clearly discovered that everything is accurately adjusted by geometrical precision of force and movement; where the chances of error are infinite, and the proofs of intelligence, therefore, equal. These proofs of design in each fragment of the universe, and in all combined, are continually further multiplied by every fresh discovery, whether in the minute or the vast by the microscope or the telescope; for every fresh law that is discovered, being in harmony with all that has previously been discovered, not only yields its own proof of design, but infinitely more, by all the relations in which it stands to other laws: it yields, in fact, as many as there are adjustments which have been effected between itself and all besides. Each new proof of design, therefore, is not a solitary fact: but one which, entering as another element into a most complex machinery, indefinitely multiplies the combinations, in any one of which chance might have gone astray. From this infinite array of proofs of design, it seems to man's reason, in ordinary moods, stark madness to account for the phenomena of the universe upon any other supposition than that which does account, and can alone account, for them all—the supposition of a Presiding Intelligence, illimitable alike in power and in wisdom.'*

For the purpose of keeping the real nature of the design argument steadily before the reader, (the Atheist observes,) I will convert it into this short proposition-Objects which bear marks of design have an intelli gent cause. The material universe, therefore, has an Intelligent Cause.

When theists say that "Objects which bear marks of design have an intelligent cause," they, in reality, assert that ALL objects which bear marks of design have an intelligent cause. But how have they ascertained this? Simply by assuming it.

Now, as no argument can be sound whose premises are untrue, it must be obvious that, if the premises from which the design argument is evolved are untrue, the design argument can be of no value whatever.

The premises from which the design argument is evolved are the assumption that all objects which bear marks of design have an intelligent cause. These premises I shall show to be untrue, by exhibiting numerous objects bearing unequivocal marks of profound design, which have NOT an intelligent cause.

Here is an acorn. I plant it in the ground: whence will issue, in time, a young tree, which, through the influences of air, moisture, &c., will become a magnificent oak, bearing unequivocal marks of profound design.

If I substitute the seeds of the beech tree, the plane tree, &c., for the acorn, analogous objects, bearing marks of profound design, will be obtained.

Here then we have a group of objects, bearing unequivocal marks of profound design, which have not an intelligent cause.

Here are a number of eggs. I place them in a box kept at a regulated temperature. After the lapse of a certain time chickens will be obtained, which, through the influences of food, air, moisture, &c., will become adult birds, bearing unequivocal marks of profound design.

If I substitute the eggs of eagles, pheasants, grouse, &c., for those of

The Article from which the above is extracted, is re-published, (with an Appendix,) as a small volume. It is written by the Rev. Henry Rogers, of Spring Hill College, Birmingham. Its highest praise is, that it is worthy of the Author's pen.-[EDITOR.]

the hen, analogous objects, bearing unequivocal marks of profound design, will be obtained.

Here then we have another group, of a different description, of objects bearing unequivocal marks of profound design, which have not an intelligent cause.

Here is a living, breathing horse. Every part of him bears marks of profound design of adaptation of means to ends-of nice adjustment of parts. And has he an intelligent cause? No. [The illustration of this is withheld for decency's sake.]

Lions, tigers, &c., are produced in a manner similar to the horse.

Here then we have a third group of objects dissimilar to either of the preceding ones, bearing unequivocal marks of profound design, and which have not an intelligent cause.

Now as no argument can be sound whose premises are untrue, and as the premises from which the design argument is evolved are the assumption that all objects which bear marks of design have an intelligent cause, and as I have shown these premises to be untrue, by exhibiting numerous objects bearing unequivocal marks of profound design which have not an intelligent cause-it follows that the design argument is of no value whatever. ALIQUIS.

P.S.-I beg to invite the author of "Reason and Faith," or any other able Christian advocate, to join me in a written discussion on these important questions-What is the value of the evidence offered in support of the existence of a Supreme Intelligence? What is the value of the evidence offered in support of the truth of Christianity.

A.

[Nearly three years since we published a paper of Aliquis's, entitled "Have we sufficient proof of the Existence of God?" copies of which we sent to the leading clergy and literary men who support Christianity, requesting (if we were in error,) the favour of their enlightenment. The only replies received were from Mr. Burke, Professor Young, and James Martineau. Aliquis has now sent us the above paper, conceived in a comprehensive, and expressed in a lucid manner, in which he assails one of the strongest fortresses of theology. We shall forward it also to selections of the clergy and others, from whom we trust to hear in reply."-ED.]

Being no great Reasoner myself, my authority is nothing, but there does appear as great a disparity between the arguments of the extract from the Review and the answer to it, as there is between the styles of writing. The first is a masterpiece, in which logic and judgment keep pace with the eloquence of language; in the other, there is nothing but assumption, and a vulgar temerity.

Do the advocates of design start with an assumption that all things indicating marks of intelligence are the result of a designing mind: or is not this an inference to which they have fairly attained by examining what is within the reach of their certain knowledge?

Thus we know of no books or houses or clothes, that came by accident: and hence men are taught trades that they may be able to act with intelligence and effect. All human experience goes to prove that those things

the origin of which we know, had an originator with intelligence proportioned to their production.

This is true of the steam engine, or any invention; as well as authorship or skill in any craft.

We account for such productions by a proportionate skill; in other words from the effect we judge of the cause. Now it is a natural and legitimate process, to apply this rule to other similar cases; and since for all productions of which we can actually trace the origin, we find a proportionate intelligent cause, the same is to be inferred respecting the works of nature.

