their particular attention to the following passage: "The ministers having grounded their armament upon the double 66 pretext of extraordinary military prepa"rations, and of important discussions, and "being well assured, that the former did "not exist, they were compelled to make "the latter; and, if ever the papers relative to the present negotiation should "be made public, it will be seen, that the "important discussions originated with them, "and, that, too, at the very same time when "the Message was resolved on." These papers have now been made public, and no one can regret more sincerely than we do, that they amply confirm this conjecture. The war is necessary, absolutely necessary to the preservation of our liberties and lives, and, therefore, we cannot but lament, that the ostensible grounds of it are manifestly unfounded in truth; we cannot but lament, that, for the purpose of sheltering the ig norance, the indecision, the weakness, the selfishness, and the wickedness, of the ministers, the nation has been plunged into a war, upon pretexts that gives to our enemy the appearance of having right on his side, and that inevitably tend to excite mistrust of us abroad, and to create and cherish a domestic opposition, a French faction, a political serpent in the bosom of the country, by which all our warlike operations will be cramped, and which may finally produce, at no very distant period, a peace still more injurious, disgraceful and fatal, than the last. Nevertheless, truth and justice, wisdom and policy, all concur in demanding a faithful statement of the case, as it now stands upon the evidence contained in the papers; for, as there is nothing more dishonourable, so is there nothing more foolish, than to hope of succeeding in a war, the real causes and objects of which are hidden. from the people.

The papers relative to the negotiation (all of which will be inserted together in the Sup plement to this Volume) may be compared to a poem, the main subject of which is Malta, relieved occasionally, by episodes respecting Holland, Switzerland, the Royalists, and the Liberty of the Press, in the last of which the Editor of this work has the honour to be introduced as one of the most implacable enemies of France. To all these topics we shall hereafter have occasion to call the attention of our readers. At present, we must confine ourselves to Malta, which is the pivot of the discussions, and on the terms respecting which the negotiations were fr nally brokeu off.

On the 23d of May, only 24 days after the peace was proclaimed in London, we

find Orro and LORD HAWKESBURY (persons well worthy of each others friendship) corresponding about the appointment of ambassadors to Malta. Between this time and the latter end of January, several letters passed between the secretary of state and others relating to the guarantees of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, which last court refused, unless some modification was made in the Xth article of the treaty of Amiens.

On the 27th of January, we find Talleyrand asking Lord Whitworth, when England meant to evacuate Malta; observing, at the same time, "that another grand "master (Prince Ruspoli having declined the office) "would soon be elected; that "all the powers of Europe invited so to do, "with the exception of Russia, whose dif"ficulties it was easy to remove, and with"out whom the guaranty would be equally complete, were ready to come forward; (3) and that consequently the term would soon arrive, when Great Britain would "have no pretext for keeping longer pos"session.". This was communicated to Lord Hawkesbury, who, on the 9th of February wrote to Lord Whitworth a statement of the views then entertained by this government relative to Malta. He states, that agreeably to the principles on which the treaty of Amiens was made, His Majesty would have had a right to demand some compensation for the late acquisitions of power which France had made on the Con tinent; but, that he had waived these pretensions, and that a communication respecting an amicable arrangement as to the evacua tion of Malta had been actually prepared, and was about to be sent to Lord Whitworth, when the attention of his Majesty's govern ment was attracted by the official report of Colonel Sebastiani, (4) which appeared in the Moniteur of the 30th of January." It "is impossible," says Lord Hawkesbury, "for His Majesty to view this report in any "other light than as an official publication; "for without referring particularly to expla "nations which have been repeatedly given upon the subject of publications in the "Moniteur, the article in question, as it purports to be the report of the First Consul in an accredited agent, as it ap pears to have been signed by Colonel Se"bastiani himself, and as it is published in "the official paper, with an official title "affixed to it, must be considered as au"thorized by the French government. This report contains the most unjustifiable insi

(3) Did ever any man besides Lord Whitworth write a sentence like this?

