the ignorance and vulgarity it exhibits, be led to attribute to the Lords of the Admiralty themselves. In one breath they accuse us of treason in exposing the weakness of the country to the enemy, and, in the next, of falsehood in greatly under-rating the strength of the fleet fit for sea. Now, either our statements are true, or they are false; if true, we have not under-rated the strength of the fleet fit for sea; if false, we have not been exposing the weakness of the country to the enemy, whom, on the contrary, our statements tend to deceive and mislead. We now assert, that there are only four ships of the line fit for sea; if this assertion be false, it can certainly be of no use to the enemy, and if it be true, the country certainly ought to know it. But, if we, who have neither commercial agents nor spies in the sea-ports, can obtain intelligence as to the state of the fleet, shall it be believed that Buonaparté finds it difficult to obtain such intelligence? For our parts, we sincerely believe, that he has intelligence of this sort infinitely more correct and minute than any that the Admiralty can boast of; and, it is by no means carrying suspicion too far, to suppose that he may have an agent, of some sort or other, in, or about, every ship in commission.-. -That an attempt at an invasion of England or Ireland will speedily take place, it would be too much to say; but, when we consider, that French French troops, in great numbers, have lately been marched into Holland, where they can possibly have no other object; that 60,000 men are stationed within a day's march of Brest; that Rochefort, St. Maloes, Caen, Havre de Grace, Boulogne, Calais, Gravelines, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Flushing, are all full of troops, and that camps are actu ally forming on three or four parts of the coast of France and Belgium; when we consider this, and are acquainted with the vast numbers of flat-bottom boats, which are constantly held in a state of preparation, we may, one would think, be permitted just to ask, how a French army covered by four or five ships of the line, could be prevented from landing at a point, where there might be no English army to repel it. What, in our present dismantled state, is to prevent an invasion of Ireland? There are 18,000 men in that country, 10,000 of whom are wanted, and are absolutely necessary for the garrison duty; and, as to the militia, a single regiment will not be collected, and brought out, for these nine months, at the very soonest. What, then, would be the consequence, if a well-ap

pointed army of 15.000 men, escorted by four or five ships of the line, were to sail out of Brest, for Ireland? We have not four or five ships of the line, at any one place, fit for sea; and, consequently, could not send out a force to meet them. And, in this state it is, that we are bidden to hold our tongues, and to repose implicit confidence in the very men, who have brought us into this dangerous and disgraceful situation!

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.-For several weeks past, rumours have prevailed, on this subject; more, perhaps, from the obvious necessity of such a change, than from any real grounds for believing it to be in the contemplation of the persons concerned. That the present ministers cannot go on alone is certain. The thing is absolutely impossible. The state would fall to pieces in their hands in the space of six months; and, as to money, the men, who would make a loan to Mr. Addington, would deserve to spend the remainder of their lives in a work-house.-Of contemplated changes, or, according to some, changes that have already taken place, we know nothing more than what we have seen in the ministerial paper, the True Briton, from which we make the following extract:" The war "which we shall have to wage will be for "existence, and it will chiefly depend, under "the favour of Providence, upon our own

unanimity and exertions, whether the "issue shall be glorious to us or not. It is "that we may possess that unanimity and "success, that we court the Union, in the "executive government, of those talents "and principles which, during unparalleled "domestic perils and ten years dreadful "warfare, preserved us at once from the "horrors of revolution, and raised our resources and our glory together, to a pitch unequalled in our annals. In this wish, we believe, we are supported, not only by a great majority of the nation, but by a great majority likewise of the present "ministers. The uprightness of their in"tentions (the majority of the present mi"nisters we mean), the real love they bear "their country, the principles which they "have uniformly practised, and a simila

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rity of mind and sentiment, identify them "with the man to whom the eyes of the "nation are at this moment anxiously turn"ed. The measures of the present ministry, as far as that great man's sentiments are publicly known, have received his warm and unqualified approbation and support. He approved of the peace "which the ministers made, because he

assertions have been publickly and solemnly made; and, they yet remain uncontradicted by those vehicles, which ministers employ for such purposes. If the statement of Buonaparté be true (and there seems to be no good reason to suppose that it is not), it is incredible that Mr. Pitt should join the ministers; because, agreeably to his sentiments respecting Malta, it is impossible that he should not disapprove of the measures, which they are pursuing, and which he is called in to support. In his speech on the preliminaries of peace, after stating, that,"compared with the East "and West Indies, the Mediterranean was but a secondary consideration," he observed, that," in case of a confederacy on the "continent, indeed, much, undoubtedly "would be done by the co-operation of "a British fleet in the Mediterranean. "But, in the present moment," said he, "and situated as Europe now is, we ought not,

