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DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

This being the topic which now engages the attention of all those, who have sense enough to perceive the danger to which their country is exposed, and who have, at the same time, a wish to preserve it, and courage to endeavour to accomplish that wish, we think it our duty to devote a considerable part of the present sheet to the speech delivered, on the subject, by MR. WINDHAM, whose Counsel, if it had been followed before, would have prevented the evils with whieh we are now beset; and, if followed now, may yet prevent those evils from terminating in our subjugation.——The Speech which we are about to insert, was delivered in the House of Commons, on the 20th instant, in disapprobation of the plan, proposed by the ministers, for raising 50,000 men, in England, Scotland, and Ireland, by way of ballot, or military conscription. The plan, as described by the Se'cretary at War, was as follows. A body of 50,000 men, to be called the Army of Reserve, to be immediately raised by ballot, according to the following quotas: the counties of England and Wales, 31,000, London and the Tower Hamlets, 3,000, Scotland, 6,000, Ireland, 10,000. Whether the conscripts were to be allowed to find substitutes, or were, in case of not serving themselves, to pay a fine to the government, does not appear to have been determined on. The term of service was four years, with an extension, as to place, to any part of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey.-The officers, to be commissioned by the King, were to come from the half-pay list of the army, from amongst those who had quitted the service for want of promotion, from the Marines, from the East India Company's service, and, if all these sources were insufficient, as if this multifarious and motley groupe were not enough so, the remaining vacancies were proposed to be filled up by persons who served as officers in Volunteer Yeomanry Corps in Ireland, during the late rebellion, to which were to be added, if necessary, the officers of the Recruiting Staff, at the head of whom is GENERAL GRAEME, a person that the Secretary at War described as being "himself a host," a circumstance at which, we trust, the naVOL. III.

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tion must have heard with the most lively joy.Such were the out-lines of the plan, to which Mr. Windham made the objections that will be found in his speech. It will be perceived, too, that he did not object to this plan without proposing another instead of it; and, it only remains for the public and the Parliament to determine, which is

the best.

SIR,-The Honourable Gentleman has introduced this measure in a manner perfectly suitable to the solemnity of the occasion, and to the impression which such an occasion was likely to produce on his mind. I wish the measure itself had been equally suitable to the manner of its introduction, or to the circumstances out of which it has arisen. But, alas! it has fallen miserably short both of the occasion and of the expectation which I had allowed myself to form of it. Instead of helping us out of our difficulties it serves only to confirm a most material part of them, and for the rest, to give us but very imperfect and inadequate assistance. This grand measure of which so much expectation has been raised, turns out, at last, to be nothing more than a mere addition to the militia, with all the evils incident to that system, perverted and misapplied as it has been for a period of several years past. In addition to 70,000 men raised or raising according to that system upon the population of Great-Britain, and of 18,000 so raised in Ireland, we are now to have 10,000 more for Ireland and 40,000 for Great Britain, making in the whole the number of 138,000, of which 18,000 (the original militia in Ireland), are to be raised by bounty in the first instance, and the rest to be raised by ballot, with the privilege of exemption from personal service, on the condition of finding a substitute. Does any man dream after this, that it is possible for Great Britain to have an army? The hope is utterly childish. The recruiting of the British army bas, as every body knows, long stood still. An army not recruited must, by degrees, waste away. In spite of all the hopes, which some may indulge of transferring men hereafter by new bounties from Hh

the force thus raised to the regular army,a most uncertain and ineligible method,the army must unavoidably stand still for the present, and one nay venture to say, under the influence of such a system is not likely to be again put in motion.

This, therefore, is my great, leading, and fundamental objection to this measure, that jt destroys all hope, now and hereafter, of a force truly regular,-that it completely cuts up the army. This it effects, not so much by the raising of so many men,—a measure which at the present moment I am not prepared to object to; but, by admitting the principle of substitution. That a compulsory levy cannot be made without a power of commutation of some sort or other, I am ready to allow. The grievance would be utterly intolerable. But I hoped, as the hon. gent. knows, that another mode might have been adopted, namely, that of commutation of service for a fixed fine; which fine should be paid not into the hands of the corps for the purpose of being laid out in providing a substitute, with all the effect which such an additional demand must have in raising the rate of the bounty, but should be paid to government, to be employed by them in any way they should think proper, or, if you choose to give it an appropriation, for the providing a recruit for the army. The great point is to abolish the present competition, under which it is impossible that the army can stand; and with this view, my meaning would cer 1ainly be, not merely to abolish this com petition so far as it would arise from the body now proposed to be raised, but universally for the whole of the militia, old or new. There should be no recruiting but for the army. The militia, and every force raised by ballot should consist of nothing but the balloted men, so far as they would go. To insure the service of them, as far as I could, or as far as they were of a description to make their service desirable, I would impose a fine, greater or less, as might ultimately be thought right; but I would sooner leave the service incomplete, than, in order to complete it, introduce that fatal principle of substitution; wrong in a constitutional view if that were now worth attending to, but far more wrong and perfectly fatal from the effect which it must have of destroying all possibility of recruiting the army.