:-a

Whereas this writer reverses the process, and assumes that all unknown instances are unlike what is known; so that if this principle be true, HUMAN EXPERIENCE IS WORTHLESS. Yet in every-day life, we have no other guide than to reason from experience. Even in single instances, where the author cannot be discovered, his existence is not doubted :detective officer, finds marks of design on a door post, on forced desks and cupboards; and without seeing any suspected person, infallibly concludes that a burglar has been at work, with certain implements and intentions. And no atheist would deny the inference: but the kind of evidence which will prove the existence of a robber, is (it seems) mere assumption, when used to prove the existence of a Creator. Thus will men depart from the maxims and usages of common sense, to construct the Sceptics' religion; whilst they ridicule our senseless superstitions. Aliquis does not say who told him that trees "have not an intelligent cause," though "bearing unequivocal marks of design."

Surely these must be very equivocal marks, which indicate what, according to this Reasoner, is not true.

There is however some credit reserved to himself, though the Creator may have none. Since he observes, "if I substitute (for the acorn) the seeds of the beech, the plane, &c. analogous objects will be obtained." This Author therefore will claim a share in design as he decides what kind of seeds he will employ; and a beech or oak avenue, shall accordingly dicate an intelligent agent who chose and employed the seeds, whilst He "who giveth to every seed its own body," has no honour from the beautiful result. There is plainly a designer called a gardener, who lays out the flower beds, and chooses the seeds; but none in making the seeds; and adapting the seasons and elements for their growth.

This gentleman says the same about horses; the grooming and shoeing of these animals, are evidences of a designer; but adapting their frame to their useful purposes, is a matter of chance. The grooming is done by somebody; the horse is invented by NOBODY.

Formerly, Mr. Editor, this gentleman-Squire Nobody-used to do everything mischievous, now it appers he does everything beneficial. In my younger days, a broken window or other fatality was ascribed to Nobody; he was reckoned the most active agent for evil: he took the place of all witches and suspicious visitants. But now the doctrine is changed, by those who do not "deny knowledge to the public,"-who teach that Nobody does all the good we experience.

Then Sir, it will follow that Aliquis though he claimed the only intelligent part in making oaks, (viz. choosing and sowing the acorns) has

really nothing to do with it; for Aliquis, I am told, means Somebody, whereas Nobody does everything of consequence. Nobody frames and upholds the laws of Nature; Nobody fashions every herb after the germ of its seed; he frames the different species of animals, and preserves those species in the world, distinct from each other. He created and continues mankind, in all pre-eminence of endowments: Nobody causeth the grass to grow for cattle, and clotheth the hills with corn: Nobody sends rain and sunshine and the alternation of the seasons. If this be true, Sir, I am so far an Atheist, that I should advocate the worship of NOBODY.

But I shall weary your readers, and therefore hasten in conclusion to examine the Atheist's Box: he observes," here are a number of eggs, I place them in a box kept at a regulated temperature. After a lapse of time chickens will be obtained, &c. If I substitute the eggs of eagles, &c., analogous objects will be obtained. Here then we have a group of objects bearing unequivocal marks of design, which have not an intelligent cause.

This chicken-experiment does appear to me, Mr. Editor, to carry more marks of intelligence than the argument which it is intended to illustrate. Some will judge that Aliquis is himself in this box; and may turn out only a chicken after all, though he tries to crow at all parsons, as if he were a full-grown bantom.

Was there not a designer to make the box; to warm it, to regulate the heat, to put the egg in, to watch over the hatching, to cackle over the final development? Suppose then this genius had put a stone as a substitute for the egg, where would the chicken be? Where Aliquis's argument is, i.e. nowhere. Therefore he still would require NOBOBY to invent an egg for him; or there would be no means of getting a chicken out of the box, with all Aliquis's designing; at least, no other means besides getting into the box himself; where I leave him and hope, Mr. Editor, you will regulate the temperature.

I am, dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

JOHN KNOX.

[We shall be happy to hear from our correspondent John Knox, again.

EDITOR.]

The Nature of Man as Spiritual, Immortal, and Responsible, will be the most frequent topic of this department: though sometimes we shall introduce MISCELLANEOUS Subjects.

MIND AND MATTER: THEIR EVIDENCES AND
DISTINCTIONS.

No apology can be requisite, in introducing such a subject as "Matter and Mind," for all must feel some interest in their own nature, and in the universe wherein they are placed.

Metaphysics, is a word as terrible to some persons as Blue-beard to children, or mathematics to professed novel readers.

Hence the majority of persons, frightened by this name, have become alienated from those studies which are classed under it; and have withdrawn themselves altogether from enquiries into the nature of mind, and the fundamental principles of human knowledge, into the region of physics or matter, where they find something tangible; and which they suppose easily understood: forgetting that NOTHING IS UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING, and that therefore if they leave mind they can do little with matter. Nay that all sciences and laws, respecting outward things, are but the classifications and inferences of the mind itself: in other words, much that is named Science, belongs to the Province of Philosophy.

The origin of the name Metaphysics, is an indication that these studies of mind and matter should be united :- "the Greeks divided philosophy into three branches, To Phusicon, To Ethicon, To Dialecticon."-Physics, Ethics, or Morals, and Dialectics or Logic and Intellectual Philosophy in general: and it is said that, the title metaphysics, arose from the direction written upon some tracts; the title being Meta (ta) Phusica, after the Physics; simply directing the order of the arrangement, according to the classification of Physics, or the natural Sciences, Morals, and Intellectual Philosophy. So that the name was merely an indication that this line of enquiry should follow the study of natural philosophy: whether this is the best arrangement, may be questioned, since the intellectual enquiries are of the greater consequence; and properly conducted, prepare for the only successful investigation of nature. Though from the simplicity of natural enquiries, the familiarity we may early obtain with the objects of the senses; this enquiry, together with the acquisition of languages, history, arithmetic, and other school occupations, may properly engage