ruin, and who raised them to the dictatorship of the world? And will they oppose his endeavours to consolidate their situation? But they are oppressed, says John Bull! If we ask with what?—the whole of John's corps diplomatique cannot tell. In politics and in public society, oppression is relative. To attempt to scare Buonaparté with the jealousy of other powers, is, perhaps, still more ridiculous! Those who have any power, are his associates in despoiling those who have none. What benefit could the change of the name of a chief produce to Great Britain, or to Europe? Would a General Moreau or a Masena be less a Frenchman than Buonaparté ? No,-but we say they may be less babile! When the ability of enemies becomes a consideration with Britons, then alas! our legislators may go home and plant potatoes.

It must be evident to the world, that the present rulers of the republic, from whatever point of view they are taken, can only be considered as rebel chief They were born subjects of their king, most of them held offices in his service, and at mature age, swore allegiance to his government; he is alive, and at this time is morally, as well entitled to sit on the throne of France, as any hereditary monarch can be to sit on the throne of his ancestors. These usurpers know, that, however pliable and passive the politics of other governments may have, now and then, appeared, it cannot be presumed that legitimate sovereigns should prostitute the dignity of their stations, and expose the safety of their persons and families in so palpable a manner, as voluntarily to sanction the rebellion, robberies, pillage, and plunder of the republic; and associate in treaties of friendship and mutual support, with the irreconcileable enemies of all legal government. The chief consul knows, that the treaties, which he has imposed upon other states, are extorted bonds, and will never bind the conscience. He is well aware, that when his authority in France has occasion for help from abroad, his part of the drama will be nearly out. Nor can he suppose that his neighbours are less sensible, that the support of France implies her dominion. In short, he knows that his authority can only be legalized by ultimate success; and that while any legal government possesses the means of opposition and resistance, the success of the French Republic cannot be considered as secure. The consul may profess peace and friendship with all states; and he may offer alliances to the great, and protection to the weak; but every legiti mate sovereign should know, that when the missionaries of Buonaparté approach his

throne, they come either to spoil, crush, or undermine it. The destruction, or subjugation of all independent nations, especially of all rival powers, is with the rulers of France, a principle of self-preservation, and is, therefore, interwoven with the very existence of their military community.

We would not be understood to say, that the present government of France intends to conquer, and incorporate with the Republic, all other European states. On the contrary, we do not suppose that the consulate would wish Holland, Spain, nor perhaps Italy, more immediately under the police of France than those countries now are: nor, do we believe, that while Great Britain and Russia continue in their present posture, Buonaparté would countenance a farther reduction of Austria, nor the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe. We consider the real sys tem of the French Republic, to be neither more nor less, than, an universal ascendency raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power. Such an ascendency is essential to the existence of the Republic, and it will be pursued as long, as that fabric does exist. The obstacles which stands most directly in the way of that pursuit, is the naval empire of Great Britain; its reduction is therefore the object, upon which the hero of the nineteenth century must first employ his natural and moral faculties, and all his supernatural talents,

OBSERVATIONS ON HIS MAJESTY'S LATE MESSAGE TO PARLIAMENT.

SIR, However indubitable is the right of ministers in certain cases, to with-hold information on the treaty with France pending the negotiation; there is nevertheless, one point that admits of great doubt, and that is, whether the men who compose the present mi. nistry are worthy of being trusted by Parliament with its confidence, and with that supply they ask to give weight to their negotiations. The minister not trusting mere iy to his master's prerogative to negotiate and to arm, comes to Parliament and asks the two Houses to make themselves parties to ibe present armament and to the consequences of

it. But is the minister a man whose abilities will not commit the safety, and whose firmness will not compromise the honour of the Parliament and the nation To this, the only answer I find made by Mr. Addington is, "that he is responsible, deeply responsible to the country, but that if Parliament will trust him he will bring us out with honour at least of every difficulty."

When I read this in the newspaper, Sir, I involuntarily turn to the first page of the

paper, to the advertisements of Doctors Brodum and Solomon, and many others, whose claims to confidence are full as good as the premier's. Namely, the assurance with which they promise and the responsibility they incur. But if my constitution be ruined by their quickeries, will it be restored by an action for damages?-Had I not better preserve it at present, by denying these men my confidence and consulting some regular physician?-How far ministers deserve the confidence they claim is still a question, therefore, and can only be determined by a reference to their past conduct.

