comes his queen, and out of the ruins of the cavern, which was her haunt, springs a palace, where, surrounded by gallant knights, the young king sees his dreams all fulfilled.

"That too," said Arnim, "is well imagined. Do not our difficulties, bravely assailed, transform themselves into delight, and do we not inhabit the memory of the obstacles we have overcome, as a golden house, -yea more, armed men spring out of them, stalwart powers of mind, multiplied by our struggles, that ring us round with defence. The adverse circumstances of life, once vanquished, become our vassals ever after."

"Good," exclaimed Roger, more and more charmed with his new friend. "You must have seen or suffered much to be able to speak thus from experience. You are younger than I am.”

"I have imagined much," answered Arnim, "suffered little, and seen less. But we fanciful susceptible people live a great deal of life through in a short time. I have passed through the transition state you described just now already, and I have life before me for well-directed labour. I have found that imagination has enriched me with some of the first fruits of experience for by that faculty I have lived in many minds of whom I have read, have become them for a time in their heroism, their passion, their calamities. Were I ever to write a tragedy, I should find this serviceable-but I lack the other elements for success in that career."

"May we neither of us ever know the misery of devoting ourselves to a vocation to which we are unequal."

"Amen," answered Arnim, with deep seriousness. The friends parted to retire to rest, having agreed to continue their journey in company early the next morning. Roger's sleep was troubled by dreams. He thought that he was going into a cave, where Louise had been transformed into a dragon, that he might unloose the spell, but the sides of the cavern moved and strained, with strange whispers, nearer to each other; the fire from the dragon's mouth grew fainter, the pressure seemed to crush the hideous shape and the rescuer together:-then came a change-he thought she had been restored to her old form, and they were in a galley on the sea, but enchanters in the shape of huge dolphins followed in their wake, and raised a storm, and he stood in the stern throwing spears at them, which continually glided off, till at last he wounded one, when the waves stilled-the sea grew darker and darker, till its colour was wholly changed, it was everywhere blood-red, and every wave was a face, swimming in that crimson ocean; the crest of each surge a pallid visage expression of the deepest woe :-then they sank, and the beauty of nature returned once more, and the vessel seemed to be nearing a tropical island which the sunny sea threw its arms about, and seemed to love, as some great mind a fair purpose there they landed, and went under the roof of leaves and hanging fringe of flower-bells, and over the floor, where there was a mosaic of blossoms for pavement, and beside a bubbling spring, the wayward lover of the leaves, for which the plants that grew along the ground endeavoured to make a network with their twining arms, but the stream glided under or shot its silver threads through them, and escaped, leaping into the sea. Here as he turned to speak again to Louise, she had vanished and he awoke.

The remainder of the journey to Königsberg was agreeable to the travellers, but present nothing specially worthy of record. On entering that city, however, they met with an adventure which will give the reader much important information concerning personages as yet but imperfectly known.

(To be continued.)

GO WHEN THE MORNING SHINETH.

Written by Mrs. Follen.

Go when the morning shineth,
Go when the noon is bright
Go when the day declineth,
Go in the hush of night.

Go with pure mind and feeling,
Cast earthly thoughts away,
And in thy chamber kneeling,
Do thou in secret pray.

Remember all who love thee,
All who are lov'd by thee;
Pray, too, for those who hate thee,
If any such there be :

Then for thyself in meekness,

A blessing humbly claim,
And link with each petition
The great Redeemer's name.

Or if, 'tis e'er denied thee
In solitude to pray,

Should holy thoughts come o'er thee,

When friends are round thy way,

E'en then the silent breathing,

Thy spirit rais'd above,

Will reach his throne of glory,

Who reigns the God of Love.

Oh not a joy nor blessing

With this can we compare,

The power that he hath given us
To pour our souls in prayer.
Whene'er thou pin'st in sadness,
Before his footstool fall,
Remember in thy gladness,
His love who gave thee all.

V.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE.

The Nature of Man as Spiritual, Immortal, and Responsible, will be the most frequent topic of this department: though sometimes we shall introduce MISCELLANEOUS Subjects.

MIND AND MATTER: THEIR EVIDENCES AND
DISTINCTIONS.

(Continued from page 96.)

BISHOP BUTLER argued that since consciousness is indivisible "it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too:" "since it is a contradiction to suppose one part of consciousness here and another there, the perceptive power is indivisible too, and consequently the subject in which it resides, i. e. the conscious being." He further observes, what has since been acknowledged by the best physiologists, "we have already several times over lost a great part, or perhaps the whole of our bodies, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain the same living agents." Whence it plainly follows, first, from the nature of the thinking principle, that it cannot be matter; and secondly, from the constant change in every part of our living frame, if our bodies were in any respects like our minds, we should not be the same individuals two days together;-which belies our strongest convictions.

the

The question whether brain can be the organ of thought, in any intelligible sense, as carrying on the thinking process, though nearly allied to present, is a subject for a separate enquiry: it may be sufficient here to observe, that since there is so great a difference between the qualities of mind and body, it is a contradiction to suppose that the operations of mind are a physical process carried on by a material agent: or that the brain thinks any more than the eye or a telescope sees.

