ference between objects compared; but a new view has been suggested by my ingenious friend Mr HEWETT WATSON. He conceives that its simple function probably is "a perception of conditions ;" and he proposes the term "Conditionality" as the name. "It is admitted," says he, "that the faculty of Form compares forms, Tune compares notes, and Colouring compares colours. In these faculties, Comparison is a mode of activity only; and it is contrary to all analogy to assign comparison to another organ as its primitive function. The organ XXXIV, therefore, will probably originate some specific perceptions distinct in kind from those of any other organ; and its comparisons will be made between its own perceptions only; as is the case with every other intellectual faculty." A few illustrations will render these ideas more clear.

When we utter the word "Man," we address Individuality alone; we speak of a being which exists, without specifying his form, size, colour, or weight; without mentioning his actions; and without intimating his condition. When we say the man walks, we add a new idea, that of walking: In this proposition we call in the aid of Eventuality, which perceives action or events. If we say the tall man walks, we address Size, Individuality and Eventuality; or if we say the black man rides, then Colour, Individuality and Eventuality combine in uttering and in understanding the proposition: But, suppose that we are told that the miserable man runs along the road; here we have first, the man,-second, his condition, miserable,-and third, his action, running: now, what organ takes cognizance of his condition." It is obvious that it must be an organ distinct from the other two, because the mind can conceive the man, without his action; it can conceive the man and his action without thinking of his condition; and his condition without adverting to his action; his condition is therefore a third and separate consideration, introduced as an article of additional information. Again, suppose that we are told that Mr A. and Miss B. were married last week at the

altar of their parish church; the information would be communicated by and addressed to the organs of Individuality, which take cognizance of Mr A. and Miss B. as individuals, and the altar and church as things which exist; Locality would inform us of the place of the marriage, and "Time" of the date of it; but in all this nothing is said of the condition of the parties. Now, suppose that we should meet them coming from the church, and should wish them much "happiness" in their "new condition," it is evident that some conceptions different from the former are added. We now contemplate them in the " married condition," and we express our wish that they may exist happy in that state.

Mr WATSON's idea is, that the primitive function of Comparison is to take cognizance of the condition in which beings and inanimate objects exist; and that it compares the conditions, just as Colour compares colours, and Tune compares sounds. Of all the means of creating interest or affording illustration, the specification of the condition of objects or beings is the most effectual. Thus, the man exists, is announced by Individuality, and produces little interest; the man dies, is announced by Individuality and Eventuality, and is more affecting; but the "good and just young man dies," stirs up a far deeper emotion; and it is the addition of his qualities and condition "good, just, and young," that makes the difference. Poets and orators, therefore, in whom this organ is large, will possess vivid perceptions of the condition and qualities of objects and beings; and if every faculty compares its own objects, it will compare conditions. If this be correct, we ought to find authors in whom Individuality predominates, illustrating their subject chiefly by comparing simple individual objects; one in whom Eventuality predominates illustrating by comparing actions; and one in whom the organ now under discussion predominates, illustrating by comparing conditions or states; and such accordingly is actually the case. The following illustrations are furnished chiefly by Eventuality.

"When AJAX strives some rock's huge weight to throw,
The line too, labours, and the words move slow;
Not so when swift CAMILLA SCOurs the plain,

Flies o'er the unbending corn, and skims along the main."


Mr WATSON observes, that, in SHERIDAN, Individuality and Eventuality are large, and Comparison only full; and the example already given on page 427, from his works, corresponds with this development.

In MOORE, Individuality is large, Eventuality deficient, and Comparison very large; and that his descriptions are confined so much to conditions, that any artist who should attempt to transfer one of his beauties to canvas, would require to invent every item of form, proportion, colour, and indeed, every thing except condition. "The harp that once through TARA's halls" is a good example of this; the whole piece being but a description and comparison of conditions. In another short poem, "Though Fate, my girl, may bid us part," the same occurs; and the following is another example,—

"When I remember all

The friends so linked together,
I've seen around me fall

Like leaves in wintry weather;

I feel like one who treads alone

Some banquet-hall deserted;

Whose lights are fled, whose garlands dead;
And all but he departed."

