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ness of the weapons, which required a | accomplishment the British soldier deal of elbow-room; partly to the seems to have excelled particularly. necessity of space demanded for the When threatened by cavalry the doubling of files," that is to say, the musketeers fired under the shelter of process by which in these days the two the Pikes; but to get them safely and ranks are converted into four; and the orderly among them, and so to disconverse "doubling of ranks; "the re-tribute them as to use their fire to the conversion of four ranks into two. It best advantage, was a difficult mais expressly laid down that the men are nouvre. Plans and dispositions for not to be taught to close up shoulder meeting the attack of cavalry are abunto shoulder, for, as Bingham mourn- dant and ingenious enough; indeed in fully says, "when necessity shall re- one French drill-book (Le Mareschal quire it, they will close themselves de Bataille, 1647), wherein pikemen are but too much of their own accord with- designated by red dots and musketeers out command." Any one who knows by black, the plans resemble beautiful the extraordinary difficulty of making designs for a tesselated pavement; but men keep their distances accurately none the less, in spite of all elaboration, will understand the trials to which the the musketeers seem generally to have instructors of those days were sub- bolted in among the Pikes as best they jected. And let it be remembered that could. The manœuvres were so comall profane swearing met with imme-plicated that often it was impossible to diate punishment. get the men to return to one front When the men had mastered the except by the words "Face to your elements of their business the captain leader," which rather reminds one of was left with the task of handling his Marryat's nigger-sergeant, "Face to company to the best advantage, a mountain, back to sea-beach." And sufficiently difficult matter. For it was important not to jumble the Pikes and the Shot, it was vital not to separate them too far, and it must have been only too easy to get the whole into hopeless confusion. The rule was, on parade as in the field, to mass the Pikes in the centre, and put half of the musketeers on each flank, both alike in ranks ten deep. An infantry attack was generally opened by an advance of musketeers from each flank, two ranks at a time; the first rank fired and filed off to the rear, the second rank took their place and did likewise; then two more ranks moved up to take their place in turn, and so on ad infinitum. Meanwhile the main body of Pikes was slowly but steadily advancing, and the musketeers, as the enemy came closer, gradually dropped back, still firing, till they were aligned with the centre of the column of Pikes. If neither side gave way, matters came to "push of pike," as the contemporary phrase ran sure sign of a stubborn fight and ultimately to a charge, in which the musketeers fell on with the butt, using the musket as a club. In this latter

yet when skilfully handled, how magnificently these men could fight! Take the one solitary body on the king's side at Naseby, which, when the whole of the rest of the army was in full flight, stood like a rock (to use Rushworth's words) and would not move an inch. This tertia could not have been above three hundred strong; but it was not until Fairfax had ordered a strong troop of cavalry to attack it in front, a regiment of foot to take it in rear, and another detachment of infantry to assail it in flank, that at last it was broken and dispersed. There is no finer example of the "unconquerable British infantry," which Napier has so eloquently celebrated.

For the rest the British soldier of that epoch had more in common with his brother of to-day than is generally supposed. Of course the prevalence of religious fanaticism gave occasion for serious mutiny at times; for though the union of the religious with the military conscience is irresistible, yet the conflict of the two means death to military 1 Cf. the adjutant of the Scots Greys at Balaclava, "Rally, the Greys, Face me!"