That it is the Militia system, extended as it has been of late years, and changed, as it is, in its nature and character, that has eat out the army, nobody can reasonably doubt. What is there in the condition of this country that should make it incapable of having

an army in some degree, at least, proportione ate to its population? or prevent its having now what it has had in all former times That the Militia system, as carried on of late would and must prevent this, is perfectly obvious. I want to know what ground there is for concluding that there are any other causes, if these were removed, which must equally produce the same effect? When we say, therefore, that we can get no men for the army, the answer is that we have never fairly tried. Let the experiment be bona fiae made. Abolish the competition: and in order to meet the effects of the change thus produced, begin now, what the H. G. says must be begun some time or other, and put your army on that new footing, which, without being necessary for its improvement; for I know not what improvement it wants; may be necessary to maintain its numbers. The first of these measures, as it has always appeared to me, is to change the condition of service from life to term of years;-a measure on which, if I cannot say, that military men are unani、 mous, I may safely say, that they are nearly so, and to which I certainly have never heard any objection that could at all be set in competition with the advantages to be expected from it. Its advantages indeed, if they really exist, are of that sort which must take place of every other consideration. The first merit of a book, says a great critick, is to make itself read. The first merit in the constitution of an army is to provide that it should continue an army.-Let the army, therefore, at this moment, and not at any time of future peace, and with a view to wars that may then be future, be put upon that footing, in which, in conjunction with other changes, it may hope to be recruited as it has heretofore been, and may release us from this dreadful and unheard-of state of being engaged in a war, without an offensive and disposeable force. With all the disadvantage which the very memory of the bounties heretofore given, will not fail to produce even when the bounties themselves, to this inordinate amount, shall be given no longer, I should not despair of seeing our army gradually restored, and the service again go on, as it did in all former times.

It is in conformity to these views that my judgment must be regulated upon the present measure. As a levy of so many men on the principle of ballot I may submit to it, government declaring it to be necessary, be cause the urgency of the case seems to leave me no option, and hardly time to consider the question. But as a ballot including the further principles of substitution, I must

formally protest against it: because it tends to produce effects, which no consideration of present advantage could, perhaps, justify the incurring but which, likewise, in my opinion, render the measure perfectly illcalculated to meet even the present danger. I may accept the ballot for the sake of the immediate force which it will produce, however disadvantageous I may think it in various other respects: but I must at least endeavour to disarm it of its chief mischief, by recommending that the terms of exemption from service should be a fixed fine, as I would, for the same reason, ex end that principle to every other part of the Militia.

But here I must make my formal complain of the government, which by its neglect, its delays, its total want of all foresight and precaution, has brought us to a state in which no pressure that is presented to us, can be fairly judged of. We are in straits in which we have no room to turn ourselves. The danger presses upon us so immediately, that we have not time to consider what is best: we must take up with what is first presented to us. Why has this measure been delayed to the present time? Why has it only now been discovered that a force of the sort now proposed would finally become necessary, and why, if such necessity was foreseen, has the time and manner of raising it only now been submitted to this House? Above all, why was the country reduced to its present defenceless state, immediately upon the signature of the Treaty of Amiens, in spite of what must have been obvious, one should have thought, to every common observer, of what the ministers now tell us, they themselves saw; namely, that the peace which they had made was no peace: but was open, at every moment, to such a rupture as that which has now happened. In this state did they think it right to dismantle our fleets, to reduce considerably our army, to discharge troops, which, in six weeks after, they wished to have back, or which if they did not wish to have back, as the H. G's gestures would seem to indicate, it is only a new proof how little they understood the real nature of their situation. All this was done for the miserable purpose of deluding the people with a false idea of the blessings, as they were called, of peace, and of the money they were to save by thus parting with all the means of safety.

Leaving these reflexions for the present, though I trust never forgetting them, let us return to the consideration of the measure immediately before us: and this, per haps, we cannot prope ly judge of without taking into our view the larger principles on which measures of this sort must depend.

We are in a new and unprecedented state of things, in which new dangers exist, and new modes of resistance must be resorted to if we would hope not to be overcome by them. If we proceed in the old beaten course, if we think that what saved us heretofore must be sufficient to save us now, our destruction is inevitable.