(4) See this Report; Register, Vol. III. p. 246%

"nuations and charges against the officer who "commanded bis forces in Egypt, and against "the British army in that quarter, insinuations "and charges wholly destitute of founda❝tion, and such as would warrant His Ma"jesty in demanding that satisfaction, " which, on occasions of this nature, inde« pendent powers, in a state of amity, have "a right to expect from each other. It dis "closes, moreover, views in the bigbest degree " injurious to the intere ts of His Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between "His Majesty and the French government; "and His Majesty would feel that he was "wanting in a proper regard to the honour "of his crown, and to the interests of his "dominions, if he could see with indiffer"ence such a system developed and avowed. "His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the "conduct of the French government on various occasions since the conclusion of "the Definitive Treaty, the insinuations "and charges contained in the report of "Colonel Sebastiani, and the views which "that report discloses, without feeling it "necessary for him distinctly to declare, "that it will be impossible for him to enter

into any further discussion relative to "Malta, unless he receives satisfactory ex"planation on the subject of this commu"nication."-This was on the 9th of February; satisfactory explanation with regard to Sebastiani's report was the object, and must have been the only rational object; for, as to the abuse of General Stuart and the British army in Egypt, strange indeed would it have been for the ministers to make that a ground of quarrel after the affair of Captain D'AUVERGNE, and after the official publication, in the Moniteur, in which His Majesty himself was styled the rewarder of assassins. What was there, then, in this report of Sebastiani? What views did it disclose so peculiarly injurious to the interests of His Majesty's dominions, and so much more repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace, than any of the other publications which France had issued since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty Sebastiani observes, that "thousand French would at present be "enough to conquer Egypt;" but, we believe, that a fair construction of this sentence, if considered together with the context, will by no means warrant the inference, that the French intended to attempt such an expedition. The report is full of lies and vain boasting; but it does not breathe a spirit so hostile to this country as many other previous publications in the

" six

Moniteur, and this is a fact which will be denied by no man who has read those publications. But whatever might be the anger or alarm excited by this repert, "satisfactory

explanation" was all that was demanded or expected on the subject; and, accordingly, we find Talleyrand, on the 17th of February, desiring to know from Lord Whitworth "what was the nature and degree

of the satisfaction which his Majesty would "require," and Lord Whithworth, for want of a better answer, we suppose, replied, that "he could not pretend to say!!!"—On the Friday previous to the 21st of February, Lord Whitworth had a two hours conversation with Buonaparté, who positively denied having any intentions of invading Egypt.As this Ambassador of ours talks about Fridays and Tuesdays as familiarly as if he were writing to a cousin in the country, and as we have not an almanack before us, we must now and then use a circumlocution in describing the time at which certain circum. stances passed.-On the 21st of February Lord Whitworth saw Talleyrand, and told him, that, "what he had said to the First "Consul (at their long interview) amount"ed to an assurance of the readiness of his

gagements which they bad contracted, in as "much as that could be reconciled with the "safety of the state," which, by the by, was rather an odd sort of declaration; but, those who have read these dispatches will experience very little surprise at any thing they shall in future meet with from the pen of Lord Whitworth Talleyrand replied, "that" (alluding to the subject of Sebastiani's report)" a project was in contemplation, by

which the integrity of the Turkish Empire "would be so effectually secured, as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either "with regard to Egypt or any part of the "Turkish dominions."-In answer to a communication of this promise Lord Hawkesbury wrote to Lord Whitworth on the 28th of February, (5) saying:-" From "the postscript of your Excellency's letter, "it appears that a project was in contem"plation, by which, according to the de"claration of Mr. Talleyrand, the integrity "of the Turkish territory would be secured

so as to do away every cause of doubt or "uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or "to any other part of the Turkish domi"nions. His Majesty will consider the com

(5) There is, in the copy laid before the Houses of Parliament, a mistake in the date of this letter of Lord Hawkesbury. It should be 28th and not 18th, since it acknowledges the receipt of a letter, dated Paris, 21st February.

