it communicates the impression which belonged to it in its entire state. In this there is no deception, because the nerve which originally intimated pain in the toe, is affected in the same manner as it was when the toe existed. In like manner the liver itself possesses little sensibility, but the phrenic nerve which is ramified on it communicates with the shoulder, and the nerve being highly sensitive, is affected by the state of the liver, and produces pain in the shoulder. The nerve in this case is really affected, and the pain is the correct indication of its state. It is the office of Causality to discover the causes of these affections, Consciousness being limited to the intimation of the sensations themselves. Every derangement of an organ of sensation or perception is accompanied with disorder of Consciousness to a corresponding extent: Thus, in jaundice, the mind has consciousness of all objects being yellow; in cases like that of Miss S. L., detailed on p. 504, there is consciousness of disturbed equilibrium; but Causality refers these perceptions to diseases as their causes. When the derangement embraces the organs of Causality themselves, the power of discriminating the impression to be diseased is lost, and insanity is established.

It would be of much practical utility to teach individuals the dependence of Consciousness on the states of the mental organs; as a means of inducing them, when under morbid excitement, to distrust their own impressions, and seek relief from sensible advisers. In the present system of education, the connexion of the feelings and intellect with material organs, is so totally overlooked, and every emotion and perception is represented as so purely mental, that when these become exalted or disordered, it is extremely difficult to enable the individual to comprehend how they can be delusive, or in any way affected by corporeal conditions ; and hence he suffers much uneasiness in secret; avoids recourse to a physician; persists in acting on his morbid impressions, as if they were sound; till at last disease is permanently established, which, under more enlightened guid

ance, might easily have been averted, or cut short at its

commencement.

It is extremely difficult to determine whether the feeling. of personal Identity indicated by the pronoun I is connected with a particular organ, or the result of the general action of the whole organs. The reader is referred to what is said on this subject on p. 107, 237, and 433.

ATTENTION is not a faculty of the mind, but consists merely in the application of the Knowing or Reflecting Faculties to their objects. Thus the faculty of Tune, excited by melody, attends to notes; the faculty of Causality, addressed by a demonstration, attends to the steps of the argument; and the other faculties of the intellect, in like manner, attend to their various objects. Concentrativeness gives continuity to the impressions of the faculties, Individuality and Eventuality direct them to their objects, and Firmness maintains them in a state of application, and these greatly aid Attention; but still attention, in itself, is a mere act of the different intellectual faculties, and not the attribute of any particular power, established exclusively for its production.

ASSOCIATION. The metaphysicians have endeavoured, by reflecting on their own consciousness, to discover universal laws, by which the succession of ideas in mankind in general is regulated. They imagine our thoughts to follow each other in established orders, and have attempted to find out the circumstances which determine these orders, and the causes in virtue of which one idea introduces another into the mind. Such an attempt appears to me to be futile, and incompatible with success. Suppose that we wished to ascertain the laws by which the succession of notes emitted by an Æolian harp is regulated, we should first endeavour to discover the causes which produced them. Similar causes, acting in similar circumstances, produce similar effects; but if we vary

one circumstance out of a thousand, we cannot calculate on the result. Now, the causes which determine the succession of notes from an Æolian harp are, the structure of the harp; the impetus of the air; the order in which it excites the various strings. Render all these circumstances the same in the case of every harp, and the same succession of notes may be assuredly predicted. But if the air, that emblem of inconstancy, will not blow twice with the same force on the same spot in a month, or will not excite the same strings twice in the same order of succession in a year; and if no two Eolian harps can be made in every particular of string, form, and substance, alike,—who, by observing the notes arising from one harp, will succeed in unfolding the laws by which the succession of notes from Æolian harps in general may be determined, whatever their size, structure, and number of strings, and the circumstances in which they may be placed? This illustration is completely applicable to the case of the human faculties. Ideas are affections of these, just as notes are affections of the strings of the harp. Ideas arise from impressions on the various faculties of the mind; and there is as little regularity in the order in which they are received, as in the breathing of the air on the strings. And, lastly, if harps may vary in structure, human beings do positively differ in the relative strength of their powers. Hence the same impressions must produce very different effects, or introduce very different ideas into minds so dissimilarly constituted; and how, amid such a countless variety of causes, can similarity of effects be expected?

