum Romanam Africanamque ecclesiam, sed per omnes mundi partes, universæ promissionis filios, cum doctrina hujus viri, sicut in tota fide, ita in gratiæ confessione congruere. Prosp. ad Ruffin. Augustinum sauctæ recordationis virum pro vita sua, et meritis, in nostra communione semper habuimus, nec un quam hunc sinistræ suspitionis saltem rumor suspexit. Cœlest. Epist. ad Gal. Episcop. These I have cited to shew what a heavy prejudice the Arminian cause lies under, being professedly opposite to the doctrine of S. Austin, and they continually slighting of his authority.

monstrous births, upon their conjunctions, they nothing doubt they shall ever want one to set on the throne and make president of all human actions: so that after he hath with various success, at least twelve hundred years, contended with the providence and grace of God, he boasteth now as if he had obtained a total victory. But yet all his prevailing is to be attributed to the diligence and varnish of his new abettors, with (to our shame be it spoken) the negligence of his adversaries: in him and his cause there is no more real worth than was, when by the ancient fathers he was exploded and cursed out of the church: so that they, who can attain through the many winding labyrinths of curious distinctions to look upon the thing itself, shall find that they have been like Egyptian novices, brought through many stately frontispieces and goodly fabrics, with much show of zeal and devotion, to the image of an ugly ape.

Yet here observe, that we do not absolutely oppose freewill as if it were nomen inane, a mere figment, when there is no such thing in the world; but only in that sense the Pelagians and Arminians do assert it. About words we will not contend: we grant man, in the substance of all his actions, as much power, liberty and freedom, as a mere created nature is capable of. We grant him to be free in his choice, from all outward coaction, or inward natural necessity, to work according to election and deliberation, spontaneously embracing what seemeth good unto him. Now call this power, free-will, or what you please; so you make it not supreme, independent, and boundless, we are not at all troubled. The imposition of names, depends upon the discretion of their inventors. Again, even in spiritual things we deny that our wills are at all debarred, or deprived of, their proper liberty; but here we say indeed, that we are not properly free until the Son makes us free. No great use of freedom in that wherein we can do nothing at all: we do not claim such a liberty as should make us despise the grace of God, whereby we may attain true liberty indeed, which addeth to, but taketh nothing from, our original freedom. But of this, after I have shewed what an idol the Arminians make of free-will, only take notice in the entrance, that we speak of it now, not as it was at first by Homo non libertate gratiam, sed gratia libertatem, assequitur. Aug.

God created, but as it is now by sin corrupted; yet being considered in that estate also, they ascribe more unto it than it was ever capable of. As it now standeth, according to my formerly proposed method, I shall shew; First, what inbred native virtue they ascribe unto it, and with how absolute a dominion and sovereignty, over all our actions, they endow it. Secondly, what power they say it hath in preparing us for the grace of God. Thirdly, how effectually operative it is in receiving the said grace; and with how little help thereof it accomplisheth the great work of our conversion: all briefly, with so many observations as shall suffice to discover their proud errors in each particular.

'Herein, saith Arminius, consisteth the liberty of the will, that all things required to enable it to will any thing being accomplished, it still remains indifferent to will, or not.' And all of them at the synod; 'There is," say they, 'accompanying the will of man, an inseparable property, which we call liberty, from whence the will is termed a power:' which, when all things pre-required as necessary to operation are fulfilled, may will any thing, or not will it; that is, our free-wills have such an absolute and uncontrollable power, in the territory of all human actions, that no influence of God's providence, no certainty of his decree, no unchangeableness of his purpose, can sway it at all in its free determinations, or have any power with his highness, to cause him to will, or resolve, on any such act as God by him intendeth to produce. Take an instance, in the great work of our conversion: All unregenerate men,” saith Arminius, have, by virtue of their free-will, a power of resisting the Holy Spirit, of rejecting the offered grace of God, of contemning the counsel of God concerning themselves; of refusing the gospel of grace, of not opening the heart to him that knocketh.' What a stout idol is this, whom neither the Holy Spirit, the grace and counsel of God, the calling

h Libertas Arbitrii consistit in eo, quod homo, positis omnibus requisitis ad volendum, indifferens tamen sit, ad volendum vel nolendum hoc vel illud. Armin. art. perpend. pag. 11.

i Voluntatem comitatur proprietas quædam inseparabilis, quam libertatem vocamus: a qua voluntas dicitur, potentia quæ positis omnibus prærequisitis ad agendum necessariis, potest velle, et nolle aut velle et non velle. Remon. in act. Synod. pag. 16.