"munication of such a project as indicating a disposition on the part of the French govern ment, to afford bim explanation and satisfac tion respecting some of the points which have "been the subject of bis representations. But "after all that passed, his Majesty cannot "consent that his troops should evacuate "the Island of Malta, until substantial secu "rity has been provided for those objects, "which, under the present circumstances,

might be materially endangered by their "removal "- Hore we see them rising from satisfactory explanation to substantial security, a very considerable step, and which cannot, we think, be fairly ascribed to any thing short of a desire, and even a determination, to protract the dispute and to hang on upon Malta, for some purpose, other than that which was alleged. At any rate, however, who would not have expected from this language of Lord Hawkesbury, that the project of Talleyrand, that project, the communication of which his Majesty "would "consider as indicating a disposition, on "the part of the French government, to af'ford him explanation and satisfaction respect

ing some of the points in dispute;" who would not have regarded this as the language of conciliation, as the harbinger of peace? What, then, must have been the surprise of Lord Whitworth, what must have been the surprise of Buonaparté, and what must be the astonishment and indignation of the British people, to hear, that their ministers, without hearing one word further from Paris, without waiting for the possibility of an answer to the letter conveying this concilia. tory language, brought a message to the Parliament calling for preparations for war! The letter, which we have last quoted, was, as we have before remarked, written on the 28th of February; on the 7th of March the message was resolved on, and a copy of it transmitted to Lord Whitworth; and, between the pacific letter of the 28th of February and the delivery of the message, no communication, touching the dispute with France, was made to the ministers, from any quarter whatever!

Strange, wonderfully strange and inconsistent as this conduct appears, however, the mystery vanishes in an instant, when we find, which was really the case, that on the 5th or 6th of March, before the answer to Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 28th of February could reach London, news arrived, that General Dundas bad re-captured the Cape of Good Hope. The ministers perceived the odium and the danger, to which the communication of this event would expose them, unless they could, previously to its being generally known, place the nation in a warlike

attitude They had just grace enough left to dread the infamy of announcing their re commencement of hostilities at the Southern point of Africa, while they were speaking the language of peace and amity in Europe; and they were, too, far from being certain," that Buonaparté would not instantly attempt an invasion of Ireland or England by way of revenge. Therefore it was that they brought the message, therefore it was that they armed; and, having thus prepared themselves, the news of the re capture of the Cape was communicated to the Public, who, not perceiving the ruse de guerre, and not reflecting on the nature of the transaction, regarded the re-capture as a lucky circumstance, instead of viewing it as the grossest of follies, or the most shameful act of fraud, that ever was committed by a nation.

Of the cause of this re-capture, 100, and of the subsequent evacuation, the papers before us furnish an explanation. On the 3d of October last, we find the accomplished Mr. Merry writing to his no less accomplished principal in Downing Street, and conveying to him an overture of a Swiss agent at Paris, who, having failed in his negotiations with Buonaparté, and having found the door of all the other foreign Ambassadors shut against him, applied, as to a pisaller, to our dignified and sapient representative. This enterprising Swiss wanted arms, ammunition, stores, and, above all, money, sticking to the old proverb " point "d'argent point de Suisse;" and, it really appears, that our ministers, those ministers who were, and who still are, suffering the French royalists tostarve in the streets of London; those ministers who abandoned to the mercy, or rather to the hellish cruelty, of the Corsican murderer, the brave, the faithful, the loyal Vendeans, thousands of whom have, since the signature of the Definitive Treaty, fallen beneath his knife; those ministers, who, at that very moment were taking measures to " transport" General Georges and his gallant followers to the woods of Canada, in order to sooth the rebel usurper against whom they had fought in the service of England; those very ministers listen to the proposition of this Swiss adventurer; and, without more ado, actually dispatched one of their habile corps diplomatique to Switzerland with offers of" •pecuniary succours." Mr. Moore, who was the knight errant chosen upon this occasion, sallied forth in search of adventures on the 10th of October, at which time the ministers sent out orders of retention to their other knight at the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time that Mr. Moore was dispatched to Switzerland or its neighbour