Matter, we have seen by its various combinations, can produce only material results, of the same nature as belong to the parts in any compound or arrangement:-figure, magnitude, and motion: it is a thing that can be divided, whilst none of the mental processes can, we cannot have half a thought, or quarter of a sensation; or a red emotion; or a square affection: we can neither weigh nor measure our principles: they are therefore questions of a different order,-affections of a different nature or substance, to those outward things we call matter-the inert and unintelligent mass, the bricks and mortar of the fabric called nature. Now the mind if inmaterial, is immortal: because being immaterial, simple and not compounded, it is not subject to the destruction which

results from decay, decomposition, or separation of its component parts. We have no instances of annihilation; for all changes destroy no parts, but only separate them: a house when burnt down, is destroyed only as a house, not as so many existing things: the structure is gone into fragments: but the soul having no parts, cannot be divided into fragments, and therefore will for ever exist as a soul. And that the mind is immaterial (and so immortal) is evident from the fact that no combinations can produce thought, from any known qualities of matter: and also because all the qualities of mind, are of another order, to those which by the senses we perceive in outward objects: as is evident from this, that we cannot perceive mind or any of its qualities, by the senses. That therefore which is not an object of sense, is of a different kind, from what is an object of sense: in other words, it is not a sensible or material thing.

Further, the mind is not to be regarded as related to space: since none of its qualities have extension: its thoughts and feelings are not so many miles long or broad: therefore it is not extended, but matter is; and consequently it is not matter.

But it has relation to time, or duration; for its states may abide so long, it may have pain or pleasure by the hour, though not by the yard: it endures, but does not extend: it lasts or exists in time, dut does not stretch, or exist in so much room or space. Mind, therefore, which actually abides during life, after the constant flux and departure of all the elements of the body, and which is not material in its nature, is not subject to decay in death, since the laws of separation or dissolution belong only to material things.

This conclusion we can state in the words of Bishop Berkeley :-"We have shewn" says that author, "that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer, than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies, (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active simple, uncompounded substance: such a being therefore, is indissoluble by the force of nature, that is to say, the soul of man is naturally immortal."

The absurdity of the contrary conclusion, may be understood, by a passage from Howe's "Living Temple;" in which he shews the folly of the epicurean philosophy.-"Only consider what is said of the constitution and nature of the human soul; which is said to be composed of very well polished, the smoothest and roundest atoms; and which are of the neatest fashion; every way you must suppose the best conditioned the whole country could afford. . . . And these are the things you must know, which think, study, contemplate, frame syllogisms, make theorems, lay plots, contrive business, act the philosopher, the logician, the mathematician and everything else. The least atoms are fittest for this turn:but sure, if all sober reason be not utterly lost and squandered away among these little entities, it must needs be judged altogether incomprehensible why, if upon account of littleness any atom should be capable of reasoning-all should not be so, and then we could not but have a very

rational world."

And what is here said by Howe respecting the atoms composing the world, may also be said of the minds too generally helping to compose

society, that if littleness is the qualification for reason; we have rooin for very general congratulation: though none shall be so highly congratulated, as those "minute philosophers" who construct mind out of

matter.

II. We may secondly consider the theory of idealism, as maintained by Bishop Berkeley, in his "Principles of Human Knowledge," and in three Dialogues on this subject between Hylas and Philonus: from which we shall learn at least, what is to be thought of the boasted certainty about matter, and how much we know of the real nature of that substance. Whence it will be seen, that to say that mind is matter, is to say that it is something of which we know nothing.

Nor let any one imagine, that what Berkeley says is a mere fallacy, which every child can detect, for he has never been answered except by urging objections which he himself clearly foresaw and refuted. And here let us advise all who can get Berkeley, to read him, especially his "Minute Philosopher," which though of a metaphysical nature, is full of inimitable beauty and simplicity: and is as pleasing in style, as it is instructive in the subjects discussed.

In his "Principles of Human Knowledge," and his Dialogues upon them with which we have now to do, his main object is to shew, that the wonderful thing called matter, the substratum or supporter of those qualities we perceive by our senses; is a thing of which we have no experience nor knowledge, and that all we are acquainted with, is certain effects in our own minds, called sensible ideas: which may result from no material or external objects; but may be produced in our thoughts, by the regular method of working carried on by an omnipotent Spirit. Now whatever may be thought as to what causes the impressions upon our senses; whether it be matter or a spirit, it is certain that we can know no more respecting it, than what we experience; that is, our sensations, or the ideas existing in our minds.

"That neither our thoughts nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind," he observes, "is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident, that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them." "Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word, the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is impossible to separate even in thought, any of these from perception." And obviously so, for they are perceptions, as every one who has considered them allows.

"Whence it follows," says the author, "that there is no other substance but spirit, or that which perceives."

"Some make a distinction, between primary and secondary qualities: by the former, they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity, or impenetrability and number: by the latter, they denote all other sensible qualities as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. Secondary qualities, they acknowledge exist only in the mind, but that our ideas of primary qualities are patterns or images of things existing without the mind, in an unthinking substance called matter. But as extension, figure and motion, are only ideas in the mind, and an idea can be like nothing but another idea, consequently, neither they nor their archetypes can exist in