Consul, in his interview with your excellency); views which are directly repugnant, not only to the spirit, but to the letter of the treaty of Amiens. From the postscript in your excellency's letter, it appears that a project was in contemplation, by which, according to the declaration of Mr. Talley and, the integrity of the Turkish territory would be secured so as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or to any other part of the Turkish dominions. His Majesty will consider the communication of such a project as indicating a disposition, on the part of the French government, to afford him of the points which have been the subject of his representation. But after all that has passed, his Majesty cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the Island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects, which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endan gered by their removal. I am, &c. HAWKESBURY. His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c. against his Majesty's government, of their unwillingness to fulfil the treaty of Amiens. The treaty of Amiens has been in a course of execution, on the part of his Majesty, if every article in which, according to the spirit of that treaty, it has been found capable of execution. There cannot be the least doubt, that Egypt is at this time completely evacuated. The delay which had arisen in the evacuation of Alexandria, was owing to accidental circumstances, the particulars of which were explained to you in my dispatch of the 30th November last; and I had every reason to believe, from the communication I had with General Andrèossy on the sub-explanation and satisfaction respecting some ject, that the French government were perfectly satisfied with the explanation which he was authorized at the time to give them respecting it. With regard to that article of the treaty which relates to Malta, the stipulations contained in it (owing to circumstances which it was not in the power of his Majesty to controul), have not been found capable of execution. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished; the silence of the Court of Berlin with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guarantying power; the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to sequestrate the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories is restored to them; the non-election of a Grand Master: these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacua tion of the Island, until some new arrangement could be adjusted for its security and independence. But when it is considered how greatly the dominion, power, and influence of France have of late been extended, his Majesty must feel, that he has an incontestible right, conformably to the principles on which the treaty of peace was negociated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make with a view of effect-sured, in all its parts, as to remove every ing the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct which his Majesty had determined to adopt, have received additional force from the views which have been recently and unreservedly manifested by the French government, respecting the Turkish dominions, and the islands in the Adriatic (and which have been in a great degree admitted by the First Paris, 5th March, 1803. No. 40.-My Lord, I saw M. de Talleyrand yesterday, and acquitted myself of your lordship's instructions. I recapitulated the several arguments therein contained, dwelling particularly on the open avowal of the Eirst Consul's views in Egypt; and concluding with the resolution of his Majesty not to withdraw his troops from Malta, until some security should be given, that by so doing his Majesty should not expose the safety of his own dominions. He heard me with great patience, and in answer endea voured, as before, to convince me that there was no reason whatever for the apprehensions which we entertained. That it was true, the acquisition of Egypt had been, and perhaps still was, a favourite object of the First Consul, but that it was not so much so as to allow him to go to war for its attainment. I then told him that what had in a particular manner excited the attention of your lordship, in my last report, was the assurance he had given me of some project being in contemplation, whereby the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so in doubt or apprehension. I begged him, therefore, to explain himself on this subject, which I conceived to be of the utmost importance; since it was only by such means that both parties could be satisfied. He then gave me to understand, that what he had termed a project was nothing more than what had been expressed in the First Consul's message to the legislative body, when he says, that there is a French ambassador at disposed to give me another opinion, and to convince me that the First Consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous to discuss, fairly and without passion, a point, which he admitted was of importance to both countries. He repeatedly assured me, that much as the First Consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace; and henceforth seek to augment his glory, by improving and con solidating the internal situation of the coun try, rather than by adding to its possessions. Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. W. No. 41.-Note from General Andréossy to Lord Hawkesbury, dated March 10, 1803.-Translation.-The undersigned ambassador and minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic to his Britannic Majesty, has received from the First Consul, express orders to require from the British government some explanations respecting the protracted occupation of the Island of Malta by the English troops. He had hoped that verbal communications would have been suf ficient to have produced satisfactory expe sitions, by preparing the way for the mutual conciliation of minds and interests, a conduct which has been prescribed to him by his ardent zeal for the maintenance of harmony Constantinople, who is charged to give | every assurance of the disposition of France to strengthen, instead of to weaken, that government. I expressed a doubt whether this, or any other parole security, would be considered as sufficient in such a transaction. Hereupon he repeated the question-What then is the security which you require, and which the First Consul can give? This, I told him, must be the subject of the negotiation on which we were willing to enter; and I trusted that the French government would bring into it the same temper, and the same real desire to conciliate, which was manifested by his Majesty's ministers. M. de Talleyrand now informed me, that the First Consul had, five or six days ago, ordered instructions to be sent to General Andréossy, by