to it. But as his proof of the heavenly bodies having souls is the regularity of their motions, it is possible that he might consider matter, before it was reduced into order, as having been without a soul; and though he speaks of the soul of the world as having existed before the body, it is possible that by body he might not mean mere matter, but matter reduced into order, and formed into a regular universe. "He," (viz. God,) he says, "gave a soul, which, by its origin and power, is prior to, and older than the body, as its governess and directrix."* He then proceeds to give an account of the essential parts and principles of this soul of the universe; but I have no occasion to follow him so far. One reason, however, why it may be doubted whether the soul of the world was supposed by Plato to be given it by God, is, that in one passage of his writings he supposes that there were more of these souls than one. Having defined soul to be the cause of self-motion, in answer to the question, whether there was only one soul in the universe, he answers, "more than one, two at least, one benevolent, and the other of a contrary disposition."† Now, according to Plato, nothing evil was made by the supreme Being himself; and, therefore, it should seem that this malevolent soul, or principle, in nature, must have had some other origin, and, perhaps, have been co-existent with matter, though subject to the controul of the supreme and good Being. It was allowed that there was something divine in the souls of men, which Clemens Alexandrinus calls the ves, that was in it, which he says the Platonists made to be an emanation from the Deity. It is probable, therefore, that Plato might suppose the proper on in the soul of the world to be essential to matter, and that God imparted the ves. That God is good, and can only be the cause of good, is most expressly asserted by Plato. "For the evils of life,' he says, we must seek for some other cause than God." According to Plato, the supreme Being himself is not only not the author of evil, but even not of things that are imperfect, and subject to decay and death. However, since it was proper, in order to complete the whole system, that 66 * Ο δε και γενέσει και αρετη, προτεραν και πρεσβυτέραν ψυχην σωμαίος, ὡς δεσπολιν και αρξεσαν αρξομένα συνεζησαίο. Timæus, p. 478. (Ρ.) † Δυοιν μεν γεπε, ελατίον μηδεν τίθωμεν, γαρ τε ευεργετίδος, και τε τανανίια δυναμers εtepуacao Ja. De Leg. L. x. p. 60s. (P.) † Οι μεν αμφι Πλαίωνα ναν μεν εν ψυχῇ θειάς μοιρας απορροιαν υπαρχονία· ψυχην δε εν σωματι κατοικίζεσιν. Strom. v. p. 590. (Ρ.) § Των δε κακων, αλλα τα δει ζηλειν τα αιτία, αλλ' ε τον Θεον. De Rep. L. ii. p. 390. (P.) such things should be formed, having himself made the celestial and immortal beings, that is, the heavenly bodies, (to each of which he assigns a soul,) Plato introduces the Divine Being as solemnly addressing himself to them, and giving them directions for the production of such creatures as he could not make, himself, (since, then, they would necessarily have been immortal,) viz, man and all terrestrial animals. (Timæus, p. 481.) This universe, created as it was, Plato speaks of, as a divinity, and in the highest style; using the following remarkable expressions at the close of his Timæus: "This universe, comprehending mortal and immortal beings, and complete, being a visible living creature, containing visible. things, the image of the intelligible," (that is, the invisible world of ideas,) "is the greatest and best visible God, the fairest and the most perfect; this one heaven" (viz. system) "being the only-begotten." On this principle it was, that Plato, and the other heathen philosophers, vindicated the system of Polytheism; supposing that one supreme God made a number of subordinate beings, each of them invested with a limited jurisdiction, so as to be considered as gods. That matter was the source of all evil was the doctrine of all the Platonists, as well as of the oriental philosophers. Plotinus says, that "matter is absolutely evil, having no portion of good in it."