Omnes irregeniti habent Lib. Arbit. et potentiam Spiritui Sancto resistendi; gratiam Dei oblatam repudiandi, consilium Dei adversus se contemnendi, evangelium gratiæ repudiandi, ei qui cor pulsat non aperiendo. Armin. artic. perpend.

of the gospel, the knocking at the door of the heart, can mové at all, or in the least measure prevail against him. Woe be unto us then, if when God calls us, our free-will be not in good temper, and well disposed to hearken unto him: for it seems there is no dealing with it by any other ways, though powerful and almighty. For grant," saith Corvinus, all the operations of grace which God can use in our conversion, yet conversion remaineth so in our own free power, that we can be not converted; that is, we can either turn or not turn ourselves:' where the idol plainly challengeth the Lord to work his utmost, and tells him, that after he hath so done, he will do what he please; his infallible prescience, his powerful predetermination, the moral efficacy of the gospel, the infusion of grace, the effectual operation of the Holy Spirit, all are nothing; not at all available in helping or furthering our independent wills in their proceedings. Well, then, in what estate will you have the idol placed? 'InTM such a one, wherein he may be suffered to sin, or to do well at his pleasure,' as the same author intimates. It seems then, as to sin, so nothing is required for him to be able to do good but God's permission? No! For the Remonstrants" (as they speak of themselves)'do always suppose a free power of obeying, or not obeying, as well in those who do obey, as in those who do not obey:' that he that is obedient, may therefore be counted obedient, because he obeyeth, when he could not obey; and so on the contrary; where all the praise of our obedience, whereby we are made to differ from others, is ascribed to ourselves alone, and that free power that is in us. Now this they mean, not of any one act of obedience, but of faith itself, and the whole consummation thereof. For if a man should say, that every man in the world. hath a power of believing if he will, and of attaining salvation, and that this power is settled in his nature, what ar

1 Positis omnibus operationibus gratiæ, quibus Deus in conversione nostri uti possit, manet tamen conversio ita in nostra potestate libera, ut possimus non converti, hoc est, nosmet ipsos convertere vel non convertere. Cor. ad Bog. pag. 263.

m Non potest Deus Lib. Arbit. integrum servare, nisi tam peccare hominem sineret, quam bene agere. Corvin. ad Molin. cap. 6.

Semper Remonstrantes supponunt liberam obediendi potentiam, et non obediendi; ut qui obediens est idcirco obediens censeatur, quia cum possit non obedire obedit tamen, et e contra. Rem. Apol. p. 70.

Quod si quis dicat omnes in universum homines, habere potentiam credendi si relint, et salutem consequendi: et hanc potentiam esse naturæ hominum divinitus collatam, quo tao argumento eum confutabis? Armin. Antip. pag. 272.

gument have you to confute him,' saith Arminius triumphantly to Perkins.

Where the sophistical innovator as plainly confounds grace and nature, as ever did Pelagius. That then, which the Arminians claim here in behalf of their free-will, is an absolute independence on God's providence, in doing any thing, and of his grace, in doing that which is good. A self-sufficiency in all its operations, a plenary indifferency of doing what we will, this, or that, as being neither determined to the one, nor inclined to the other, by any overruling influence from heaven; so, that the good acts of our wills have no dependance on God's providence as they are acts, nor on his grace as they are good; but in both regards proceed from such a principle within us, as is no way moved by any superior agent. Now the first of these we deny unto our wills, because they are created; and the second, because they are corrupted: their creation hinders them from doing any thing of themselves without the assistance of God's providence, and their corruption, of doing any thing that is good without his grace. A self-sufficiency for operation, without the effectual motion of Almighty God, the first cause of all things, we can allow neither to men, nor angels, unless we intend to make them gods; and a power of doing good, equal unto that they have of doing evil, we must not grant to man by nature, unless we will deny the fall of Adam, and fancy ourselves still in paradise; but let us consider these things apart.

First, I shall not stand to decipher the nature of human liberty, which perhaps would require a larger discourse than my proposed method will bear it may suffice, that according to my former intimation, we grant as large a freedom and dominion to our wills over their own acts, as a creature subject to the supreme rule of God's providence is capable of; endued we are with such a liberty of will, as is free from all outward compulsion and inward necessity, having an elective faculty of applying itself unto that which seems good unto it, in which it is a free choice, notwithstanding it is subservient to the decree of God, as I shewed before; chap. iv. Most free it is in all its acts, both in regard of the object it chooseth, and in regard of that vital power and faculty whereby it worketh; infallibly comply