duality and Eventuality, of the functions of Causality, but it is not complete. When we treat of an original and simple power of mind, all we can do is to state the circumstances. which excite it, and to give the mental affection a name. We cannot, for example, by means of a definition, enable a person who never felt sweetness, to understand what it is. We can only say that sugar, and other saccharine substances, when applied to the organ of taste, excite in them a particular sensation, which we call sweetness. It is the same with Causality. All we can accomplish is to point out the circumstances in which the mental affection connected with that organ arises, and to give a name to the affection itself. Now, the metaphysical definition describes with sufficient accuracy the circumstances which excite the affection; but it does not convey any notion of the original mental state itself which is thereby produced: In addition to the invariable sequence which Eventuality perceives, an impression of power or efficiency in the antecedent to produce the consequent, appears to me to be excited in the mind, by contemplating instances of causation in nature; and this impression seems to be the primitive mental affection connected with the organ of Causality.

It is said, that it is only by experience, and by observing the invariableness of the sequence that we discover the connexion of cause and effect, and this is correct; but in this respect Causality does not differ from the other faculties. Caloric as a substance existing in nature is one thing, and the feeling of heat produced by it in the human nerves is another. Before the mind can experience the feeling, heat must be applied to the nerves; but after it has been applied and the sensation felt, the mind knows nothing about what caloric is in itself, or how it comes to have the quality of exciting the sensation. All that the mind discovers is, that caloric, be it what it may, exists; and that it is capable of exciting in the nerves, the peculiar feeling which is named heat or warmth. The same holds in regard to Causality. Before the mind can know the pre

sence of a cause, it must have manifested itself to the faculty by producing an effect. The presentment of caloric to the nerves produces the feeling of heat; and the presentment of an instance of causation excites in Causality the impression that a cause exists. Suppose a bent bow, with the arrow drawn to the head, but retained in this position, to be presented, it is said that Causality, prior to experience, could never discover that, on the restraining power being withdrawn, the bow would expand and propel the arrow; and this is quite correct; because a bow in this condition is an object which excites only the faculties of Form, Size, Colouring, &c. It is an object of still life, of simple existence; when it expands, and the arrow starts from the string, it becomes an object of Eventuality, which perceives the motion; but in addition to the perception of the bow as a substance, and to the perception of the motion of the arrow, an instinctive impression is generated, that the expansion was the cause of the arrow's motion; and this impression is produced by Causality. The most illiterate savage would repeat the operation in the confidence that the effect would follow. A monkey, however, although it might find the arrow very useful to knock down fruit which it could not reach with its feet, would not repeat the operation although presented with the bow and arrow. It possesses hands and arms quite adapted to draw the string, but having no organ of Causality, it would not receive the impression of causation; it might see the phenomena succeed each other, without any idea of efficiency being excited *.

• Beavers and others of the lower animals appear, at first sight, to have some degree of Causality. Beavers adapt the structure of their dam with surprising sagacity to the pressure of the water; and in preparing it, they not only cut trees in such a way, as to make certain of their falling into the water, and not on dry land, but they select trees so situated, that when they do fall, the stream shall carry them to the spot where they wish them to be placed. There appears a knowledge of cause and effect in these operations; and yet the beaver cannot apply this knowledge out of its own department. I am inclined, therefore, to give a different ex

Individuality, Eventuality, and Comparison take cognizance of things obvious to the senses. Causality looks a little farther than these, perceives the dependencies of phenomena, and furnishes the idea of causation, as implying something more than mere juxta-position or sequence,—— as forming an invisible bond of connexion between cause and effect. It impresses us with an irresistible conviction, that every phenomenon or change in nature is caused by something, and hence, by successive steps, leads us to the First Cause of all. In looking at the actions of men, it leads us to consider the motives, or moving causes, from which they proceed. Individuality judges of direct evidence, or facts; Causality of circumstantial evidence, or that by inference. In a trial, a juryman, with large Individuality and small Causality, will have great difficulty in convicting on circum

