connect us with external objects, or direct the movements of our bodies, act by material organs at all;" that is to say, that feeling, fancy, and reflection, are acts so purely mental, that they have no connexion with organization.

Long before Mr JEFFREY penned these sentences, however, Dr THOMAS BROWN had written, even in the Edinburgh Review, that "Memory, imagination, and judgment, may be all set to sleep by a few grains of a very common and simple drug;" and Dr CULLEN, BLUMENBACH, Dr GREGORY, MAGENDIE, and, in short, all physiological authors, had published positive statements that the mental faculties are connected with the brain.

What, then, does the proposition that the brain is the organ of the mind imply? Let us take the case of the eye as somewhat analogous. If the eye be the organ of vision, it will be conceded, first, That sight cannot be enjoyed without its instrumentality; secondly, That every act of vision must be accompanied by a corresponding state of the organ; and, vice versa, that every change of condition in the organ must influence sight; and, thirdly, That the perfection of vision will be in relation to the perfection of the organ. In like manner, if the brain be the organ of the mind, it will follow that the mind does not act in this life independently of its organ; and hence, that every emotion and judgment of which we are conscious, are the result of mind and its organ acting together. Secondly, That every mental affection must be accompanied with a corresponding state of the organ; and, vice versa, every state of the organ must be attended by a certain condition of the mind. And, thirdly, That the perfection of the manifestations of the mind will bear a relation to the perfection of its organ, just as perfection of vision bears a relation to the perfection of the eye. These propositions appear to be incontrovertible; and to follow as necessary consequences, from the simple fact that the mind acts by means of organization. But if they be well-founded, how important a study does that of the organ of the mind become! It is the study of mind itself, in the

And the very

only condition in which it is known to us. fact that in past ages, mind has been studied without reference to organization, accounts for the melancholy truth, that up to the present day no philosophy of mind suited to practical purposes exists.

Holding it then as established by the evidence of the most esteemed physiologists, and also by observation, that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that the state of the brain influences its state, the next question which presents itself is, Whether the mind in every act employs the whole brain as one organ, or whether separate faculties of the mind are connected with distinct portions of the brain as their respective organs? The following considerations may enable us to solve this question :

1st, In all ascertained instances, different functions are never performed by thes ame organ, but, the reverse: each function has an organ for itself: thus, the stomach digests food, the liver secretes bile, the heart propels the blood, the eyes see, the ears hear, the tongue tastes, and the nose smells. Nay, on analysing these examples, it is found that wherever the function is compound, each element of it is performed by means of a distinct organ; thus, to accomplish taste there is one nerve, whose office is to move the tongue, another nerve whose duty it is to communicate the ordinary sense of feeling to the tongue, and a third nerve which conveys the sensations of taste. A similar combination of nerves takes place in the hands, arms, and other parts of the body, which are the organs of feeling; namely, one nerve gives motion, another feeling, and a third conveys to the mind a knowledge of the state of the organ; and, except in the case of the tongue, all these nerves are blended in one common sheath.

In the economy of the human frame, there is no ascertained example of one nerve performing two functions, such as feeling and communicating motion, or seeing and hearing, or tasting and smelling. In the case of the brain, therefore, analogy would lead us to expect, that if reason

ing be an act different from loving or hating, there will be one organ for reasoning, another for loving, and a third for hating.

2dly,* It is an indisputed truth, that the various mental powers of man appear in succession, and, as a general rule, that the reflecting or reasoning faculties are those which arrive latest at perfection. In the child, the powers of observing the existence and qualities of external objects arrive much sooner at their maturity than the reasoning faculties. Daily observation shows that the brain undergoes a corresponding change; whereas we have no evidence that the immaterial principle varies in its powers from year to year. If the brain, as a whole, is the organ of the mind, this successive development of faculties is utterly at variance with what we should expect a priori; because, if the general organ is fitted for manifesting with success one mental faculty, it ought to be equally so for the operation of all, which we see is not the case. Observation, indeed, shows that different parts of the brain are really developed at different periods of life. In infancy, according to CHAUSSIER, the cerebellum forms one-fifteenth of the encephalic mass; and in adult age, from one-sixth to one-eighth, its size being thus in strict accordance with the energy of the propensity of which it is the organ. In childhood, the middle part of the forehead generally predominates; in later life, the upper lateral parts become more prominent, which facts also are in strict accordance with the periods of unfolding of the knowing and reasoning powers.

