when a thing in its present existence is the moving object of knowledge. Knowledge abstractive is when the species of the thing doth move us to know the thing itself; and that whether the thing itself be present or absent, and have existence or not. The example of intuitive sensitive knowledge or perception, which he giveth, is the eye-seeing colours. The instance of abstractive sensitive knowledge is, as the fantasy doth imagine colours the instance of intuitive, intellective knowledge is, the saints seeing the glory of God in heaven; and he might have instanced in many other things. The instance of abstractive, intellective knowledge, is the understanding's knowledge of the quiddity of colours by means of the species to which may be added, that abstractive knowledge is either per speciem propriam or per speciem alienam: in this life the soul knoweth its own acts, either intuitively, or by an act, if possible, yet nearer to its essential power, that hath no usual, distinguishing name. It knoweth its own powers, inclinations, and habits, neither by a knowledge, in proper and strict sense, intuitive or abstractive; for it is not by a proper species, but it is its natural, innate power of discerning this principle, that quicquid agit potest agere quod agit; by arguing ab actu ad potentiam et naturam. But in the large sense, as Cartesius useth the word, this may be called an idea. The mind knoweth God, and angels, and other men's souls, in this large sense, also, by an idea, but not per speciem propriam, sed alienam, that is, not by a species of God and angels, but by an idea borrowed from our own intellections and volitions. But this is not an idea that ever passed through the senses; and Gassendus might have thought on it, whether it be not an idea in the intellect, if not without the fantasy, at least over and above the idea in the imagination, when he denieth that there are any such intellective ideas.

2. But what, if there had been nothing in the intellect but what passed through the sense? It would no more thence follow, that the intellect is no more noble, spiritual, or immortal than the sense, than it will follow that the king is no better than his porter, because none cometh to him till he let them in, or that the animal spirits are no more noble than the teeth, or than the natural heat; or the third concoction is no more excellent than the first, because nothing cometh to the third concoction but what was masticated, swallowed, and passed the first and second concoction: of which before.

3. And even, by the help of things sensible, Epicurus can

reach the knowledge of insensible atoms; and Cartesius, of his subtle matter, and globuli cœlestes; why, then, by things sensible, may we not reach the knowledge of spiritual substances and powers?

Yet, after all this, I am much of their mind who think that it is not actual knowledge that is born with us; nor is there any true idea or picture of any thing innate in our understandings ; and I think that if, per possibile vel impossibile, you suppose a man born without any one sense, that he would have had no actual knowledge at all, though that is uncertain. Because, as if I had not seen any thing objective, I should not have perceived that I could see; so if I had never known any other object, I could not have known what it is to know: and other objects have no way, that I know of, to the intellect, but through the sense (though what the active spirits would have done upon the fantasy, I cannot possibly understand). But all this only concludeth, that the senses' reception is the way to the intellection of things sensible; and that it was a necessary occasion, sine qua non, to the perception of our own intellectual act, because thus necessary to the act itself: but not that any idea of our own intellection, or any of all the things fore-instanced, was received through the senses.

Object. X. That which things corporeal work upon, is corporeal for it cannot be conceived how bodies can work upon that which hath no body. But things corporeal work upon the soul: ergo, it is itself corporeal.

Answ. 1. I largely before showed, that our uncertainty of the just consistence of metaphysical matter, or incorporeal substance, doth make all such arguings to sound like dreams.

2. I have showed that spiritual powers receive not impressions as dull matter doth, by a mere passive power, but by an activity and outgoing; it worketh indeed upon that which it receiveth, much more than any such matter can be said to work upon it: nay, matter doth not properly work upon it at all, but only affordeth it matter to work upon, and occasion to exercise its active power. As the stone, or tree, doth not work upon the sight, but the sight by the help of light doth work upon it. As the eye can see a dunghill, and yet be of a nobler kind; and God and angels can know beasts and worms, and yet be incorporeal. So man can know things inanimate, and yet be animate; and things insensible, and yet be sensible; and things irrational, and yet be rational; and things corporeal, and yet be

incorporeal. And this by the activity and extent of its power, and not by any passive, debasing defectiveness at all.

Object. XI. That is not incorporeal which neither knoweth itself to be incorporeal, nor hath any notion but negative of an incorporeal being: but such is man's soul.e

Answ. 1. If the soul know not itself to be an immortal spirit, what maketh almost all the world to judge so of themselves? Insomuch, that those men that under pretence of philosophy deny it, are fain to study very hard, and take many years' pains to blot out this light of nature from their minds, because they cannot be ignorant of it at easy rates. The understanding will not lose its natural light, nor suffer such verities to be obliterated, but by a great deal of industry, and by the engines of abundance of false notions, which are sought after to that use. As Cicero saith of the Epicureans, they learn those things; "quæ cum præclare didicerunt nihil sciant." ('Piso. de Fin. 5. p. 204.) They learn diligently to unlearn the truth, that when they have learned much, they may know little.

2. Hath man no notion but negative of an incorporeal being? I showed you before why the notion of materiality should not be here used for a cheat or blind. But look back on what I said, even now, and you will see that, as Cartes truly saith, "We have not only positive conceptions of a mind, but the first, the clearest, and the surest conceptions of it, in the measure that is fit for our present state."