hood, a remonstrance was made by Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. Otto, to which no answer has ever been given from that day to this-On the 31st of Oct. Mr. Moore writes home, that, upon his arrival at Constance, on the 27th, he found that the Diet of Schwitz had made a formal submission to the French arms; and, on the 25th of November, Lord Hawkesbury writes to him to return home; which the unfortunate knight was, doubtless, very glad to do, having, without even entering their territory, rendered the Swiss much about the same sort of service as that which Don Quixotte rendered the farmer's boy; and having himself been, for nearly two months, the standing jest of the French and German writers, who absolutely laughed him off the Continent. When, therefore, it was known, that the Diet of Schwitz had submitted, the ministers hastened to countermand the orders they had sent out for the retention of the Cape. They were in a humour now to surrender every thing; for, under the date of the 30th of November, we find an apology sent by Lord Hawkesbury for General Stuart's not having evacuated Egypt, and stating, that an order had now been sent him to do it immediately. There was still some excuse for keeping Malta till the guarantees were completed, but that too would have been surrendered, had no orders been gone out for the retention of the Cape. Those orders might be executed, and the news might come off, before the counterorder arrived; if so, as we should have had nothing at all left in hand, a war, on the part of France, would have instantly ensued; she would, as her first act, have seized on Malta and on Egypt, just about the time when we should have heard of the final surrender of the Cape. This the Isafe politicians" were afraid of, and, therefore, they kept talking about arrangements, grand-masters, guarantees, and Sebastiani's Report, till they should hear whether their order for surrendering the Cape overtook the order for its retention. it did not. The recapture was made; the news came while they were eking out their tenure upon the gasconades of Sebastiani, which appear to have been their last resource, and instantly they changed their tone from the pacific language of Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 28th of February, to that of the King's Message and the measures subsequent thereto.

Now, therefore, and not till now, the "important discussions," mentioned in the Message began. A demand was now, for the first time, made to retain Malta for a term of years, or in perpetuity; and, as we

before observed, a dispute was thus invented by the ministers, to hide their real mo tives. Having, however, begun the quarrel, they soon brought into it all those points which ought to have been the subject of discussion long before; but, the real object of the Message and the armament was, the dread which they justly entertained of the consequences that might arise from the news of the recapture of the Cape finding them in an attitude of profound peace, When they perceived, that this news, being almost immediately followed by that of a final restoration of the Cape, produced no very great effect in France and Holland, they would gladly have recalled the Message together with its attendant measures; but, here the love of piace interposed; they: well knew that the cause of the Message, would have been demanded at their hands; they well knew, that proof of the "military preparations" having ceased, proof of the satisfactory termination of the "important discussions," would have been required, in order to justify the discontinuance of the armament; such proof they could not have given the true motive of their conduct; must have appeared, and even the vain and insolent Addingtons had not the assurance to hope, that the people would have patiently borne the expense of two or three millions merely on account of those upstarts. having retained, for a few days, a post since given up. Something, therefore, and something a little solid, too, they were compelled to obtain in their own defence, and to this we have to attribute their demands. respecting Malta. If they obtained what they asked, it gave them a new lease of their places; if not, they could but lose those places, a loss which already threatened them, and which, on account of the finances in particular, they began to regard as inevitable. Their demands were not acceded to, and the consequence is, we are, now in a state of war; a war for which there were and are many good and sufficient causes, a war which is absolutely necessary to the very existence of England as an independent nation, but which, as far as is proved by the diplomatic papers, is grounded upon pretexts totally false, and which,, if the language of the declaration be ad hered to, may consistently be closed, without having effected any one of the objects for which alone it ought to have been commenced; a war, in short, undertaken neither for national honour nor national security, but solely for purposes of ministerial interest and ambition.-And, is it true, can it possibly be true, that Mr. Pitt will defend the authors of this measure? Will

he for ever blast his fame by identifying himself with these men? We trust not; but, whatever may be his line of conduct, whatever national sacrifices he may be determined to make rather than acknowledge his error respecting the treaty of Amiens, rather than suffer his creatures to incur the responsibility which the nation has a right to demand at their hands, we hope that the Parliament will not forget, or neglect, their duty to their Sovereign and his people.