Now, Sir, immediately after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, Buonaparté as in the present instance, fitted out "a vast armament while the most important negotiations were depending."- While our swords yet reeked with the best blood of France, while the wounds she had received in Egypt still smarted, but ministers were not alarmed; though then not at peace they suffered the French fleets to sail. It is true, Buonaparté's armament did not prove hostile, but it does not follow, for that reason, that ministers were justified in trusting that to chance. Perhaps, Sir, the Consul expected more from the docility of our administration, than to the rigour of his own armies; and the politician who looks to Alexandria and to Amiens, will probably applaud his judgment. If this conjecture be well founded, (and the subsequent present hostile temper of the pacificator renders it highly probable,) Mr. Addington cannot plead the event as a justification of his confidence, for it is a maxim of reason as well as of law, that no man shall plead his own wrong.But if, Sir, we condemn his tameness in 1801, let us look to his vigour in 1802; and I think, though the subjects are different we shall still recognize the hand of the same

master.

The French diplomatists have dated the æra of their new system of European public law from the treaty of Luneville, but unfortunately this simple code which silences the contention of so many rights, by annihilating the powers that laid claim to them, was not exempt from some intricacies at which the simplicity of French justice was so much shocked in the former system; it acknowledged the independence of Switzerlaud, though in the near neighbourhood of the great nation. The warmest admirers of the new system must allow this to be a blemish. France, however, had herself formally recognized this indepen dence, and Switzerland had not since then committed any act of hostility against France. But the Swiss people changed the

form of government which was agreeable to the chief Consul, and substituted another, an act they had surely a right to do if they were independent, at least if that word has any meaning in French Dictionaries. Buonaparté however, in undisguised violation (not only of the rights of others, but of those he bimself had acknowledged, and of that treaty to which he exacted Austria's implicit adherence) marched a French army into the country, and has there established a motley administration of his own making, which he calls a constitution. This part of his own code of public law was intricate and entangled: the military legislator unravelled it, as Alexander did the Gordian knot.

Our ministers thought they saw something more warlike and jacobinical than they had expected. Disappointed in not seeing Buonaparte's nature softened by the allurements of reviving commerce, and bis brow smoothed into sleek complaisance behind a counter *, they again discovered" that gigantic and hideous ambition which would revolutionize all nations, and render all people tributary to France, +"" they thought the cause of Switzerland, the common cause of every power that is not a voluntary slave to the influence of France," + they boldly resolved to assert the independence of Europe by defending that of Switzerland, and with the shield of Britannia to protect the cradle of liberty. And what did they do?—they sent Mr. Moore post haste to Constance, and he returned by easy journeys.-Notwithstanding this, however, Switzerland was subdued.

--

Now, Sir, is Mr. Moore about to make another trip to the Continent?-What new exploits are we to look for from the vigour of ministerial councils?-It is impossible to foresee, but we may perhaps guess, ex pede Herculem.

Having discussed their vigour, let us proceed to the next ground of confidence, the abilities they have hitherto displayed.

But these men concluded the peace of Amiens, the cause of our present embarrassed situation, that treaty, which, to borrow the beautiful language of Mr. Canning, has left the country in a slumber, that does not recruit her strength, but harasses her imagination with terrific dreams; that treaty which its authors themselves have now found to be fraught only with war, and which by the present message they have virtually avowed to be destitute of the only merit it ever claimed to procure repose.—

* See Mr. Sheridan's Speech on the Peace. + True Briton, Oct. 14, 1802.

