fice to convince him of his error.

For the closeness of the analogy between the works of nature, and the word of the gospel, being found to be such, that every blow which is aimed at the one, rebounds with undiminished force against the other the conviction of their common origin must be the inference of unbiassed understanding.

Thus, when in the outset of his argument, the deist tells us, that as obedience must be the object of God's approbation, and disobedience the ground of his displeasure, it must follow by natural consequence, that when men have transgressed the divine commands, repentance and amendment of life will place them in the same situation as if they had never offended:-he does not recollect, that actual experience of the course of nature directly contradicts the assertion; and that, in the common occurrences of life, the man, who by intemperance and voluptuousness, has injured his character, his fortune, and his health, does not find himself instantly restored to the full enjoyment of these blessings on repenting of his past misconduct, and determining on future amendment. Now, if the attributes of the Deity demand, that the punishment should not outlive the crime, on what ground shall we justify this temporal dispensation? The difference in degree, cannot affect the question in the least. It matters not, whether the punishment be of long or of short duration; whether in this world or in the next. If the justice or the goodness of God, require that punishment should not be inflicted, when repentance has taken place; it must be a violation of those attributes to permit any punishment whatever, the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will it avail to say, that the evils of this life attendant upon vice, are the effects of an established constitution, and follow in the way of natural consequence. Is not that established constitution itself, the effect of the divine decree? And are not its several operations as much the appointment of its Almighty framer, as if they had individually flowed from his immediate direction? But besides, what reason have we to suppose that God's treatment of us in a future state, will not be of the same nature as we find it in this; according to established rules, and in the way of natural consequence? Many circumstances might be urged on the contrary, to evince the likelihood that it will. But this is not necessary to our present purpose. It is sufficient, that the deist cannot prove that it will not. Our experience of the present state of things evinces, that indemnity is not the consequence of repentance here: can he adduce a counter-experience to show, that it will hereafter? The justice and goodness of

God are not then necessarily concerned, in virtue of the sinner's repentance, to remove all evil consequent upon sin in the next life, or else the arrangement of events in this, has not been regulated by the dietates of justice and goodness. If the deist admits the latter, what becomes of his natural religion?

Now let us inquire, whether the conclusions of abstract reasoning will coincide with the deductions of experience. If obedience be at all times our duty, in what way can present repentance release us from the punishment of former transgressions ?(d) Can repentance annihilate what is past? Or, can we do more by present obedience, than acquit ourselves of present obligation? Or, does the contrition we experience, added to the positive duties we discharge, constitute a surplusage of merit, which may be transferred to the reduction of our former demerit? And is the justification of the philosopher, who is too enlightened to be a Christian, to be built, after all, upon the absurdities of supererogation? "We may as well affirm," says a learned Divine, "that our former obedience atones for our present sins, as that our present obedience makes amends for antecedent transgressions." And it is surely with a peculiar ill grace, that this sufficiency of repentance is urged by those, who deny the possible efficacy of Christ's mediation; since the ground on which they deny the latter, equally serves for the rejection of the former: the necessary connexion between the merits of one being, and the acquittal of another, not being less conceivable, than that which is conceived to subsist between obedience at one time, and the forgiveness of disobedience at another.

Since then, upon the whole, experience (as far as it extends) goes to prove the natural inefficacy of repentance to remove the effects of past transgressions; and the abstract reason of the thing, can furnish no link, whereby to connect present obedience with forgiveness of former sins: it follows, that however the contemplation of God's infinite goodness and love, might excite some faint hope, that mercy would be extended to the sincerely penitent; the animating certainty of this momentous truth, without which the religious sense can have no place, can be derived from the express communication of the Deity alone. (e)

But it is yet urged by those, who would measure the proceedings of divine wisdom by the standard of their own reason; that, admitting the necessity of a Revelation on this

(d) See No, IV. (e) See No. V.

subject, it had been sufficient for the Deity to have made known to man his benevolent intention; and that the circuitous apparatus of the scheme of redemption must have been superfluous, for the purpose of rescuing the world from the terrors and dominion of sin; when this might have been ef fected in a way infinitely more simple and intelligible, and better calculated to excite our gratitude and love, merely by proclaiming to mankind a free pardon, and perfect indemnity, on condition of repentance and amendment.

To the disputer, who would thus prescribe to God the mode by which he may best conduct his creatures to happiness, we might as before reply, by the application of his own argument to the course of ordinary events: and we might demand of him to inform us, wherefore the Deity should have left the sustenance of life, depending on the tedious process of human labour and contrivance, in rearing from a small seed, and conducting to the perfection fitting it for the use of man, the necessary article of nourishment; when the end might have been at once accomplished by its instantaneous production. And will he contend that bread has not been ordained for the support of man; because that, instead of the present circuitous mode of its production, it might have been rained down from heaven, like the manna in the wilderness? On grounds such as these, the philosopher (as he wishes to be called) may be safely allowed to object to the notion of forgiveness by a Mediator.

