can establish the credit of a miracle. How is this objection to be answered but by a reference to the natural world? by shewing that what we call the course of nature, from which a miracle is said to be a deviation, is in fact only a system appointed by the God of nature; and consequently liable to be suspended or altered according to his pleasure? Or perhaps the sceptic may say, that pretensions to miraculous powers have abounded in all ages; and that, as such pretensions have in the majority of instances been shewn to be false, we may reasonably conclude that they were so in all. To meet this objection, we must refer to the criteria of miracles, which are all deductions of human reason; and shew that the purposes, for which the miraculous powers are said to have been exerted, were consonant to just conceptions of the Divine Nature and Attributes: and those, conceptions derived from sources extraneous and independent of the Revelation itself. For we must not, in the first instance, say, that we obtain the knowledge of the nature and attributes of God from a revelation, and then prove the truth of that revelation by a reference to the knowledge so obtained.

1

But is not this, it will be asked, to constitute human reason the judge of the Divine

dispensations? Is it not to say that man, blind and ignorant man, can certainly determine what ought and what ought not to proceed from God? By no means. It is only to compare one set of facts with another; to compare the conceptions of the Divine nature, which we derive from the perusal of the Bible, with those which we derive from the contemplation of the phenomena of the natural and moral world. If the written word and the visible world both proceed from the same author, they cannot but agree in the testimony which they bear to his character and attributes.

Men, it is true, have not unfrequently been induced by the love of paradox, by the desire of obtaining a reputation for superior talent and acuteness, or by other motives of a similar description, to assert the all-sufficiency of human reason, and to deny the necessity of a revelation. Hence many good and pious Christians have run into the opposite extreme, and been disposed to regard all, who have recourse to reason and the light of nature in the investigation of religious truth, as little better than infidels; puffed up with a presumptuous conceit of their own knowledge, and siting in judgement on the fitness of the Divine procedure. Yet what just ground is there

for these heavy accusations? Is not reason the gift of God? Does not the light of nature emanate from the author of nature? from Him who is the fountain of light? In what then consists the presumption of endeavouring to trace the Divine character and operations, by means of that light, which God has himself supplied? The knowledge of divine things which we acquire by the proper exercise of our various faculties on the phenomena of the visible world, is as strictly the gift of God, as that which we derive from the perusal of his revealed word.

Warburton, in the 2d and 3d Chapters of the third Book of the Doctrine of Grace, has pointed out with his usual acuteness, the causes in which the existing disposition to undervalue and condemn the argument a posteriori originated. In their endeavours to defend our holy religion, divines, instead of taking their stand upon the firm basis of truth, have been too apt to shift their ground, and think opinions right in proportion as they were further removed from those of the adversary with whom they were immediately contending. Hence they have continually run into extremes; sometimes exalting human reason above all due bounds; at other times as unjustly depreciating

it. In the seventeenth century, fanaticism was the error against which the clergy had principally to contend; and in order to place themselves at the greatest possible distance from it, they took every opportunity of launching forth into the praises of human reason, and asserting its sufficiency to the discovery of divine truth; till the Gospel at length came to be spoken of as a mere republication of the religion of nature. The infidel was not slow in availing himself of the advantage which such unguarded expressions afforded him; and began to deny the necessity of revelation, under the pretence that natural religion was sufficient for every purpose. Our divines again took the alarm; and, instead of endeavouring to mark out the precise bounds of reason and revelation, saw no better mode of extricating themselves from the difficulty, than by running into the opposite extreme, and decrying natural religion with as much vehemence as their predecessors had extolled it. To return to Tertullian.

We have seen his opinion respecting the testimony, borne by the soul of man, to the unity and attributes of God, and to a future state. Let us now examine his sentiments respecting the soul itself; which are detailed

in the 15 Treatise de Animâ. After the body or flesh 16 of Adam had been formed out of the 17 dust of the earth, God breathed into his nostrils the 18 breath of life, and man became a living soul. Man, therefore, is composed of two parts, oap and yvxn, Caro and 19 Anima,

15 We have seen that our author wrote a distinct Treatise on the Origin of the Soul, de Censu Animæ, against Hermogenes, who contended that it was formed out of matter. Chap. I. p. 64.

16 c. 3. See, concerning the creation of man, de Resurrectione Carnis, cc. 5. 7.

17 Tertullian supposes the earth out of which man was made, to have been in a humid state, having been lately covered with water. De Baptismo, c. 3. Adv. Valentinianos, c. 24. Adv. Hermogenem, c. 29. Qui tunc de limo formari habebat. Adv. Praxeam, c. 12. De limo caro in Adam. De Animâ, c. 27. For a definition of the body, see de Resurrectione Carnis, c. 35.

18 This breath Tertullian sometimes calls the substance of God. A rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus (homo), sed etiam ex substantiâ ipsius animatus. Adv. Praxeam, c. 5. Compare adv. Marc. L. ii. cc. 5, 6. Quoquo tamen, inquis, modo substantia Creatoris delicti capax invenitur, quum afflatus Dei, id est, anima, in homine deliquit. c. 9. The objection here stated was urged, not only by the Marcionites, but also by Hermogenes. See de Animâ,

c. 11.

19 Tertullian sometimes uses the word Spiritus to designate the Soul. See de Baptismo, cc. 4. 5. De Pœnitentiâ, c. 3. Siquidem et caro et Spiritus Dei res; alia manu ejus expressa; alia afflatu ejus consummata. De Spectaculis, c. 2. Et tamen et corpore et spiritu desciit a suo institutore. In another passage in the same Tract, c. 13. Spiritus and Anima are joined together, and appear to be synonymous, unless the former means the breath. Quæ non intestinis transiguntur,