Mr. Fox indeed, denied this, and any argument supported by so great a name acquires a lustre not its own.-" Are we to "be told," he exclaimed, "that ministers "dared make no peace, because the un"seasonable ambition of France may now "drive us to hostilities? Are we to be told "that we must wage war till we had ob"tained a satisfactory assurance on the part " of the enemy of a sincere desire to cul"tivate the blessings of tranquillity in the "true spirit of peace?"-In the full extent of this principle, certainly not. But though the want of this satisfactory assurance does not altogether preclude peace, yet does it very much reduce the value of it, and ought equally to lower the price we are willing to give. This sincere disposition to peace on the part of the enemy, is indeed, by far the most important point to be considered; it is of greater value than a colony more, or a sugar island less, because a free nation like this secks only honourable security at the end of war, and the amicable temper of our rival is a better pledge for this than his humiliation. It was lacking this, that made the cessions under the late treaty doubly mischievous to the country. The peace of Amiens wanted this wholesome complexion which might promise its long life, and its late admirers already feel that if it is a beauty, it is but a candle-light beauty, whose artificial charms, though they might please while contemplated only by the taper of Mr. Addington's abilities, must fade away before the broad day of experience.

This general principle needs only to be fully stated, I should think, to be acknowledged. When treating with a man whose enmity was founded on the interests of his ambition, aggravated by the satanic pride of his nature, and embittered by recent defeat;-whose friendship was as fatal to some, even as his enmity, whose abilities, unrestrained by conscience, were surpassed only by his boundless ambition, whose perfidy had ere now stained the olive branch with blood, and mixed poison in the cup of peace. -In treating with such a man, no able minister would make great sacrifices for peace. He would see what little difference there was between the enmity and friendship of such a man, and however anxious for tranquillity, yet wisely setting but little valse on the hollowness of such a peace, he would pay but a small price for it, at least be would not purchase it at an exorbitant price.

Now, Sir, this general principle being admitted, we proceed to the application. And I will ask any candid man, the ministers themselves, whether there were any traits in the physiognomy of Buonaparte's cha

racter resembling the enemy above supposed? Whether in proportion to the predominance of those features, the security, and thereby, the value of peace were not reduced? And consequently, whether we should not have been justified in offering but few cessions to obtain it?-But in fact, whether we did not make more and greater sacrifices, than we had ever done for any peace since the existence of the monarchy? -When they have answered these questions, let ministers tell us, whether having paid this high price, we are not bereft of the advantages of our contract, of the security which peace ought to bring, perhaps, plunged in a renewal of the war?-Then let them say, if they dare insult common sense so much, that the treaty of Amiens is not defective, which paid so high a consideration for such a paltry truce; or that they, who concluded that treaty, are not to blame, are not unworthy of confidence, are not guilty of the calamities that now threat

en us.

The general character of the late peace is ample proof of the imbecility of its framers; but there is one article that even beggars the rest, I mean that respecting Malta, which was probably the gerin of our present embarrassment. I grant we have no right to assume for certain, that Malta is the point in dispute at present: yet when we consider that the article which professed to restore the order, depended for its execution on the guarantee of a power not a party to the treaty, that that power has refused its guarantee, and that we have kept possession long after the time fixed by the late treaty for the evacuation of Malta had expired; we must naturally conclude, that Malta is at least one of the questions in discussion.Nor ought we to wonder at this; for never was any thing stipulated in every part so contradictory and impracticable as the restoration and the patch-work government of

the order.

The nugatory nature of that article was proved long ago à priori, and experience has since confirmed it. But for a ministry whose motto was present safety, and who claimed as their chief merit the restoration of peace, to leave an important point which was virtually undecided, which must require ulterior negotiation, and might therefore renew the war; and that too when treating with an ambitious conqueror who would never fear appealing to the sword, and when we paid down so vast a price for peace, seems little short of madness. If Buonaparte be hostilely inclined, as minis ters fear, what better opportunity can he have to colour over a violation of the treaty

than Malta affords? And to whom does he owe this opportunity? If the Consul made peace only to prepare for war, no article was ever better contrived, on which to renew hostilities, and were it not known of what mild elements our ministry is composed, it would be natural to conclude, that they made peace with the same perfidious intention. Of this however, all Europe will acquit them, and, even should they renew the war, very justly conclude, that they did it by accident.

Sir, these arguments against the treaty in general, and the article respecting Malta are not new. Mr. Addington and his colleagues have repeatedly heard them urged both in and out of Parliament, at the time they concluded this peace. They cannot plead ignorance, they sinned against the country with the truth before them.-And now they come to ask for confidence on the very occasion that proves them unworthy of it.