The great desideratum which we have to make good, the great problem which we have to propose to ourselves, is to find the means by which that natural force, which, in this as in all similar instances, is on the side of those attacked, may be so applied as to overcome the superior advantages of another kind which may be found on the side of the enemy. If the enemy could bring with him an army not more considerable than that which we should have to oppose him, great as the object is at stake, much as I should advise that even in that case no precautions should be omitted, yet such is my confidence in the excellence of British troops, such are the proofs which they have given of their capacity to contend with and to overcome upon any thing like equal terms the troops with whom they would have to deal, that even without those subsidiary aids, which yet it would not be right to neglect, I should feel perfectly at ease about the event.

But we are to calculare upon the supposition, a supposition far from inconsistent with the probability of the fact, that the enemy may be able to land an army in this country greater either than the whole of our regular force, or at least than that part of it which could immediately be collected to oppose them. The question then is, how shall this deficiency be supplied?--And here we have, as the foundation of our hopes, this leading fact, that in the case of every in vaded country, but certainly of every invaded island, the physical force is always on the side of the invaded.-No country probably, was ever invaded by a force superior in number, to the portion of the inhabitants of that country capable of bearing arms. It certainly will not happen to us to be so. Were the enemy to find the means of putting on shore in different parts, a body of a hundred thousand men, a supposition not likely, but by no means to be rejected as impossible, the population of this very town would yield a torce that ought to make no difficulty of contending with them. --There is no question therefore of the sufficiency of physical force: but, though we are abundantly satisfied of this truth, to a degree 13ded that leads us often into a childish and boastful confidence, let us not overlook another truth, not less important and certain, that in the conduct of human affairs it

rarely the physical force which determines. the event. If it did so, no country, as appears by what is just said, would ever fall a prey to invasion. Hanover would at this time be an independent country. It was not for want of inhabitants capable of bearing arms that that country yielded up without a blow, its laws, its government, its liberties, its property, to the handful of men, comparatively speaking, who marched against it under General Mortier. It is thus, in other instances. A battle is fought, a fortress is taken, and the country submits. If we have a mind to pursue this truth, in cases of a different sort, by what means do all the governments of the earth subsist? By possessing the physical force? Quite the contrary; the physical force is always on the side of the governed. The government of every country, with all their establishments of senates and magistrates, and ministers and officers, and even with the armies which it may have at its disposal, is nothing, in point of numbers, compared with the inhabitants at large yet thus weak in physical force, these governments are able, fortunately for the peace and happiness of the world, to hold in subjection those inhabitats, and that not only in countries where the general sentiment may be supposed to go with the government, and the submission of consequence to be voluntary, as in these happy realms, but in countries such as that of France at this moment, where of 50 or 60 millions or more, whom Buonaparté may have at his disposal, there are not probably so many thousands who really wish him well or submit to his government on any other principle than that of fear. This truth, therefore, the jacobinism of modern times chose as the foundation of all its operations, the scope and object of which was to apply the physical force of every country to the subversion of its govern

ment.

We are in circumstances, when we must prosecute a similar inquiry for a very opposite purpose; and must endeavour to find out how the physical means of a great country may be employed, not for the overthrow of its government, but to save itself from the incursion of foreign armies. And we may venture to say, that if these means can be gradually discovered and brought into use, the discovery will form an epoch in human affairs hardly less important, and certainly much more satisfactory, than that which was produced by the discovery above alluded to, of the art of overthrowing governments."

We are now in the state of being com

pelled to try what can be done towards effecting this great desideratum; in which if we cannot succeed better than has been done in most of the countries in Europe, in Hano ver, in Holland, in Flanders, in Italy, in Switzerland, the fate of this country will hang on nothing but chance. We must form our judgment of the present measure by its tendency to carry those endeavours into effect.-The general course of the proceeding, in the minds of his Majesty's ministers, seems to have been this-A regular force, a force consisting of troops of the line is confessedly the best; but circumstances, and above all the urgency of the case, will not allow of this being obtained in time. Not being able therefore to obtain the best, you must do what the law directs in the case of evidence, you must get the next best. This next best is a Militia, or a force raised upon the principles now proposed. There will therefore be three species of force in the country, 1st. the Regulars, 2dly, the Militia, and 3dly, the Volunteers, and other corps of that description; and these being to be taken, in point of preference, in the order in which they are here enumerated, the Regulars being to be considered as better than the Militia, and the Militia than the Volunteers, the masculine more worthy than the feminine, and the feminine than the neuter,-You must do in this, as all persons must do in similar circumstances, you must take the second when you cannot get the first, and the third when you cannot get either of the other two.