discipline. There was only one remedy heart, and the inevitable result was at for such mutiny, and that was unflinch-least common enough to be made a milingly applied. How troublesome this itary offence. Swearing and drunkenfanaticism was in other slighter ways ness likewise were not uncommon; and may be gathered from the following all these offences were punished alike description of a little riot that took with flogging or the wooden horse. place in the City on Sunday, October Moreover, such punishments were in16th, 1653. "An anabaptistical soldier flicted in public so as to combine the was preaching at a little place in St. maximum of degradation. Thus we Paul's churchyard. The boys [appren- hear of men flogged up and down the tices] congregated, and by their throw- ranks of the regiment in the High ing of stones gave interruption to the Street of Windsor, or in Holborn; or speaker and his audience; who being of their riding the wooden horse at assisted by the soldiers routed the boys. Charing Cross with cans about their Some heads were broken and so much necks for being drunk and unruly. noise made that the mayor and sheriffs The "horse" was simply a triangular not being far from thence at church ridge of wood, in which men were set marched thither. The soldiers desired astride with muskets tied to their legs. satisfaction of the 'prentices. 'Twas Flogging was not so severe as in the made answer, "'Twas an unlawful as- Peninsular days, the historic "cat" sembly;' and the sheriff said he knew having been only just invented for the not by what authority soldiers should benefit of the navy. "Running the preach there. The soldier replied, 'By gantlope" that is, being flogged down this authority,' and presented his pistol the ranks of the regiment, every man at him, but did not give fire. In fine, being armed with a cudgel, was rethe soldiers had the better, cut and beat served ror offenders against a comrade. many and carried with them the mar- Severe as this punishment must have shal of the City, threatening to im- been, Gustavus Adolphus was comprison him; but did not. The lord pelled to make it a capital offence for a mayor and his brethren are at this man to run the gantlope more than minute with the general complaining. | twice, as men could always be found to The City generally are highly exasperated, but a parcel of tame cocknies." (Thurloe S.P. IV. 139.)

At the same time it is surely a fallacy to look upon Cromwell's army as composed exclusively of saints. It must be borne in mind that throughout the period of Puritan ascendency one of the filthiest sheets to be found in any language was printed and published regularly in London every week, and that there were lewd livers, drunkards, and extortioners in the Long Parliament itself. That the army was well behaved as a rule there can, we think, be no doubt; but this was principally due to severe discipline rigidly enforced. No doubt there were certain corps which gave a tone to the whole, but dread of punishment had a large share in persuading the others to accept it. Still the full body and comely posture, like the curls above the foragecap, were too much for many a female

submit to it (presumably to amuse their comrades) for a few shillings. But insensitive as men may have been to pain in those days, it is by no means so certain that they were equally insensitive to public ridicule and degradation, which was always part of the punishment in Cromwell's time. In those days the newspapers reported the punishment of insubordination with pleasure; now they claim sympathy for the insubordinate. The British public will not suffer the soldier to share its amusements, as being a creature unfit for its noble company; but it joyfully encourages him to mutiny against his officers. It treats him with contempt which he does not deserve; but interposes to save him from punishment which he does. It was Cromwell who made the British soldier's profession an honor to him, and offence against it a reproach. England will never see another Cromwell; but

This is the question which is now something very much less than this is being discussed with serious earnest- immediately possible. The curse of ness in at least two of the Cabinets of the existing situation is that it is the Europe. This policy of a word is a natural and necessary result of interpossibility which the next month may national anarchy. To effect any imsee translated into a realized fact.provement, international anarchy must For the necessity of taking some ac- be subjugated by the introduction, on tion in this direction is no longer the however small a scale, of international dream of the idealist and the philoso- agreement. To introduce this interpher. It has taken its place in the national agreement it is necessary to deliberations of sovereigns and states- begin at the beginning, to start from men. It is being discussed by am- things as they are. What, then, can be bassadors, and it may soon find an more obvious and more simple than imperious voice in the impassionate the proposal which is now being serimandate of suffering democracies. ously considered in the highest quarters Halt ! That is all. We have not got beyond that yet. But that word of categorical imperative is already trembling upon the lips of Europe.

In the pages of this review a statesman of European reputation last month propounded a suggestion which did infinite honor to his heart, but which unfortunately outran considerably the facts of the immediate situation. After eloquently exposing the frightful evils of the present suicidal competition of armaments, M. Jules Simon suggested as an immediate palliative that the duration of military service should be reduced from three years to two, or even to one. The relief thus obtained, it may be pointed out, might be more apparent than real. A reduction of years of service by one-third might be neutralized by adding one-third to the number of men in the ranks. But this by the way. The serious objections to the adoption of this suggestion are two. First, Germany has already reduced the term of her military service; and secondly, there is no reason to believe that Russia, which has a much rougher human material to work upon, would consent to try to make the moujik into a soldier in less than three years. Of course if the powers would agree to M. Simon's proposal, well and good. But there is, to put it mildly, no evidence justifying any hope that they would accept a change that would involve so many and such drastic changes in their military systems.