We cannot expect that those who sacrifieed so much, and obtained only a precarious truce, will now conclude, an arrangement that may hush all disputes without degradation; or that the projectors of Mr. Moore's expedition will not commit the honour of the nation by menaces made only to be abandoned, and by armaments fitted out with much noise and bluster, only to publish more completely our subsequent submission. This last, I own Sir, is what I dread. Ministers I see assume a threatening attitude, and strut the militia through the kingdom; but I fear, if they remain in office, they will soon be planet struck and submit. Our premier, may perhaps, attempt the part of the "bold thunder," while his noble colleague may perform the "brisk lightning;" but neither, I believe, will surpass Mr. Bayes's actors in the Rehearsal; nor much intimidate the hero of Jaffa, who, once cradled the rocking elements of civil discord, now" rides on the whirlwind and directs the storm."-The authors of the late peace will soon relapse into timidity under the name of confidence; and discover the virtues of Buonaparté where they first found them, in their own weakness. For, had they judged of the reliance to be placed on the treaty of Amiens, by the character of the other contracting party, had they estimated his character by his actions, and his future conduct by his past, they would not have committed this country to his faith or his moderation. If the nation tries them by the same standard, it will not repose the trust they claim; it will support the King against his enemies, but it will beseech him to call another to the field, nor entrust the banner of national honour to a

From the Paris Journal, called the " Journal du Commerce," of March 18, 1803.

The peace of Europe is the act of the French Government. After so dreadful a war it was, no doubt, the most splendid favour which could ever be conferred on long suffering humanity; and cotemporaries will indubitably, in this respect, anticipate the judgment both of the historian and posterity at large-it required a considerable degree of ability to divert Paul I. from his cruel and long existing prejudices, and to detach him from a coalition to which he must have been the more devoted, as he was peculiarly influenced by romantic sentiments of honour and glory; this was the first measure adopted for carrying into execution a system not less bold than great, namely, of urging, (as it were, between France and Russia) the belligerent powers, and compelling them to make peace, and expedite the execution of former treatiesthat conception, which has already proved so beneficial in its consequences, was the mest powerful guarantee which had ever been given to Europe of a solid and permanent peace.-England had twice imposed upon us-Lord Cornwallis would have perhaps given us a repetition of the part which Malmesbury had playedthe circle of Popilius was drawn, and the Treaty was concluded. A message from the King of England to the House of Commons throws a dark shade over the Peace, which was so much wished for, over this Peace, which is as necessary for his own subjects, as for the other nations of Europe. Now what does this same Message contain? What relates to heads of nations is to be spoken of with great circumspection and respect-supposing even that ridicule were to attach to their decrees, a different conduct would be attended with serious consequences; on such occasions, jesting must be out of the question.The King of Great Britain thinks it necessary to inform the House of Commons that, on account of the great preparations carrying on in the Ports of France and Holland, he deems it expedient to resort to measures of precaution for the safety of his dominions.--We can neither deny nor dissemble the state in which our Navy and that of Holland stood at the conclusion of the war-a Nation should possess a military power in proportion to the extent of its territory, and of its commercial relations, as well as to the force which may eventually be brought against it-the first care, therefore, of our Government should have been to restore our navy. The Bri tish Government did not, to be sure, consider it was implied in the treaty that it could, at will, set limits to the number of our ships, and send over a Commissary to the port of Dunkirk !Those days are gone by. Why then this uneasi ness with regard to a Government which aimed so cordially at peace, which negotiated it with all its means, which commanded it with all its for power, a peace which became so necessary

all Europe, perishing by a war, as inveterate as it was unreasonable?-For the better understanding of this message, we think it will be sufficient to translate it into other words. What would be said of the French Government, if it transmitted the following message to the Legisla tive Body?-Government deems it necessary to inform the Legislative Body that, as the British Government does not burn at least one half of its navy; that as a certain degree of bustle prevails in the British ports, arsenals and dock yards; and because it does not execute the treaties, &c. it judges it to be prudent to adopt measures of precaution for the safety of the State, &c.-There is certainly no difference between calling for the reduction of an existing force, or pretending to prevent the creation of a necessary force; but there would be a difference with respect to the Governments which would hold such language, and France might allege motives, which would not, perhaps, meet the approbation of the British Government, for we might repeat, it was the French who wished for, and who actually made and commanded peace; it was you, British Government, that wished for war-it is you then who are to be suspected, and who are calculated to awaken alarm.-England is borne down by an enormous debt, and she wishes to make us pay the interest of it, as well as the capital, by the means of a treaty of commerce, drawn up in a certain way-It is very good natured of her to make dupes of us! think, however, that if Europe has no right to consider us as cowards, she can aduce no reasons to prove us to be fools. After having conquered with our arms; after having negotiated with equal ability, foresight, magnanimity, and resolution, it must be supposed that a Government which was capable of such achievements, would have greatly degenerated, if it consented at once to pay, indirectly, the expenses of the war which was waged against us, and to furnish the means of renewing it!-The period must come when Governments, as well as individuals, will do each other justice, and consent, through their own exertions, to extricate themselves from their embarrassment, however great, and into which their own imprudence plunged them, under pain of falling into a worse and more unenviable predi