which he was to require an immediate and categorical answer to the plain question Whether his Majesty would, or would not, cause Malta to be evacuated by the British troops? That he concluded this communication was already made, and that he expected to learn the result of it in a very few days; adding, that all the First Consul wanted was to know precisely on what he had to depend. I could not help lamenting this precipitate measure, since it could answer no good purpose, and would only tend to introduce into the discussion ill-humour and offended dig-between the two countries, and of the peace nity, in the place of dispassionate reasoning. I begged him, however, to be prepared, and to prepare the First Consul, to meet with more opposition to his will than he had been accustomed to on similar occasions. I told him, that his Majesty was willing to discuss the point in dispute with fairness and candour, but certainly never would be intimidated into acquiescence; and I repeatedly urged, that if he wished well to the peace of the two countries, he should prepare the First Consul for the consequences which might naturally be expected from this step, and thus prevent the effect of any sudden gust of ill-humour. He was unwilling to admit that there could be any chance of satisfying the First Consul short of a compliance with his wishes, founded as he pretended on good faith. Our conversation ended here, and I wait the result of General Andréossy's communication with the utmost impatience. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) WHITWORTH. P. S. In the interval between the writing and the transcribing the above dispatch, I have taken another opportunity of seeing M. de Talleyrand, and I am glad to find, that (for what purpose I know not) he had represented the instructions to General Andréossy as much more absolute and offensive than they really are. I found him to-day entirely VOL. III. of Europe, objects of the solicitude of the French government: but the undersigned thinks he can no longer delay complying with the instructions he had received, and he has therefore the honour of addressing the following observations to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, which recal to recollec tion the spirit and the leading features of the verbal communications which he has previously made to him. By the conditions of the fourth paragraph of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate the Island of Malta and its de-~ pendencies three months after the exchange of the ratifications. Ten months have elapsed since the ratifications have been exchanged, and the English troops are still at Malta. The French troops, on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan and Papal states, have not waited the expiration of the three months which were granted to them to withdraw, and have quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had reestablished, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon. What can be alledged in justification of the delay in evacuating Malta? Has not the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens provided for every thing? And the Neapolitan troops being arrived, under what pretext do those of England stil remain there? Is it because all the power D He enumerated in the 6th paragraph have not yet | jesty's disposition for the preservation of peace. I beg leave to return your lordship my thanks for having apprized me of this circumstance by a special messenger; I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was just setting out to communicate it to the First Consul, and ap peared under considerable agitation. returned with me to his Cabinet, and though he told me he was pressed for time, he suf fered me to relate the circumstance without interruption. I endeavoured to make him sensible that this measure was merely precautionary, and not in the least degree in-. tended as a menace. I concluded my observations by repeating that it was merely a measure of self-security, founded on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, remarking at the same time, that had not even these armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumstance of the First Consul's determination to augment so considerably his army in time of peace, would have been a full and sufficient motive for such a measure of precaution. M. de Talleyrand now informed me that he was already acquainted with the business; that a messenger had that morning arrived, who had brought him a copy of the message, which he communicated to me. I could draw from him no re accep ed the guaranty which is devolved upon them. But this is not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the island; and besides, Austria has already sent its act of guaranty: Russia itself has made only a single difficulty, which is done away by the accession of the First Consul to the modifications proposed, unless indeed England itself throws obstacles in the way, by refusing to accede to the proposals of Russia, which after all could not affect the engagements of his Britannic Majesty, who, according to the express conditions of the treaty, is to evacuate the island of Malta within three months, placing it under the guard of the Neapolitans, who are to garrison it, until the definitive arrangements of the Order are settled. It should therefore seem impossible, and it would be without example in the history of nations, were his Britann e Majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification, of the very one, which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point. Indeed, the First Consul who cordially relies on the intentions of his Britannic Majesty, and cannot suppose them to be less open and generous than those with which he is animated, has hitherto been unwilling to attribute the delay of the evacuation of the island of Malta, to any other than to maritime cir-ply whatever to my observations. He concumstances. The undersigned is, therefore, charged to require explanations on this point, and he is persuaded that the British ministry will be the more anxious to furnish such as will be satisfactory, as they must be sensible how necessary they are for the maintenance of harmony, and how important they are for the honour of the two nations. The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Lord Hawkesbury the assurances of his high consideration. (Signed) F. ANDREOSSY. Portland-place, 10th March. 1803. Paris, March 12, 1803. No. 42.