country. If we are thus, then, to fight for "our all, we surely may be allowed to express "a wish to be conducted in the field by those "leaders whom we love -Let Mr. Pitt, "Mr. Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Mel"ville, and a few others whom we could name, "direct the affairs of the nation, and we "shall think, not only our safety insured, "but our victory certain." (6)- The wisdom and uprightness of men, who have reduced us to the necessity of waging war "for our existence;"-the peace being "necessary to the country" while it is denied to be a peace of necessity; the wisdom of trying the experiment of peace" at all, especially with a dismantled fleet;-" the breathing time" which peace has given the nation; the "impossibility of the grounds of a new war being condemned by the most malignant oppositionist;"-the "unanimity" likely to be produced by excepting from the praise of uprightness a part of the administration, and by styling part of the parliament" blood-hounds;"-these are points which, perhaps, we may hereafter have an opportunity of discussing with Mr. John Hiley Addington, who, we are well assured, is the author of the article, from which we have made the above extract; but, we shall, at present, confine ourselves to a few short remarks, as to the nature of the change, which is said to be about to take place, as far as that change relates to Mr. Pitt. If he comes in, it is upon some principle, connected with the present state of affairs. It is declared, in the Manifesto of Buonaparté, that there were, at the date of the King's Message, no points of discussion between this country and France, except Malta, which place, he says, the English ministry wished to keep for five years longer. (7) These

(6) True Briton, March 7, 1803. (7) See Manifesto, present sheet, P 518.

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upon any one principle of wisdom or "policy, to prefer acquisitions in the Mediterranean to the attainment of the means of "giving additional security to our possessions in "the East and West Indies."-Is it possible, therefore, that, after having, within these few months, restored the Cape of Good Hope, the ministers can think of going to war for the temporary possession of Malta? And, that Mr. Pitt will join them for such a purpose?-Mr. Pitt proceeded:-" Upon "this principle" [of not wounding the feelings of the enemy] "he hoped the "House would concur with him in think

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ing, that we ought not to insist upon re"taining the Island of Malta. It appeared "to him more consistent with wisdom and "sound policy, rather to put Malta under "the protection of a third power, than, "by retaining it ourselves, to mortify the pride "and attract the jealousy of the enemy." (8) -Yet, this is the very object, which, according to the declarations of the French Government, our ministers have in view, and to effect which they are now preparing to make war.-Is it, then, we ask, likely; is it possible, that this can be the principle of a coalition between then and Mr. Pitt? We hope not; we trust not. We love to believe, that, in returning to office, Mr. Pitt will return to those principles of policy which formerly beamed from his enlightened mind:-" Our simple

object" (said he, when defending the prosecution of the last war,) “Our object is security, just security, with a little mixture of indemnification. These are the legitimate objects of war at all times, and when we

(8) See Debates, Vol. I. pp. 1137 and 1138.

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"have attained that end, we are in a con"dition to derive from peace its beneficent advantages; but until then, our duty and 46 our interest require that we should per"severe unappalled in the struggle to which "we were provoked. We shall not be satisfied with a false security. War, with all its "evils, is better than a peace in which there is nothing to be seen but usurpation and injustice, dwelling with savage delight on the "bumbled prostrate condition of some timid " suppliant people. * * * * I do not con"fine my views to the territorial limits of "France. I contemplate the principles, "character, and conduct of France; I con"sider what these are; I see in them the "issues of distraction, of infamy and ruin to every state in ber alliance, and therefore, I say, that until the aspect of that mighty "mass of iniquity and folly is entirely changed, until the character of the go"vernment is totally reversed; until by the common consent of the general voice of all 66 men, I can with truth tell Parliament, "France is no longer terrible for her contempt "of the rights of every other nation; she no longer avows schemes of universal empire, "sbe bas settled into a state whose government maintain those relations in their integrity "in which alone civilized communities are "to find their security, from which they "are to derive their distinction and their glory; "until in the situation of France we have "exhibited to us those features of a wise, a "just, and a liberal policy, I cannot treat with "ber. The time to come to the discussion "of a peace can only be the time when you can look with confidence to an bonourable "issue; to such a peace as shall at once restore to Europe HER SETTLED AND BALANCED CONSTITUTION OF GENERAL POLITY, "and to every negotiating power in particular,

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can

THAT WEIGHT IN THE SCALE OF GENE

RAL EMPIRE which bas ever been found the "best guarantee and pledge of local indepen"dence and general security. SUCH ARE MY 66 SENTIMENTS. I AM NOT AFRAID TO 66 AVOW THEM. I COMMIT THEM TO THE THINKING AMONG MANKIND, and if they "have not been poisoned by the stream of French sophistry, and prejudiced by her "falsehoods, I am sure they will approve "of the determination I have avowed, "for those grave and mature reasons on "which I found it." (9) Such was the policy,

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(9) See his speech in the committee of supply on the 7th of June, 1799, when he also stated,

and such were the principles, which, in one of those moments when the humbler virtue of private friendship triumphs over that of public duty, Mr. Pitt abandoned, by his defence of the treaty of Amiens; but to which, we hope, he is now about to return. In what degree this hope is discouraged by his joining with men, who have persevered in a system of perpetual concession, we, at present, forbear to state; but, as we never have, in one single instance deviated from the principles on which we formerly lent him all the little support in our power, so his returning to those principles, clearly expressed by actions as well as by words, is the only ground on which we can promise ourselves the honour of being numbered amongst the friends of his new administration.