cament.

ON ENGLAND.

We

From the Paris Journal, called the " Journal des Débats," of March 19, 1803.

England has created two singular privileges for itself: the first, in considering the commerce of the whole world as its exclusive property; the second, in indulging itself in the boldest discussions on the conduct of all governments, and in treating them with an insolence of language often insufferable. All the nations of Europe have been grossly insulted in the debates of the English Parliament since the treaty of Amiens. No person can deny this assertion, which is proved by the public journals. By virtue of the first privilege, England never patiently suffers any nation to extend its commerce; by the second, it considers the slightest observations of other governments on their privileges, as an attack upon its dignity; its pride is even offended when its own declarations are repeated by any other nation.

It is in these two assumed privileges, and in thei consequences, that the eause of the present extraordinary conduct of the British Minister must be sought; for it is impossible that any thing new could have occurred in the negotiations. Let us take a review, in a few words, of what has passed since the meeting of Parliament. In his speech, on opening the session, the King did not affirm that his conduct towards France should be regulated ac cording to the treaty of Amiens, but by the situa tion of Europe. This was to announce clearly, that the treaty (of which his Majesty took no notice) either should or should not be executed, according to circumstances.-The party, which disapproved of the peace, in the midst of the most indecorous charges on France, loudly demanded the non-execution of the treaty, in censuring the ministers for having concluded it. Have the ministers denied the possibility of a renewal of hostilities, and the disgraceful idea of a violation of the faith of treaties? No; they justified the peace with timidity; they claimed thanks for having concluded it; and they positively declared, that they would take the first Lord favourable opportunity of renewing the war. Hawkesbury urged no objection against war, but the danger of undertaking it without continental alliances; no member of administration objected that the national honour was pledged to the fulfilment of treaties; and the minister himself, at length avowing that he hesitated between peace and war, has demanded an establishment bordering upon both; that is to say double the peace establishment. Such has been the conduct of England since the treaty of Amiens; and it may be asserted upon good grounds, that the part in that country most inclined to peace, was that, which wished to gain time to sound the dispositions of the powers of Europe before they appealed to arms.-The French government has not uttered a complaint, but, leaving wholly to the English the liberty of discussing a treaty, which all parties had originally approved of, has confined itself to the cordial execution of the articles agreed on.-Three months after the opening of the English Parliament, the session of the Legislative Body commenced in France: the government presented a review of the situation of the Republic; and, according to custom, published to the nation the state of its relations. As the whole world saw and was acquainted with it, it was unavoidable to say, that the contending parties of England left the question of peace or war in the same uncertainty; and that Malta had not been evacuated, though it ought three months after the signing of the treaty. This public fact was mentioned with all the decorum which nations owe each other, even in their differences; and all that regarded England in the review of the situation of France, was so far from any hostile disposition, that it concluded with the following sentence: "Yes, no doubt, peace will "every day be more consolidated; the relations of "the two governments will assume that character "of benevolence which accords with their recipro"cal interests.

A happy repose will obliterate the "long calamities of a disastrous war; and both "France and England, in promoting their mutual "happiness, will deserve the gratitude of the whole "world."-The French, who all remember how many prospects of peace and happiness the review of the situation of France presented by the government gave rise to, will scarcely believe that it could become, with respect to England, an appeal to oppression, to invasion, and to arms. We well know that the state of our finances has struck the English with astonishment; they have not known France since they regarded it but with animosity, whilst