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CHAPTER him there. That this was his view of the matter is

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1685.

Preparations and plan of invasion.

tion. May 2.

plain, as we are informed by Burnet that he depended
not only on an army of his own clan and vassals, but
that he took it for granted, that the western and
southern counties would all at once come about him,
when he had gathered a good force together in his own
country; and surely, such an expectation, when we re-
flect upon
the situation of those counties, was by no

means unreasonable.

Argyle's counsel, backed by Lord Grey and the rest of Monmouth's advisers, and opposed by none except Fletcher of Salton, to whom some add Captain Matthews, prevailed, and it was agreed to invade immediately, and at one time, the two kingdoms. Monmouth had raised some money from his jewels, and Argyle had a loan of ten thousand pounds from a rich widow in AmArgyle's expedi- sterdam. With these resources, such as they were, ships. and arms were provided, and Argyle sailed from Vly on the second of May, with three small vessels, accompanied by Sir Patrick Hume, Sir John Cochrane, and a few more Scotch gentlemen, and by two Englishmen, Ayloffe, a nephew by marriage to Lord Chancellor Clarendon, and Rumbold the malster, who had been accused of being principally concerned in that conspiracy which, from his farm in Hertfordshire, where it was pretended Charles the Second was to have been intercepted in his way from Newmarket, and assassi

Sir Pa- CHAPTER

nated, had been called the Rye-house plot.* Sir Patrick Hume is said to have advised the shortest passage, in order to come more unexpectedly upon the enemy; but Argyle, who is represented as remarkably tenacious of his own opinions, persisted in his plan of sailing round the north of Scotland, as well for the purpose of landing at once among his own vassals, as for that of being nearer to the western counties, which had been most severely oppressed, and from which, of course, he expected most assistance. Each of these plans had no doubt its peculiar advantages; but, as far as we can judge at this distance of time, those belonging to the Earl's scheme seem to preponderate; for the force he carried with him was certainly not sufficient to enable him, by striking any decisive stroke, to avail himself even of the most unprepared state in which he could hope to find the King's government. As he must therefore depend entirely upon reinforcements from the country, it seemed reasonable to make for that part where succour was most likely to be obtained, even at the hazard of incurring the disadvantage which must evidently result from the enemy's having early notice

* The detailed account of the exiles from England and Scotland, from page 171 to 175, was inserted in the work by Mr. Fox, after this passage was written. As it is there introduced, Mr. Fox would, no doubt, have erased the repetition of it; but it has been the object of the Editor to preserve scrupulously the words of the MSS. E.

III.

1685.

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CHAPTER of his attack, and consequently proportionable time for defence.

1685.

Discovered by his landing in

Unfortunately, this hazard was converted into a certhe Orkneys. tainty, by his sending some men on shore in the Orkneys. Two of these, Spence and Blackadder, were seized at Kirkwall by the bishop of the diocese, and sent up prisoners to Edinburgh, by which means the government was not only satisfied of the reality of the intended invasion, of which, however, they had before had some intimation,* but could guess with a reasonable certainty, the part of the coast where the descent was to take place; for Argyle could not possibly have sailed so far to the north with any other view, than of making his landing either on his own estate, or in some of the western counties. Among the numberless charges of imprudence against the unfortunate Argyle, charges too often inconsiderately urged against him who fails in any enterprize of moment, that which is founded upon the circumstance just mentioned appears to me to be the most weighty, though it is that which is the least mentioned, and by no author, as far as I recollect, much enforced. If the landing in the north was merely for the purpose of gaining intelligence respecting the disposition of the country, or for the more frivolous object

* Vide Appendix. Burnet. II. 313. Woodrow, II. 513.

III.

1685.

of making some few prisoners, it was indeed imprudent CHAPTER in the highest degree. That prisoners, such as were likely to be taken on this occasion, should have been a consideration with any man of common sense, is impossible. The desire of gaining intelligence concerning the disposition of the people, was indeed a natural curiosity; but it would be a strong instance of that impatience which has been often alledged, though in no other case proved, to have been part of the Earl's character, if, for the sake of gratifying such a desire, he gave the enemy any important advantage. Of the intelligence which he sought thus eagerly, it was evident that he could not, in that place, and at that time, make any immediate use; whereas, of that which he afforded his enemies, they could, and did avail themselves against him. The most favourable account of this proceeding, and which seems to deserve most credit, is, that having missed the proper passage through the Orkney islands, he thought proper to send on shore for pilots, and that Spence very imprudently took the opportunity of going to confer with a relation at Kirkwall;* but it is to be remarked, that it was not necessary, for the purpose of getting pilots, to employ men of note, such as Blackadder and Spence, the latter of whom was the Earl's Secretary; and that it was an unpardonable neglect not to give the strictest injunctions to those who were em

* Woodrow, II. 513.

III.

CHAPTER ployed, against going a step further into the country than was absolutely necessary.

1685.

His descent on
Argyleshire.

Argyle, with his wonted generosity of spirit, was at first determined to lay siege to Kirkwall, in order to recover his friends; but partly by the dissuasions of his followers, and still more by the objections made by the masters of the ships, to a delay which might make them lose the favourable winds for their intended voyage, he was induced to prosecute his course.* In the mean time the government made the use that it was obvious they would make, of the information they had obtained, and when the Earl arrived at his destination, he learned that considerable forces were got together to repel any attack that he might meditate. Being prevented by contrary winds from reaching the isle of Ilay, where he had proposed to make his first landing, he sailed back to Dunstafnage in Lorn, and there sent ashore his son, Mr. Charles Campbell, to engage his tenants, and other friends, and dependants of his family, to rise in his behalf; but even there he found less encouragement and assistance than he had expected, and the Laird of Lochniel, who gave him the best assurances, treacherously betrayed him, sent his letter to the Government, and joined the royal forces under the Marquis of Athol. He then proceeded southwards, and landed at Camp

* Woodrow, II. 531.

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