This abstract, Sir, though called for by a Peer of the Realm, and signed by a Secretary of the Treasury, is, I have no scruple to say, as confused and fallacious a representation as ever was exhibited upon paper, whether considered as a comparative view of the revenue of last year with that of each of the two former years, or, as an enumeration and addition of the several heads of receipt during the last year only. It is in the latter light which I am now about to consider it.

And, first, I should be glad to know, for what reason it is, that Lord Auckland and Mr. Vansittart include the corn bounties in the net produce of the permanent revenue? The bounties on the importation of corn are, it is true, paid out of the receipts at the custom house, and, of course, the sum brought to the Exchequer from the custom house, is less, by the amount of those bounties, than it would be if no bounties were paid. In comparing, therefore, the Exchequer receipts of customs in one year with those of another year, it is proper to include corn bounties in both; but, the third coJump of this abstract exhibits the receipts of the last year in order to show what will be the receipts of the present year, and of every future year; and, therefore, unless Lord Auckland has got a promise from Providence, unless he has "taken a bond

of fate," that no corn bounties shall be wanted this year, or in any future year, he has done wrong to include, in his estimate of Exchequer receipt, the corn bounties paid last year. Corn bounties have been wanted in 1800, 1801, and 1802; and, why are we to suppose, how can we hope, that they will not be wanted in future? But, unfortunately for his lordship's statements, you, Sir, whose estimates of the 10th of December he meant to strengthen and confirm, did, in that very speech, reckon amongst the expenses of this year, £524,573 for corn bounties (1). "If, indeed, the corn bounties of the last year had been uncommonly great in amount, an average of seve ral years might have been sought, and the residue beyond that average, might have been reasonably included in the Exchequer receipt of customs of last year; but this was not the case; the corn bounties, paid in 1800, amounted to £44,836, those of 1801, to £1,420,355, those of 1802, to 2715,323, the average of which sums is 2726,838. The corn bounties of 1802, can, therefore, on no principle of fair calculation, possibly be admitted into the pre

sent estimate.

(1) See Register, vol. II. p. 779.

Increase of balances and bills, in the hands of the Receiver-General of Customs, naturally arises from an increase of receipts at the custom-house, and, as those receipts will be found to arise from newly created causes, it would not be fair to include this increase even in a comparative view between the produce of last year and that of former years; but, what earthly reason, let me ask you, can there be for including it in, or rather, adding it to, the net produce of last year, unless you count upon a decrease of trade in the present year? If your tradecontinues the same that it now is, the ba lances and bills in hand will, in all probability, continue to be as great in amount as they were at the close of the last year; so, that, without an assurance, that the bills and balances of the present year shall be less than those of the last, this sum also must be deducted from the estimate.

Beer duties postponed: that is to say, beer duties which became due before the expiration of last year, but not being received, will, of course, be received in the present year, and are, therefore, added to the receipts of last year in making out an esti mate of the receipts of this. The sum is £232,097, being the difference between postponed beer duties at the end of 1801 and those postponed at the end of last year; but, this addition to the postponed duties arises from a new cause; it arises from the additional duty on beer, estimated, accord. ing to these accounts, at £731,952 a year, a cause that will continue, and that will render the postponement this year as great as it was last; or, if it does not, the suc ceeding year must, in that respect, experi ence a defalcation; and, therefore, the add ing of the above-mentioned postponed duties to the receipts of the last year, in order to come at an estimate of future permanent annual receipts is reducible to no principle of arithmetic or of reason. If your house and land in Richmond Park, for instance, were let for £1,000 a year, and your tenant had paid you only £900 of his rent last year, would you, from that circumstance conclude, that your estate would in fature be worth, £1,100 a year? That this is a fair illustration will be perceived in a mo ment. The whole of the new duties, amongst which is the beer duty, out of which the postponement arises, are, in the accounts estimated at, £4,785,123. The du ties actually received amount to £1,957,340, and, in order to make out an estimate for the present and future years, the residue, being £2,827 783, is added, as will be seen by the abstract in page 545. Here, then, is a most dextrous tour de main; first the actual re