share with you today. As you see the facility is truly an incredible accomplishment. Even to those who have not had years of scientific training, the enormous complexity of the project can be appreciated. Please let me repeat: 8 years of dedicated

manpower and $350 million dollars have been pumped into the

MFTF-B.

With $20 million in additional investment we can reap a wealth of knowledge from the project. Without the additional funding, the

$350 million will be utterly wasted. It will be like we had burned the previous $350 million dollar bills because we couldn't find another $20 million.

In 1980 under the Magnetic Fusion Engineering Act, we made a commitment to develop fusion as a viable energy source for this country. Scientists had intended the MFTF-B project as one of the two options in the search for a way to harness fusion. In not allowing the project to run, we are not upholding our commitment.

Let's not lose this momentum our scientists have been able to build over the years. I hope you can find savings in other areas which will enable this committee to learn from the $350 million investment at Livermore.

Thank you.

Mrs. LLOYD. I hope we continue to have the benefit of your input. The rest of our witnesses may come up at this time if you wish. I would like to hold our attention, our questions rather, until we hear all of the statements from our witnesses.

Our witnesses this afternoon are certainly good friends of this committee. We even have the former chairman of the subcommittee, the Honorable Mike McCormack. We also have Dr. Steven Dean, who is president of Fusion Power Associates, who is certainly no stranger to this committee. We are also very happy to have Dr. Allan Mense representing the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, who has served this committee well. And we are also happy to have Prof. George Miley of the University of Illinois. Mike, we always are happy to see you and to benefit from your perspective on the fusion programs as you were the author of our fusion legislation. Your written testimony will be made a part of the record, and you may summarize as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCCORMACK, FORMER U.S.

REPRESENTATIVE

Mr. McCORMACK. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, I am certainly, of course, delighted to be invited to appear again before this subcommittee and discuss some thoughts concerning magnetic fusion.

I would like to establish that I am speaking for myself, alone. I do not represent any other entity or individual, public or private. Madam Chairman, I testified before this committee 1 year ago, and I made several points. I should like to quickly refer back to them by way of just establishing a frame of reference.

I suggested that this subcommittee propose a study of a new approach to fusion research because: (1) There was little likelihood of Federal funding for a new next step large magnetic fusion experiment. There was little likelihood of meaningful international cooperation in such a large machine, and that it would be "fraught with endless difficulty, frustration, and delay"-that's a quote from last year—that a large machine was not likely to be a realistic step toward practical fusion power, and that the United States should not continue large machine programs beyond the scheduled operation of the TFTR.

I quoted from your report that the "goal of the Magnetic Fusion Program is develop and ultimately demonstrate the technology for providing electric power from fusion reactors at commercial scale,' and I suggested that this might best be done with small machines rather than large ones and that small machines may be made inexpensively enough to be attractive for commercial use.

I pointed out that a great deal more was known then, and indeed now, about the plasma physics of small machines than in 1980, and that leading plasma physicists believe that it is possible to create a sustained fusion reaction in a small machine.

I added that small machines may have the advantage of being zero maintenance-cheap enough to be thrown away when they wear out or become inoperable. And I pointed out that there are a variety of designs of small machines.

I also pointed out that there is significant interest in magnetic fusion within private industry, but that industry is unlikely to participate in innovative research in fusion until there is a DOE research site for testing machines with actual deuterium-tritium burns.

I emphasized that such a site could not possibly be on a college campus or in a conventional industrial laboratory. I stated that:

It would be necessary to be located at a DOE facility with all the preexisting services that major DOE facilities provide: remoteness, security, NRC and DOE supervision, tritium-handling facilities, available hot lab examination facilities, radiation monitoring and control, waste disposal facilities, adequate (low-cost) electric power, and scientific and engineering support from experienced onsite contractors.

I emphasized that such a fusion research center should be available to any governmental agency or private entity for testing.

Madam Chairman, I was, of course, pleased when your subcommittee report and the report of the full committee recommended that the DOE conduct such a study. And although that legislation did not become law, it appears to have had a significant impact. I know that you detected, as I have in the testimony of Dr. Alvin Trivelpiece yesterday, and by the Magnetic Fusion Energy Program review that accompanied the fiscal year 1987 budget request, that the administration appears to be turning in the direction of a fusion program that is more focused and more directed toward the goal of producing fusion power. This is certainly to be applauded. However, there are several points I should like to make for consideration by this subcommittee at this time as you prepare authorizing legislation and offer congressional guidance.

The first is an observation. There is frequently a tendancy to build a mythology around a subject to rewrite history to suit the perspective or the prejudice of the historian. And once this mythology is accepted or goes unchallenged it is easy to rationalize policies or programs or failures according to misconceptions that have been thus created. This may not at first seem to be important, but I believe it is very important with respect to the case of fusion research and development-past, present, and future.

Madam Chairman, I might digress to say that I attended the OPA workshop this morning on fusion for which you recommended me, and that this point was made quite clearly at that time alsoand I think accepted. This myth is that fusion research has been driven, or even heavily influenced, by the oil crises or the energy crisis of the 1970's. This is categorically untrue.

In reality, it is an insult to the intelligence of Members of Congress and this committee; to say nothing of the many scientists who have already given much of their lives to the program before 1973.