It is quite obvious, that condition is the prominent feature, indeed, almost the whole physiognomy of these lines.

In the busts of POPE, Individuality is moderately developed, Eventuality very large, and Comparison considerable. "The styles of POPE and MOORE," says Mr WATSON, "seem to be quite contrasted in this respect, that POPE narrates all the circumstances of his stories in succession, as they may be supposed to occur. MOORE, on the other hand, gives us a series of highly finished pictures, describing clearly and beautifully the state of the earth,

atmosphere, sky, clouds, and dramatis persona, for the time being, but by no means with that regular sequence of occurrences which is to be found in POPE. His stories are the whole routine of real life; those of MOORE stage representations, where a good deal is done behind the scenes, and only the most effective parts brought into view. POPE writes historical documents with the minute accuracy and detail of a French pedigree; MOORE's pen is like the pencil of an artist, and creates a gallery of paintings, where we see the same persons in different situations at different periods, but with no more information of what becomes of them in the interim, than we can obtain concerning the noon-day dwelling of Oberon, or the Ghost of Royal Hamlet. Their styles being thus different, we should expect their similies to exhibit a corresponding diversity, if there be really no special organ of Comparison: those of POPE should be less strongly characterized by resemblance of condition, and show a greater or more proportional variety in the points of similitude; the comparisons should be more diversified, and the resemblances more comprehensive."-Phren. Journ. vi. 389.

I communicated Mr WATSON's ideas to Dr SPURZHEIM, before they were published in the Phrenological Journal; and he favoured me with the following remarks, in a letter, dated Dublin, 16th May 1830:-" My description of Comparison involves the essence of Mr WATSON's idea :Among your examples, young horse belongs to it, but not lively horse. The horse being lively, is known by Eventuality, in the same way as motion in general. The generality of attributes and all abstract ideas and general notions are conceived by Comparison. Condition indicates not only state, but also cause; and if Comparison shall be replaced by another term, it cannot be Conditionality. Abstraction or generalization should be preferable. Vergleichender Scharfsinn is very significant: It compares, discriminates, separates, abstracts, adapts, and generalizes. The philosophers styled Nominalists had it in an eminent degree, whilst

Individuality was predominant in the Realists. Comparison compares conditions or states, and conditions or causes. Its essential result is generalization and discrimination."

These differences of opinion apply only to the metaphysical analysis of the faculty: the organ and the manifestations which accompany it are held to be perfectly ascertained. Examples of the organ are given under Eventuality, p. 425.


IT has long been a matter of general observation, that men possessing a profound and comprehensive intellect, such as SOCRATES, BACON, and GALILEO, have the upper part of the forehead greatly developed. At Vienna, Dr GALL remarked, that, in the most zealous disciples of KANT, men distinguished for profound, penetrating, metaphysical talent, the parts of the brain lying immediately outwards, and to the sides of the organ of Comparison, were distinctly enlarged. He and Dr SPURZHEIM subsequently saw a mask of KANT himself, moulded after death, and perceived an extraordinary projection of these parts. At a later period, they became personally acquainted with FICHTE, and found a development of that region still larger than in KANT. Innumerable additional observations satisfied them concerning the functions of this organ; Dr GALL named it "Esprit métaphysique, Profondeur d'esprit," and Dr SPURZHEIM "Causality."

Dr THOMAS BROWN says, "a cause, in the fullest definition which it philosophically admits, may be said to be, that which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always, immediately followed by a similar change. Priority in the sequence observed, and invariableness of antecedence in the past and future sequences supposed, are the elements, and the only elements, combined in the notion of a cause." This is a definition by means of Indivi

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