-My Lord, The messenger Mason arrived yesterday morning early, with your lordship's letter of the 7th, informing me, that in consequence of the preparations in th ports of France and Holland, which, though avowedly intended for colonial service, might, in the event of a rupture, be turned against some part of the British dominions, his Majesty had judged it expedient to send a message to both houses of parliament, recommending, in tern.s void of of fence, the adoption of such measures as may be consistent with the honour of his crown, and the security of his dominions, and at the same time such as will manifest his Ma fined himself strictly to the assurance which he has so repeatedly made, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by his Majesty's ministers; that the First Consul was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his Majesty's dominions, unless forced to do so by a commencement of hostilitics on our part; that he should always consider the refusal to evacuate Malta as such a commencement of hostilities; and that as we had hitherto hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures which might eventually be necessary. He disclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other destination than to the colonies, and concluded that for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of his Majesty's go vernment. He then desired leave to go to the First Consul, promising that he would let me know the result when we met at dinner at the Prussian minister's. He did not come there till near seven o'clock, and when we rose from dinner, he took me aside, and informed me, that although the First Consul had been highly irritated at the unjust suspicion which his Majesty's government entertained, yet he would not allow himself to be so far mastered by his feelings, as to lose sight Note verbale, referred to in No. 42.Translation.-I. If his Britannic Majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetfluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his Majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.-II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.-III. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position.-IV. It is natural that the First Cousul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.-V. It is likewise in the nature of things, that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Swis*serland, should be under the necessity of con tinuing a French army in that country.-VI. It is also the natural consequence of all this, that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.-VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important as cannot fail to agitate all Europe. The result of all these movements will be to France irritate the two countries still more. will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English arinaments, and nevertheless every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French The experience of nations, and the course of events prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostiAs to the lity, is unfortunately not remote. differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic Majesty's message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined that a serious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament. Europe well knows that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her. arms. Paris, March 14, 1803. Mason No. 43.-My Lord, The messenger went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and until yesterday (Sunday) I saw no one likely to give me any further information such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his Majesty's message had produced on At the court which was the First Consul. held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days He immediately said, and so you are ago, No! I replied, we determined to go to war. are too sensible of the advantages of peace.— Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.-As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, C'en est déja trop.→ Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez.-I told him, that was very far from his Majesty's intentions.--He then proceeded to Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, Les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'Epée, je lis ne respecserai le dernier à la remettre. tent pas les Traités. Il faut dorénavant les * D2 actual state of possession of the different partics, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession and of engagements was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of natons, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subse couvrir de Crepe noir.-He, then went his round, in a few minutes he came back to me, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again.-Pourquoi des Armemens? Contre qui des mesures de precaution? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-être tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider.-On ne vou droit, said I, ni l'un niquently made in their relative situation; that l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelli- if there ever was a case to which this pringence avec elle. Il faut donc respecter les ciple might be applied with peculiar propriety, traités, replied he; Malheur à ceux qui ne it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the respectent pas les traités; ils en seront re-negotiation was conducted on a basis not sponsable à toute l'Europe.-He was too merely proposed by his Majesty, but spemuch agitated to make it adviseable for me cially agreed to, in an official note, by the to prolong the conversation; I therefore made French government, viz. that his Majesty no answer, and he retired to his apartment, should keep a compensation out of his conquests repeating the last phrase. It is to be re-for the important acquisition of territory made marked that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by 200 people who were present, and I ain persuaded that there was not a single person, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occa sion. I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to Mr. Talleyrand on this subject, I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH, Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. No. 44.Extract of a dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, 1803.- send your excellency a copy of the note presented to me by General Andre rossy on the 10th instant, (vide page 57) and a copy of the answer which I have this day by his Majesty's commands returned to it. No. 45-Note. The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the King the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant. In obeying the commands of his Majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given on more than one occasion by himself verbally to General Andréossy, and by Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French Ambassador, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this Treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the I by France upon the Continent. That is a sufficient |