3dly, Genius is almost always partial, which it ought not to be, if the organ of the mind were single. A genius for poetry, for mechanics, for drawing, for music, or for mathematics, sometimes appears at a very early age in individuals, who, in regard to all other pursuits, are mere ordi

The following instances are taken from Dr ANDREW COMBE's Observations on Dr BARCLAY'S Objections to Phrenology, published in the Transactions of the Phrenological Society, page 413.

nary men, and who, with every effort, can never attain to any thing above mediocrity.

4thly, The phenomena of dreaming are at variance with the supposition of the mind manifesting all its faculties by means of a single organ, while they are quite consistent with, and explicable by, that of a plurality of organs. In dreaming, the mind experiences numerous vivid emotions, such as those of fear, joy, affection, arising, succeeding one another, and departing without control from the intellectual powers;—or, it is filled with a thousand varied conceptions, sometimes connected and rational, but more frequently disjointed and absurd, and all differing widely from the waking operations of the mind, in wanting harmony, consistency, and sense. These phenomena harmonize remarkably with the notion of a variety of faculties and organs, some of which, being active, would communicate these ideas and feelings which constitute a dream, while others remaining asleep would, by their inactivity, permit that disordered action which characterizes the pictures formed by the fancy during sleep.

Were the organ of mind single, it is clear that all the faculties should be asleep or awake to the same extent at the same time; or, in other words, that no such thing as dreaming could take place.

5thly, The admitted phenomena of Partial Idiocy and Partial Insanity, are so plainly and strongly in contradiction with the notion of a single organ of mind, that PINEL himself, no friend to Phrenology, asks if their phenomena can be reconciled to such a conception.

Partial Idiocy is that state in which an individual manifests one or several powers of the mind with an ordinary degree of energy, while he is deprived to a greater or less extent of the power of manifesting all the others. PINEL, HASLAM, RUSH, ESQUIROL, and, in short, every writer on insanity, speaks of the partial development of certain mental powers in idiots; and RUSH in particular not only alludes to the powers of intellect, but also to the partial pos

session of the moral faculties. Some idiots, he observes, are as remarkable for correct moral feelings as some great geniuses are for the reverse. In his Traité du Goitre et de la Crétinisme, FODERE' thus speaks, p. 133:-"It is remarked, that, by an inexplicable singularity, some of these individuals (cretins), endowed with so weak minds, are born with a particular talent for copying paintings, for rhyming, or for music. I have known several who taught themselves to play passably on the organ and harpsichord; others who understood, without ever having had a master, the repairing of watches, and the construction of some pieces of mechanism." He adds, that these powers could not be attributed to the intellect, "for these individuals not only could not read books which treated of the principles of mechanics, but ils etaient deroutés lorsqu'on en parlait et ne se perfectionnaient jamais." It must be observed also, that these unfortunate individuals differ very much in the kind as well as quantity of mental power possessed. For example, an instance is given by PINEL of an idiot girl who manifested a most wonderful propensity to imitate whatever she heard or saw, but who displayed no other intellectual faculty in a perceptible degree, and never attached an idea to the sound she uttered. Dr RUSH particularizes one man who was remarkable for his religious feelings, although exceedingly deficient in intellectual power, and other moral sentiments; and, among the cretins, many are to be found who scarcely manifest any other faculty of the mind except that of Amativeness. One is all kindness and good nature, another quarrelsome and mischievous. One has a lively perception of harmony in music, while another has none.

It ought also to be observed, that the characteristic features of each particular case are strictly permanent. The idiot, who to-day manifests the faculty of Tune, the feeling of Benevolence, of Veneration, or of Self-esteem, will not to-morrow, nor in a year, change the nature of his predominant manifestations. Were the deficiency of the single organ the cause of idiocy, these phenomena ought not to ap

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