Something very much more simple than this is wanted, and fortunately

viz., to promote an international understanding that, until the close of the present century, no power will increase the sum of money annually devoted to military and naval expenditure beyond the maximum war budget of the current year? Due provision would, of course, have to be made for the possible unforeseen burdens of war or insurrection in Asia or Africa, and it would also be necessary to make due allowance for what may be described as the slight contingent increase of expenditure which may be necessary to carry out the programmes of the present year. Any amount of elasticity might be allowed for in details, if so be that there could then better be secured the vital principle of an international understanding as to the maximum of expenditure on armaments for the next six years. If that were once secured everything else might follow.

The considerations which have led to this proposal are obvious. The principle of allowing every State to decide at its own sovereign will and pleasure upon the amount, nature, and constitution of its armaments is left absolutely intact. For the last quarter of a century the powers have been left without any understanding of any kind to allocate whatever proportion of their revenues they thought fit to the maintenance of their defensive and offensive force. They have by a process of continual experiment arrived this year at the heaviest expenditure they have ever made, and it is reasonable to suppose that, after so many years, they

That, of

have succeeded in establishing to their | ble, it would effect no relief of the own satisfaction what amount of armor burdens which are weighing down the they can afford to carry. Having industry of the nations. reached this point, all that it is now course, is true. But it would be much proposed to do is to introduce a law of more than a mere academic advantage the maximum for the next six years. to arrest the automatic growth of naEach power would still be left abso- tional expenditure. In the past the lutely free to vary to any extent the war budgets of Europe have increased sums devoted to each arm of the ser- at the rate of twenty-three per cent. in vice, subject only to one limitation. six years. In the next six years they The total war budget should not be would probably show at least as great increased beyond the point at which an increase, or say £25,000,000 per anthey have each fixed it this year for num in 1900. To prevent the impothemselves. They can, of course, re-sition of that fresh burden would be a duce their expenditure as much as they triumph for civilization and common please. There will be no law of mini- sense. But the advantage would not mum. Only a law of maximum. In end there. If once the law of the maxother words, the powers would enter imum were to be accepted as part of into an international understanding the recognized rule of Europe, two

to regard the war budgets of this year as the high-water mark of military and naval expenditure for the closing years of this century.

Such an understanding would abrogate most of the difficulties that confront those who seek to arrive at the same result by fixing the quota of troops with the colors, or by stipulating for the observance of a certain standard of naval strength. The powers, being naturally distrustful of each other, constantly question the good faith of their neighbors. Inquiries, difficult either to answer or to parry, would be made as to the strength of garrisons and the number and condition of the war ships. By this means the very effort to secure peace might precipitate war. All these dangers could be averted by the simple process of fixing the law of the maximum. Each power, on entering upon this agreement, would specify the sum which it devotes this year to its armaments, and, so long as the military and naval estimates of succeeding years did not exceed that sum, no question would arise. There is no check so simple and effective as the money check, nor is there any limitation upon the liberty of action of the powers less irksome or embarrassing.

It may be objected that, although the international arrangement under discussion might be academically admira

years would not elapse before the powers would come to consider whether it might not be possible to reduce that accepted maximum. There is no special sanctity about the figure fixed by the war ministries of 1894. The status quo must be accepted as the startingpoint. But so long as the relative proportion of the expenditure of the several powers is maintained intact there could be no objection to a simultaneous scaling down all round, say by five or ten, or even by twenty per cent. The first thing to be done, however, is not to discuss whether agreement to reduce is possible, but to demonstrate that an agreement not to increase is both possible and practical. After the powers have shown their willingness loyally to abide by the law of the maximum as fixed by this status quo, they will be in a much better position to broach the further question as to the possibility of a simultaneous modification of the status quo.

Even if no such modification were attempted, the acceptance of the law of the maximum would mark a great stride towards the establishment of international law in the place of in|ternational anarchy. A broad, unmistakable mark would be drawn by the common consent of all the powers indicating the extent beyond which the exactions of militarism should not go.