Quest. 1. Have you not a positive conception of intellection and volition? If not, you are unfit for any controversies about them, and cannot own your own humanity.

Quest. 2. Have you not a clearer perception that you think, and know, or reason, either right or wrong, than you have what that thing is that you think or reason about?

Quest. 3. Have you not a sure and positive conception that omnis actus est alicujus actus, et quod nihil, nihil agit, and therefore that you are an intelligent, volitive being?

Quest. 4. Have you not a positive, sure conception, that quicquid agit agere potest, and that nothing doth that which it cannot do; and therefore that your souls are beings potentiated for intellection, volition, and execution?

Quest. 5. Have you not a positive, sure conception that you have a natural inclination to these acts, and a pleasure in them,

e Vid. Paul. Cortesium, in Sent. 1, Dis. 1, p. 7, et Dis. 2, p. 8. That spiritual things are better known than corporeal, and of the knowledge of God.

and that they are natural and perfective to you, and, consequently, that your souls are beings that have not only a power, but a vis et inclinatio naturalis, or a power that is natural, and active, and inclined to these particular things.f

Quest. 6. Have you not a positive, sure conception that the end and highest object of these acts and inclinations, are things above sense, viz., yourselves or minds in the first place, and then the things above you, the first Being, Cause, and Mover of all; the infinite Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, who is your Maker and your End? If you find no such thing, the Lord have mercy on you; for every honest man may find it.

Quest. 7. Have you not a positive, sure conception that such as the operations are, which flow from the essential powers or faculties, such in nobility, and excellency, and nature, is the substance thus potentiated and acting?

All these are clear, undeniable, positive conceptions of the soul, which, set together, are thus much: that the mind or soul of man is a noble essence, above the reach and nature of sense, naturally potentiated and inclined, as an active being, to intellection, volition, and seeking after things celestial and everlasting, especially God himself, his ultimate End. All this is positive, clear, and sure; and you would think this enough, 1. If you would consider what Lud. Vives saith that God hath given man a soul to use, rather than accurately to know; or to know so far as is necessary to use. As your child may have the use of his knife, or clock, or watch, or clothes, without knowing what metal they are made of, or how to compose and make the like, as long as he can but do that with them which is necessary to their use. Often, saith Seneca, "Necessaria ignoramus, quia superflua didicimus." 2. If your minds were not by sense deluded and captivated to such fixed ideas of things corporeal and gross, as to overlook all other beings, and measure all substance by such gross ideas., 3. If you well considered that you know in any respect little more of things corporeal, and in some respect much less. Let us see wherein it is that you know more; either as to the sensible or insensible parts of such beings. As for the substances, as such, you confess they are but per accidens, the objects of sense, and that, as stripped of their accidents, you have no positive, true conception of them; and as for the accidents, you are no whit agreed either what they are, or how

f Porphyr. de occas. inq. Anima est essentia inextensa, immaterialis, immortalis, in vita habente à seipsa vivere atque esse simpliciter possidente.

many. Of all things, you are most unanimous in that of quantity, moles, or extension; but what a poor kind of knowledge is it, to know that this or that is quantum, and not to know what it is that is quantum. What light, colour, sapor, odor are, and what all the senses that perceive them, you are as much disagreed as if this age had been the first that had debated it. The same I may say both of qualities in general, and of all other in particular, except figure, which properly belongeth not to that predicament. Of all the rest there is the like disagreement; even time and place, which, truly, are nothing but entia rationis, are disposed by you in the first place, and are two of Gassendus's four predicaments. About the number either of principles or elements, there is no agreement; no, nor what any one of the elements are: who hath told us what is the form of earth, or water, or air; or described them otherwise than by their qualities? And then differ you as much about those qualities! Who hath told us any thing about the naked matter or form of fire, such as the sun and luminaries are, any otherwise than by its acts and powers, or virtues of motion, light, and heat, as we describe to you the soul of man? And if you go to the invisible part of matter, it would make a man rather sick than wise, to read men provincias dare atomis, as Cicero speaketh; and to think with what bold, unreasonable fiction they number them, as shaped and figured; and figure and shape them to the uses which they have feigned for them; and then use them and conduct them, and vary their motions, as confidently and seriously as if they had given us any proof of this, and indeed expected to be believed: nay, we must know how the corners of atoms (pardon the contradiction) came to be filed or worn off by motion, and so reduced to greater subtlety. And Gassendus, after all the fabric which he buildeth upon atoms, saith, "That atoms have not of themselves a moving force, but from God's first motion." (S. 1. c. viii. p. 280.) "Non quod Deo necesse fuerit creare seorsim atomos, quas deinceps in partes grandiores, grandioresque ex his, mundus constaret, compingerit; sed quod creans materiæ massam, in corpuscula exolubilem, atque adeo ex corpusculis tanquam minimis extremisque particulis compositam, concreasse illi ipsa corpuscula consentur." (Ibid.) So that they know not indeed whether God created matter first in atoms disjunct, or in more large and bulky parts; and so whether motion did divide grosser and greater parts into atoms, or whether it coagulated atoms into greater