Fusion research started in the 1950's, fully 20 years before any thought of an oil crisis, or before energy became a popular subject of the 1970's. It was known then as Project Sherwood. It stumbled over the fact that plasmas could not be adequately controled at that time, until the Russian success of the tokamaks in the late 1960's which was picked up.

By 1973, when I became a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Dr. Robert Hirsch became the Director of Fusion Energy, the program began to accelerate. And during that

period, from 1973 to 1980-Steve Dean is aware of this and Jack Dugan is aware of this-the program was driven by accomplishments, goals, and inspiration. It was a period of successes with the Princeton large Torus, the Alcator at MIT, and successes at Livermore. It was a period of building, but it had nothing whatsoever to do with the energy crisis.

At no time during the entire period did anyone pretend that fusion energy would have any impact, especially in the near future future, with respect to the energy crisis. Our most optimistic goals involved some sort of fusion demonstration plant by the year 2000, and hopefully commercialization some time after the year 2010.

I hope no one on this committee will be trapped into thinking that fusion funding is a function of real or apparent oil supply. It is not. This has never been true. The program should be isolated in its approach from the questions of energy supply and demand for the immediate, and even indeed for the forseeable future. A fusion program should continue to be a research, development, and demonstration program-moving forward as rapidly as is technologically and economically practicle, to provide us an intimate supply of energy-primarly electrical energy-at the earliest realistic date.

The second myth is like the first. It is that this program is a "research only" program. This has never been true, in spite of statements that have been made in the last few years that this is a 70year, or more recently a 35-year, "research only" program. I am sure you realize that Congress would never have allowed this, would never have funded such a program. Everything that we have done in the past, all the authorization and appropriation legislation, has been built around the concept that this is to provide the people of this Nation and the world with expensive, environmentally acceptable energy from an infinite fuel supply at the earliest realistic date. It has never been anything else. We should not fall into that trap.

Accordingly, Madam Chairman, I was most pleased yesterday to hear you and Congressman Morrison question Dr. Trivelpiece about goals and sites and dates for success. This is now critically important.

I believe this subcommittee is in a position to make a major contribution by insisting that the Department of Energy come forth soon with a specific program for the production of fusion electricity at the earliest reasonable date. I am not suggesting that we be unrealistic, or that you be unrealistic, or that you ask them to be unrealistic. But I think it's important for them to get into context what the congressional intent is. I suggest that Members of Congress and the public in general really expect nothing else.

I think there are three major lines of approach that should be followed in reaching such a goal.

The first of these is selecting a site for a DOE research centeras you discussed yesterday, Madam Chairman. And since this will require at least 5 to 7 years to have ready for operation it should be obvious that we should start now. There is no reason for delay. It must be located at a major DOE site such as Oak Ridge, Hanford, Idaho, or Los Alamos. Under no conditions should the committee allow the pretense that fusion research machines with deutrium-tritium burns could be located on or near any college campus

or any populated community. Such an idea is simply not worthy of serious consideration.

In addition, such a site should be developed so that private industry could bring machines to the facility for testing. This is totally consistent with administration philosophy, and it offers private industry's only apparent opportunity to get into the game competitively at this time with innovation and competition of ideas that are so important.

In addition to designing a site and starting construction on it, the materials testing program should be initiated at once. The administration calls for materials testing program, but it does not provide for any 14 mev neutrons in it. I think this is a major flaw in the program. The FMIT is an obvious area for international cooperation. We had serious interest in funding the FMIT among the Japanese and the Germans before the program was dropped by this Administration. I think this should be re-explored. Money should be appropriated and a commitment made by the DOE to build the FMIT, and I believe that we would have significant international cooperation. I believe that this is an area for cooperation with the Russians.

And this brings me, Madam Chairman, to a major point. I seriously question the wisdom of tying our fusion program to a collaborative effort with the Russians. I applaud every initiative for cooperation with the Russians, and I hope that we can establish many programs in research and development that will bring us together, step by step, so that we can learn to work together and avoid any potential for conflict. However, a realistic appraisal of our position with respect to the fusion program quickly makes it clear that we are beyond the point where we have any interest in any large fusion machine-especially for research only. Such a machine would indeed be just a "Spruce Goose."

Our need is for a variety of small fusion machines that have a potential for practical commercialization. Such small machines are so much less expensive than one big machine that we can build them, and the fusion research center for testing them, without the problems and delay of international cooperation. This country can easily build a complete fusion research center and several small machines for testing for 5 to 10 percent of the cost of a large fusion research machine. It can be done on this budget that we have today, and it would be folly to waste our money on a big machine, or even a share of one.

I strongly suggest that the House Committee on Science and Technology explore the possibility of a collaborative effort with the Russians on the super collider. I know that isn't the subject of this particular hearing, but I believe that is the appropriate area for cooperation. This is going to be the kind of basic research that is far more realistic for collaborative effort.

Incidentally, I have no objection to sharing all of the data from fusion with the Russians. I don't mean to cut them out. I just think it would be wrong to tie ourselves to such an international program.

So to conclude, Madam Chairman, I applaud the apparent decision on the part of the Department and the Office of Fusion Energy, to move the fusion program more towards engineering de