All this, so stated, is perfectly true. I am willing to admit, not only that the Regulars are better than the Militia, which no intelligent Militia officer wlil feel at all disposed to deny; but that Militia, on equal numbers, are better than any other species of force of an establishment still less regular.-But in the application of this to the support of the present measure there is a complete fallacy: for it is not what the option would be between these descriptions of force supposing them all before us, or, putting one out of the question, what would be the choice between the remaining two; but whether you will begin by raising that which you do not consider as best, and thereby produce a state of things in which to obtain the best shall be no longer practicable. From the language held about the comparative value of these objects you would suppose a course to be held the very reverse of that actually pursued; you would suppose the higher bounty given for the best force: and that it was only when hopes on that side were nearly exhausted, that you laid out your endea vours on a force confessedly less eligible.

But just the contrary. You give your fifteen guineas for service in the Militia; and ten or five for service in the army: and then you exclaim, that you are obliged to have recourse to Militia, because you can get no army. This statement, therefore, when applied thus generally, can by no means be admitted. All that can be said is, that in the mode proposed, and by a continuance of the Militia system, you will, for a time, raise your men faster, and will, in the same time, produce a greater force. The question will then be, how far the superior quantity will compensate the difference of quality; and how far present advantages must be made to outweigh, in the actual circumstances, all consideration of objects, even of the highest consequence, in future.

In this view it may be necessary to say a word or two, on the difference that must, for ever, subsist between troops of the line, and every other species of troops serving upon the footing of a Militia. It is as little pleasant to me as to any other gentleman to be making comparisons, that can rarely be satisfactory to both parties, and to be marking perpetually to officers of the Militia, that, after all their zeal, all their intelligence, all their honourable sacrifices, all their meritorious exertions, and with all the wellfounded vanity which they may feel at the success of their endeavours; a success far exceeding all that the founders of the Militia could ever have ventured to promise themselves; the service in which they have thas laboured, cannot, by the very nature of it, ever attain to all the qualities which belong to regular troops. It is no reproach to them that this should be so; because it is no reproach to any one that he cannot alter the nature of things; at the same time I do not say that the reflection may not be in some small degree painful: it may be painful to those who have done so much, to think that it should not be possible for them to do every thing; that they must find in the nature of the subject those limits which they do not find in their own zeal or talents.-The difference between the two services, is founded on the eternal difference that must subsist between troops, who always remain at home, and those who are placed from time to time in distant stations; between troops who have seen service, and those who, generally speaking, have not; between troops commanded by officers, who have never acted with them in difficulties and dangers, who have never shown, because they have had no opportunity of showing, their title to command by the valour which they have displayed, who can pretend to no experience, who can bring no

authority from former reputation;-and troops, whose officers possess in themselves all these sources of ascendency, and all these claims to respect. There is, moreover, a sort of soldier character, arising from a thousand canses, and acquired insensibly in the course of regular service, which will easily be distinguished by discerning eyes, and will furnish in general a marked discrimination between the Militia soldier, and the soldier of the line. These circumstances must of course enter into account when we are regulating our choice between the two services, and founding our measures on the mixed consideration of numbers in each, compared with their respective qualities. However confident I may feel that our Militia force will prove a most valuable part, should the enemy come, of the national defence, however certain I am that in the day of action Militia regiments will be found who will have distinguished themselves not less than the choicest troops we have, I can never say generally that a force of that description is to be put upon a level with that of the regular army.

I have been surprised, therefore, to hear it urged, that while a certain number of men must be kept at home for the defence of the country, it was a matter of indifference whe ther our army to that amount was composed of Militia or Regulars. I thought I had heard upon other occasions high hopes expressed of the security which the country must derive from the return of those veterau legions, who had so crowned themselves with glory, and established the military fame of the country, in Egypt and other places. But according to this idea, they could do no more for us than any other equal number of troops, who had never seen an enemy. But is even this the only difference between Regulars and Militia, between a disposeable and undisposeable force? Though the cir cumstances of the war may, at one time, re quire a force of a certain amount to be kept within the kingdom, the next moment may set a great part of it at liberty; and is it of no consequence that its constitution should be such as to make it incapable of availing itself of that liberty? Nay, if even that should be so, and that in point of fact the power of sending it abroad was one of which no use could be made, is it indifferent whether the enemy is apprized or not of that truth, and whether he is enabled to calculate his plans upon the previous knowledge, that the force existing in the country can, in no case, be sent against him? If the evils with which we have to struggle, if the dangers which threaten us are ever to end, it must be by some change, from with