planation. It is probable that each knowing faculty is adapted to the natural laws of its objects; the organ of Tune is fitted not only to feel in accordance with the laws of harmony, but instinctively to seek to obey them in producing music; it desires melody, and melody cannot be produced except in conformity with those laws: it therefore tries, and tries again, until at last it succeeds in producing sounds agreeable to itself, and just because its constitution and the laws of harmony are in accordance, it at last fulfils these laws by instinctive impulse, without knowing them. It is probable that the organs of Constructiveness and Weight in the beaver, are in like manner adapted to the laws of gravitation, and that it instinctively obeys them without knowing any thing of the laws themselves. This would account for its powers being perfect, yet limited in their sphere. Constructiveness and weight in man also may be adapted to these laws, but, by the addition of Causality, he may become acquainted with natural powers as general agents, and become capable of tracing their general application. Thus, a beaver, an elephant, and a savage, may, by the mere instinct of weight and momentum, roll or pull up an inclined plain a heavy body, which they cannot lift, without knowing any thing of the causes why they succeed in raising it in this way; but a philosopher, with great Causality, may recognise the existence of the cause, ascertain the laws of its operation, and then adapt it to a variety of purposes. This would account for philosophers often excelling in particular branches of science, who are very deficient in Causality, NEWTON, for example, in mathematics and weight; while no man is ever observed to be eminent for his talent of applying causation generally, who has a deficiency of that kind.

stantial evidence. He in whom Causality is large will often feel that kind of proof to be irresistible. It induces us, on all occasions, to ask, Why is this so? It gives deep penetration, and the perception of logical consequence in argument. It is large in persons who possess a natural genius for metaphysics, political economy, or similar sciences. When greatly larger than Individuality, Eventuality, and Comparison, it tends to vague generalities of speculation, altogether inapplicable to the affairs of life; and hence those in whom it predominates are not calculated to shine in general society. Their sphere of thought is too abstracted to be reached by ordinary minds; they feel this, and remain silent; and hence are reputed dull, heavy, and even stupid. A great defect of the organ renders the intellect superficial; and unfits the individual for forming comprehensive and consecutive views, either in abstract science or business. Coincidence only, and not Causation, is then perceived in events: Such persons are often admirably fitted for common situations, or for executing plans devised by profounder intellects; but, if they are entrusted with the duties of legislators, or become directors in any public affair, embracing Causation, it is difficult to make them comprehend the natural dependencies of things, and to act according to them. Blind to remote consequences, they stigmatize as visionary all intellectual perceptions which their own minds cannot reach ; they reject principle as vain theory; are captivated by expedients, and represent these as the beau ideal of practical wisdom.

Dr SPURZHEIM observes, "that the faculty of Individuality makes us acquainted with objects and facts; the faculty of Comparison points out their identity, analogy or difference; and Causality desires to know the causes of all events consequently, those three faculties together forming systems, drawing conclusions, indications, or corollaries, and pointing out principles and laws, constitute the true philosophical understanding."

It is interesting to trace the effects of this faculty, strong

or weak, in the mental character, as it exhibits itself in the occurrences of life. I accompanied two gentlemen to see a great public work, in one of whom Individuality was large and Causality small, and in the other of whom the proportions of these organs were exactly reversed. The former, in surveying the different objects and operations, put question after question to the workmen, in rapid and long continued succession; and nearly all the information which he carried away with him was acquired in answer to specific interrogatories. His mind scarcely supplied a step by its own reflection; and did not appear to survey the operations as a systematic whole. The latter individual looked a long time in silence before he put a question at all; and when he did ask one, it was, What is the use of that? The answer enabled his own mind to supply a multitude of additional ideas; he proceeded in his examination, and it was only on arriving at another incomprehensible part of the apparatus, that he again inquired. At last he got through; then turned back, and, with the most apparent satisfaction, contemplated in silence the operations from beginning to end as an entire system. I heard him afterwards describe what he had seen, and discovered that he had carried off a distinct comprehension of the principles and objects of the work. It is probable that a superficial observer would have regarded the first as the acute, intelligent, and observing man of genius; the person who noticed every thing, and asked about every thing; and the latter as a dull uninteresting person, who put only two or three questions in all, looked heavily, and said nothing.

A gentleman in a boat was unexpectedly desired to steer. He took hold of the helm, hesitated a moment what to do, and then steered with just effect. Being asked why he hesitated, he replied, "I was unacquainted with steering, and required to think how the helm acts." He was requested to explain how thinking led him to the point, and replied, That he knew, from study, the theory of the helm's action; that he just run over in his mind the water's action upon it, and its action on the boat, and then he saw the whole plainly before