If we place a number of persons on a hill-top, say Arthur Seat, overlooking a champaign country, and the sea, and bid each declare his thoughts;—we shall find that one, with Ideality predominant, will think of the magnificence of nature, the boundless extent of the ocean, the vastness of the mountains; and on recalling the scene, these ideas and emotions will be associated with it in his mind: another, with great Causality and Constructiveness, and little Ide

ality, will admire the skill which he sees displayed in farming the fields, and in constructing the houses and the ships: one, with Benevolence large, will think of the happiness enjoyed by the people who inhabit the plain: another, with Acquisitiveness active, will think how the various branches of industry will pay; and one, with a strong Veneration, will probably take occasion to admire the greatness and goodness of God. Now, the metaphysician expects to find out laws, by which, on Arthur Seat being afterwards mentioned, in the presence of these individuals, we may be able to tell the train of thoughts which it will introduce into their several minds; and he hopes to arrive at this result, by studying the train which arises in his own mind, on the hill being referred to as an object of thought. Such an expectation must necessarily be futile. Each of the individuals supposed would, on the mention of the hill, experience a train of ideas corresponding to the first impressions which he received on the top, and nothing can be more dissimilar than these. As well, therefore, to use the words of an ingenious phrenologist, may we expect, by studying the forms and hues of the clouds, which flit along the sky to-day, to be able to discover laws, by which their succession will be regulated to-morrow: as, by reflecting on the ideas which pass in one mind, to discover links of association, by which ideas in the minds of mankind in general will be uniformly connected, and introduced in a determinate succession.

Although, however, it is in vain to expect to find any law or principle regulating the association of one idea with another, the mutual influence of organs by association is determinate. There are also natural associations betwixt certain external objects and the internal faculties: and, lastly, artificial associations may be formed betwixt objects and the feelings of the mind; and the laws which regulate these constitute certain knowledge, and are interesting to be known. Let us, therefore, inquire briefly into these laws of association.

In the first place, we are able to perform anew, when we wish to do so, any voluntary motion which we have performed before. This shews that the nerves of motion are so associated or connected with the organs of the mind, as to be at the command of the will.

In the second place, by conceiving an object in distress, we can raise the emotion of pity in the mind; by conceiving a splendid scene in nature, we can excite the emotion of sublimity and beauty produced by Ideality; by reading a terrific story, we are able to experience the chilling emotions of fear creeping along the nerves. These facts point out a close connexion betwixt the organs of Intellect and the organs of the different propensities and sentiments. Indeed, in the dissection of the brain, the closest relation betwixt its different parts is perceived, combined with arrangements for separate functions; but this is connexion rather than association.

Farther, Mr SCOTT, in his "Observations on Phrenology,” has pointed out, in a very ingenious manner, the beautiful association, in point of arrangement, of the organs, for the purposes of mutual assistance in their action. "When I began," says he, "to consider the schedule or map presented to us by Drs GALL and SPURZHEIM, I could at first see none of this beauty in it. In looking over their list of powers, I could observe no order or connexion between them. The whole presented to me a rude appearance, quite different, as I then thought, from what is commonly found in nature. After a more attentive consideration, however, light began to dawn upon me, and, beginning to consider the faculties. in a certain way, and to group them after a certain order, the whole gradually formed themselves before me into a system of surprising symmetry; and, like the disjointed parts of an anamorphosis, when seen from the proper point of view, collecting themselves into one elegant design, delighted me with the appearance of that very order and beauty which I would beforehand have expected to find in them.

In a scheme such as this, where we find powers