the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. "The leading doctrine," says he, " of Phrenology is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth of this position can obviously be ascertained only by observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked, how it can be reconciled with the great principle to which so frequent reference has been made, that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states?

"It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree affect Dr BROWN's leading principle. The cerebral organs are not the mind-nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance. And the only difference that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to Dr BROWN's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind, to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions of the encephalon.

"In looking upon any object-as snow-we have the notion of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow but in the mind. That is, the notion of colour is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind. There is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of colour, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. will be conceded, that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious, that another step in the process might be conceived, without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of colour, it might be a particular portion of the encepha

It

lon. As the notion of colour, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of colour, it follows, that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr BROWN himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material organ, which state would have been different had the organ been different.

"A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.

"When we say, then, that when we have any power, as, for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter but of mind.-The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I alluded in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr BROWN had not considered."

It is not necessary in studying Phrenology to decide which of these views is the correct interpretation of nature, because the effects of the organs on the mind is the same, whichever of them be adopted. Holding the mind to consist of an aggregate of powers,-then each acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested with a degree of energy in proportion to its size. Viewing it as a simple substance,

capable of existing in a variety of states, it enters into each state by means of a separate organ: when the organs are spontaneously active, they induce their relative states; without their influence these cannot take place: when they are large, the states are excited vigorously; when they are small, they exist feebly. The reader may therefore adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable. In the following pages the faculties will be treated of as distinct mental powers, connected with separate organs, because this view enables me to bring out the doctrine more simply and luminously, than by considering them as merely particular states of the general power-the Mind; and this language, moreover, is correct even on the latter hypothesis, because, according to this view, when the organ of Causality, for example, is largely possessed, the individual is capable of reasoning logically and acutely; of which mental acts he is incapable, when that organ is greatly deficient. The word faculty or power, therefore, is used to express the quality which is possessed in the one, and not. in the other case, and which, being active, is legitimately designated, and universally recognised, by either of these

terms.

"It has occurred to me," continues Mr WELSH," that another difficulty of a metaphysical nature may suggest itself in regard to the principles of Phrenology. It may be asked, What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs ? But the system of Dr BROWN affords us no more light upon this point, than the system of Dr GALL. Indeed, a passage which I have quoted from his Lectures shews, that he considered that those who engaged in such inquiries were ignorant of the limits of our faculties. It is only experience that can teach us in what state the soul exists when separated from the body. And in this sense the precept of the poet holds equally in a scientific and in a religious point of view,

"Wait the great teacher Death, and GoD adore."

1

DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES.

DR SPURZHEIM divides the faculties into two orders, FEELINGS and INTELLECT, or into affective and intellectual faculties. The feelings are subdivided into two genera, PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS. He applies the name propensities to indicate internal impulses, which invite only to certain actions; and Sentiments designate other feelings, not limited to inclination alone, but which have an emotion of a peculiar kind superadded. Acquisitiveness, for example, is a mere impulse to acquire; Veneration gives a tendency to worship, accompanied with a particular emotion, which latter quality is the reason of its being denominated a Sentiment.

The second order of faculties makes us acquainted with objects which exist, their qualities and relations; and they are called intellectual. They are subdivided by Dr SPURZHEIM into four genera. The first includes the external senses and voluntary motion; the second, those internal powers which perceive existence; or make man and animals acquainted with external objects, and their physical qualities; and the third, the powers which perceive the relations of external objects. These three genera are named perceptive faculties. The fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other powers, which compare, judge, and discriminate; and these are named reflective faculties.

The names of the faculties employed in this work are, with few exceptions, those suggested by Dr SPURZHEIM. To designate propensity, the termination ive is added to a root or fundamental word, and indicates the quality of producing ; and ness, the abstract state, as Destructiveness. The termination ous, characterizes a sentiment, as Cautious, Conscientious. To these is added ness, to express the abstract

H

state, as Cautiousness, Conscientiousness. The names of the intellectual faculties are easily understood, and do not require any particular explanation.

Considerable difficulty attends the arrangement of the faculties and organs. In the first and second editions of this work, they were arranged and numbered according to the order adopted in Dr SPURZHEIM's New Physiognomical System, published in 1815. The principle of that arrangement was, as far as possible, philosophical. The organs common to man and the lower animals came first, beginning with the lowest, and ascending. The organs of the moral sentiments were next treated of; and, lastly, the organs of intellect. Since 1815, the great divisions of this classification have been retained, but repeated alterations have been made by Dr SPURZHEIM in the arrangement of the details. It appears impossible to arrive at a correct classification until all the organs, and also the primitive faculty or ultimate function of each, shall be definitely ascertained, which is not at present the case. Till this end shall be accomplished, every interim arrangement will be in danger of being overturned by subsequent discoveries. In the mean time, however, for the sake of uniformity, I adopt Dr SPURZHEIM's last order of arrangement. During his visit to Edinburgh in 1828, he demonstrated the anatomy of the brain, and traced out the connexion between the organs in a manner so clear and satisfactory, that the basis of his arrangement appeared founded in nature. Dr GALL seems not to have adopted any philosophical principle of classification; but it is proper that his names and order should be known. I shall, therefore, add to the present work a table of his order.

In the case of many of the organs, observations have been made to such an extent, that the functions are held to be ascertained; and in regard to others, where the observations have been fewer, the functions are stated as probable. There is no difference of opinion among phrenologists in regard to the kind of manifestations which ac