+ Thus I have given the best view that I been able to collect of every thing that can be supposed to constitute the Trinity of Plato, from his own writings, without finding in them any resemblance to the Christian Trinity, or indeed any proper personification of the divine logos, which has been made the second person in it. I have particularly examined what the learned Dr. Cudworth and others have advanced on this dark subject, without seeing their conclusions properly supported. To shew on how slight foundations such writers as he (who certainly did not mean to deceive) can advance such things as he does, and how far their imagination and hypothesis can impose upon them, I shall lay before my readers two of his assertions on this subject. He says, "In his second epistle to Dionysius, he" (Plato) Θνητα γαρ και αθαναία ζωα λαβων, και ξυμπληρωθεις όδε κόσμος, οὕτω ζωον δραῖον, τα δραία περιέχον, είκων το νοηls, Θεος αισθητός μέγιςος και αριςος, καλλιςος τε και τελεω Παῖος, εις έρανος όδε, μονογενης ων. Timæus, p. 501. (P.) † Οπερ εςιν ἡ ὕλη, τείο το ονίως κακον, μηδεμιαν εχον αγαθε μοιραν. En.i. L. viii. Sect. v. p. 75. (P.) Intellectual System, L. i. C. i. p. 407. (P.) "does mention a Trinity of divine hypostases all together." From this, one would expect at least something like the Athanasian doctrine of three persons in one God. But all that I can learn from Plato in this epistle is as follows: Sending his letter to a great distance, and apprehensive of the possibility of its not reaching the person to whom it was addressed, he says, that he had written so obscurely, that only Dionysius himself could understand it. "All things are about the king of all, and all things are for the sake of him, and he is the author of every thing that is fair and good; but the second about the second, and the third about the third. The mind of man may stretch itself to learn what these things are, looking at those which resemble them, of which none do it sufficiently; but with respect to the king, and the things of which I speak, there is nothing like them."* This is Dr. Cudworth's Trinity of divine hypostases, and it is certainly as obscure as any doctrine of the Trinity needs to be. Plato himself, or Dionysius, can alone explain it to us. I imagine, however, that, in this dark manner, he might refer to one or other of the ternaries above-mentioned, viz. the supreme Being, his ideas, and the visible world; or the supreme Being, the visible world, and primeval matter. Again, the Doctor says, (p. 406,) “In other places of his" (Plato's)" writings, he frequently asserts above the selfmoving psyche, an immoveable and standing ves, or intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world." But it has appeared, that, according to Plato, the supreme Being himself, whom he styles the good, was the Demiurgus with respect to every thing that is immortal and perfect, and that not his ves, but those other created immortal beings, were the makers of man and all other mortal and imperfect creatures. As to the many passages in the writings of Plato, which, he says, teach the contrary doctrine, I can only say, that I have not found any of them; and that if there be any such, they must be contradicted by what I have already quoted from him. In a tract that remains, of Timæus Locrus, from whom it is acknowledged that Plato borrowed the outlines of his system, we perceive no trace of two intelligent beings, but Περι τον πανίων βασιλεα παντ' εςι, και εκείνα ἕνεκα πανία, και εκείνο αιτιον απάντων των καλων, δεύτερον δε περι τα δεύτερα, και τρίτον περί τα τρία ή εν ανθρωπινη ψυχή, περί αυτά ορεγείαι, μαθει ποι άτία εςι, βλέπεσα εις τα αυτης συγγενή, ὧν δεν ικανώς έχεις το δε βασιλέως περί, και ών είπον, εδεν εςι τε7. Epist. ad Dionysium it. p. 670. (P.) of one only, which he calls God, a being essentially good, who himself formed the world out of pre-existent matter.* "God," he says, "being good, and seeing matter capable of receiving ideas,” (meaning, probably, the impressions of ideas,) “ and capable of change, but variously and irregularly, was desirous of reducing it into order, and to bring it from uncertain changes to a fixed state, that the differences of bodies might correspond and not vary at random, made the world out of the whole of matter; giving all nature for its boundary, that it might comprehend every thing within itself, and be one, his only-begotten, a perfect, living, rational and spherical body.”