We are say the writers of a daily paper, "the very last who would attempt to vindicate the conduct of the present crazy "and impetent ministry. Such a task would "require the greatest effort of ingenuity.

At this awful and alarming crisis, however, "when the enemy is at our gate-when he "threatens the destruction of our dearest " rights and liberties-when he avo vs that "nothing will satisfy him but the complete "humiliation or slavery of Englishmen, the "reduction of this seat of freedom to the "groveling and detestable state of a French "province-it is then our duty to invigorate the "measures of Government. At such a moment"ous and dangerous crisis, party distinctions " and party prejudices ought to cease, and the "only spirit of emulation ought to be, who, on such a great and urgent occasion, will "first meet and repel our common Enemy, "and the Enemy of Mankind."-Amen! So be it, with all our hearts! We are under the influence of no party; we are of no party but that of our King and his faithful people. Yes, perish the man, who would not, at this time, endeavour to "invigorate the measures of government." That is the very object of all our endeavours, and it will be readily allowed, that nothing is so likely to effect it, as driving from that government weakness and pusillanimity. But, the government, to have lasting vigour, must possess the confidence of the people. It may just sustain itself by means of their money; but, in order to make the required exertions, it must have their hearts also, and these are not to be obtained without an assurance, without "the evidence of facts," that another peace of Amiens will not be made; that the interests and honour of their country will not be again sacrificed to gratify the avarice and the vanity of another set of weak and wicked ministers. Until they obtain such an assurance, they will never again give their cordial support to the government; and this assurance can be given them only in bringing to justice, strict justice, the authors of their present calamity and disgrace. True it is, that the enemy

will be satisfied with nothing short of the slavery of Englishmen, nothing short of "reducing this seat of freedom to the gro"velling and detestable state of a province "of France;" but, let it be remembered, that it was to this enemy, this insolent, and malignant enemy, that the present ministers surrendered the means of effecting his object (if it ever is to be effected) and that they did this, too, with a perfect knowledge of the disposition and intentions of that enemy. Till, therefore, justice be rendered them on this score, what hope can they entertain from any sacrifices or exertions of theirs? and what confidence can they repose in the government which shall refuse them that justice?

NOTICES.

Next week we shall publish two sheets, and, shall, if possible, enter fully into our proposed discussion relative to the justice and necessity of impeaching the ministers, a subject to which, we are glad to perceive, the public has, at last, turned its serious attention.

Correspondents will, we doubt not, have the goodness to excuse our omissions of this week. The communications respecting Malta shall certainly appear in our next.

*

*

*The readers of the Register must, on several occasions have derived great pleasure and information, from the writings which have been published therein, under the name of SwENSKA. They will doubtless remember that it was from this gentleman, we received and published an intimation of the project for the new division of Germany, several days before even the ministers had any suspicion on the subject. We have lately made some extracts from a work by the same hand: some copies of this work, which has been published at the Hague, are now re ceived in London, and we take the liberty to recommend its perusal to every gentleman who wishes to possess an accurate knowledge of the present situation, interests and views of the nations on the continent. The author writes generally from personal observation; and, as to France in particular, his information is interesting and valuable beyond description.-The work is English, and the price is 12s. It is entitled "Sketches on the

Intrinsic Strength, Military and Naval Force "of France and Russia; with remarks on their

present connexion, political influence, and future "projects."-Sold by Harding, Pall Mall; Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden; and Richardson, Royal Exchange.

ERRATUM in last sheet, p. 735, 1. 29 for Darnley read Danby.

LONDON