With respect to every such objection as this, it may be well, once for all, to make this general observation. We find, from the whole course of nature, that God governs the world, not by independent acts, but by connected system. The instruments which he employs in the ordinary works of his Providence, are not physically necessary to his operations. He might have acted without them, if he pleased. "He might, for instance, have created all men, without the intervention of parents: but where then had been the beneficial connexion between parents and children; and the numerous advantages resulting to human society from such connexion?" The difficulty lies here: the uses arising from the connexions of God's acts may be various; and such are the pregnancies of his works, that a single act may answer a prodigious variety of purposes. Of these several purposes we are, for the most part, ignorant: and from this ignorance are derived most of our weak objections against the ways of his Providence; whilst we foolishly presume, that, like human agents, he has but one end in view. (ƒ)

(f) See No. VI.

This observation we shall find of material use in our examination of the remaining arguments adduced by the deist on the present subject. And there is none to which it more forcibly applies than to that by which he endeavours to prove the notion of a Mediator to be inconsistent with the divine immutability. It is either, he affirms, (g) agreeable to the will of God to grant salvation on repentance, and then he will grant it without a Mediator: or it is not agreeable to his will, and then a Mediator can be of no avail, unless we admit the mutability of the divine decrees.

But the objector is not, perhaps, aware how far this reasoning will extend. Let us try it in the case of prayer. All such things as are agreeable to the will of God must be accomplished, whether we pray or not; and therefore our prayers are useless, unless they be supposed to have a power of altering his will. And indeed, with equal conclusiveness it might be proved that repentance itself must be unnecessary. For if it be fit that our sins should be forgiven, God will forgive us without repentance: and if it be unfit, repentance can be of no avail. (h)

The error in all these conclusions is the same. It consists in mistaking a conditional for an absolute decree; and in supposing God to ordain an end unalterably, without any concern as to the intermediate steps, whereby that end is to be accomplished. Whereas the manner is sometimes as necessary as the act proposed: so that if not done in that particular way, it would not have been done at all. Of this observation, abundant illustration may be derived, as well from natural as from revealed religion." Thus we know from natural religion, that it is agreeable to the will of God, that the distresses of mankind should be relieved: and yet we see the destitute, from a wise constitution of Providence, left to the precarious benevolence of their fellow-men; and if not relieved by them, they are not relieved at all. In like manner, in Revelation, in the case of Naaman the Syrian, we find that God was willing he should be healed of his leprosy; but yet he was not willing that it should be done, except in one particular manAbana and Pharpar were as famous as any of the rivers of Israel. Could he not wash in them, and be clean? Certainly he might, if the design of God had been no more than to heal him. Or it might have been done without any washing at all. But the healing was not the only design of God, nor the most important. The manner of the cure was of more consequence in the moral design of God, than the cure

ner.

(g) See No. VII. (h) See No. VIII.

itself: the effect being produced, for the sake of manifesting to the whole kingdom of Syria, the great power of the God of Israel, by which the cure was performed." And in like manner, though God willed that the penitent sinner should receive forgiveness; we may see good reason why, agreeably to his usual proceeding, he might will it to be granted in one particular manner only, through the intervention of a Mediator. (i)

Although in the present stage of the subject, in which we are concerned with the objections of the DEIST, the argument should be confined to the deductions of natural reason; yet I have added this instance from Revelation, because, strange to say, some who assume the name of Christians, and profess not altogether to discard the written word of Revelation, adopt the very principle which we have just examined. For what are the doctrines of that description of Christians, (k) in the sister kingdom,* who glory in having brought down the high things of God to the level of man's understanding? That Christ was a person sent into the world to promulgate the will of God: to communicate new lights on the subject of religious duties: by his life to set an example of perfect obedience: by his death to manifest his sincerity: and by his resurrection to convince us of the great truth which he had been commissioned to teach, our rising again to future life. This, say they, is the sum and substance of Christianity. It furnishes a purer morality, and a more operative enforcement: its morality more pure, as built on juster notions of the divine nature: and its enforcement more operative, as founded on a certainty of a state of retribution. (1)-And is then Christianity nothing but a new and more formal promulgation of the religion of nature? Is the death of Christ but an attestation of his truth? And are we, after all, left to our own merit for acceptance; and obliged to trust for our salvation to the perfection of our obedience? Then, indeed, has the great Author of our religion in vain submitted to the agonies of the cross; if after having given to mankind a law, which leaves them less excusable in their transgressions, he has left them to be judged by the rigour of that law, and to stand or fall by their own personal deserts.

It is said, indeed, that as by this new dispensation, the certainty of pardon on repentance has been made known, mankind has been informed of all that is essential in the doctrine of mediation. But granting that no more was intended

(i) See No. IX.

(¿) See No. X.
• England.

(1) See No. XI.