† According to Timæus, ideas and nous must have been synonymous, and the same with the divine Being himself, or the proper furniture of his mind. For having begun with saying that " there are two causes of all things, viz. mind, (nous,) of those things that are according to reason, and necessity, of those things that are acted upon like body. The former," he says, "was called God, being the origin of the best things." He then says, that "all things are idea, matter and sensible things, their offspring." The former, viz. idea, he defines to be "something unbegotten, immoveable and abiding, intelligible, and the pattern of things that are produced and changeable."§ Afterwards, having said that matter is eternal, he says, “ there are two opposite principles, idea, which may be compared to the male or the father, and matter, to a female or the mother; and the third," he adds, "is the offspring of these," meaning nature. This is in reality the whole of Plato's system, and delivered with greater clearness than he has done it himself; and we see that, in effect, it is the τινος. Πριν ων ωρανον γενεσθαι, λόγῳ ηςην ιδεα τε και ύλα, και ὁ Θεος δημιεργος τω βελ- † Αγαθος ων ὁ Θεός, όρων τε ταν ύλαν δεχομεναν ταν ιδέαν και αλλοιωμεναν, παντοίως μεν, αλακίως δε, εδειτ' ες ταξιν αυίαν αγεν, και εξ αορίςων μεταβολαν, ες ὡρισμεναν καλασασαι· ιν ὁμολογοι ται διακρίσεις των σωμαίων γιγνοιντο, και μη κατ' αυλομαίον τροπας δεχοιίο εποίησεν ων τον δὲ τον κόσμον εξ απάσας τας ύλας, ὁρον αυτον κατασκευαξας τας τω οντος φυσιος, δια το πανία τ' αλλα εν αὐτῷ περιέχεν, ένα, μονογενή, τελειον, εμψυχον τε και λογικον (κρεσσονα γαρ τα δε αψυχω και αλόγω εςόν) και σφαιροειδες σωμα. Ibid. (P.) † Δυο αιλιας ειμεν των συμπανίων· νοον μεν, των κατα λόγον γιγνομενων αναγκαν δε, των βια κατίας δυναμεις των σωμαίων· τελεων δε, τον μεν, τας τ' αγαθω φύσιος ειμεν, Θεον τε ονυμαίνεσθαι, αρχαν τε των αρίσων. Ibid. p. 544. (Ρ.) § Τα δε ξυμπανία, ιδεαν, ύλαν, αισθήλον τε, οιον εκγονον τελεων και το μεν, ειμεν αγε ναῖον τε και ακιναίον, και μενον τε, και τας, ταυίῳ φυσιος νοαίον τε και παράδειγμα των γενωμενων, ικασα εν μεταβολα ενιι. Ibid. (Ρ.) είδος | Ταυλαν δε ταν ύλαν αίδιον μεν εφα. Δυο ὧν αίδε αρχαι εναντιαι εντι αν το μεν λογον έχει αρρενος τε και παίρος" αδ' ύλα, θήλεος τε και μαίερος τρίτα δε ειμεν τα εκ τελων εκγονα. Ibid. p. 545, (Ρ.) doctrine of one God, who made all things out of uncreated matter, from patterns of things existing in his own mind. That Plato borrowed from Timæus we see in his copying his very phraseology. For he says that, "the origin of the world is mixed, being produced from the conjunction of necessity and mind, nous."* He also say, "we must distinguish two causes of things, the one necessary, the other divine." Nothing could be more exactly copied. CHAPTER VII.‡ A VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LATER THOSE who are usually called the later Platonists, were those philosophers, chiefly of Alexandria, who, a little before and after the commencement of the Christian æra, adopted the general principles of Plato, but not without incorporating with them those of other philosophers, so that theirs was not an absolutely pure and unmixed Platonism. However, in their notions concerning God, and the general system of things, they aimed at this, pretending only to interpret the meaning of Plato, and to reason from his principles, though their refinements have only served to make the system more mysterious and absurd. SECTION I. The Doctrine of the later Platonists concerning God WE see, in the writings of these later Platonists, or may better conjecture from them, what was meant by the ideal or intelligible world, which makes so great a figure in this system, and which is sometimes confounded with nous or logos, the seat, receptacle, or place of this ideal world. But, in their writings, the term logos, of which so much account is made in the works of Philo, and the philosophizing Christians, does not much occur; though there can be no diffi Μεμιγμένη γαρ εν ή τωδε κοσμο γενεσις, εξ ανάγκης τε και να συςάσεως εγενήθη. Timæus, Opera, p. 533, Ed. Gen. (P.) Η Διο δη χρη δυο αιτιας ειδη διορίζεσθαι το μεν, αναγκαιον το δε, θείον. Ibid. p. 542. (P.) Copied, with enlargements, from the author's paper, Theol. Rep. IV. p. 381. |