most sensible technical approach would be to have a different zone for each reactor very dependent upon its risk analysis. Mr. ATKINS. If I could ask you a question, just for a citizen sitting in this audience. They are involved with a licensing procedure, perhaps the most controversial one in the country that we have had in history-certainly, one of the handful of the most controversial ones. It is a generic rule that has been applied-in fact, you have got rulemaking ongoing to look at increasing it to 20 miles, and you have never before granted an exemption, to your knowledge, to go down to anything below 10 miles, and all of a sudden, in the middle of the proceedings, at a time when a major obstacle is the people beyond the 2-mile zone, but within the 10-mile zone who are concerned about safety issues; and, as the Governor indicated, every single, without exception, public safety official and professional who has looked at that in the State, has said that you cannot adequately evacuate them. So, all of a sudden, what we say is if you cannot evacuate them, then tell them there is no risk; and, for the average citizen—that looks mighty strange. I mean maybe it is legitimately that you were coaching the Public Service people; maybe it is legitimate that there is some factor that makes Seabrook unique, but nobody has seen it here; there has not been anything in the public. The only thing that makes it unique is that Massachusetts happens to be just outside that 2-mile zone, and this is the way to cut them out. I just ask you is there any-I ask this to Mr. Wingo-is there any way that you can tell me that by having a zone that is 10 miles instead of 2 miles that that is going to pose any risk to anybody in the case of a nuclear accident? Is there any possible conceivable advantage to the public safety of shrinking that zone from 10 miles to 2 miles? Is there any way that you can tell these people they are going to be safer if there is only a 2-mile zone? Mr. WINGO. Once again, the determination of risk Mr. ATKINS. I am not asking you about risk now-let's leave risk aside. We are doing a 10-mile zone. I am asking you whatever the risk is, we know no insurance company will take the risk. We know the industry is desperately trying to get the taxpayers to take up the risk; but whatever that risk is, I am asking you that, given that risk, is there anybody anyway, anybody's going to be safer with the 2-mile zone than they would be with the 10-mile zone? Mr. WINGO. To answer that hypothetical question, I would have to respond in the following way: Certainly Mr. ATKINS. Just yes or no would be helpful. Mr. WINGO [continuing]. Certainly more protection would be afforded if you had a plume-exposure plan in the 10-mile area versus 2, because you would have a management information decisionmaking process that would extend beyond the 2-mile zone. However, an assessment of risk is necessary to make a determination Mr. ATKINS. So- Mr. WINGO [continuing]. As to whether or not the public would be at risk as a function of radius from the plant. Mr. ATKINS. So people Mr. WINGO. That is the basis of risk assessment. Mr. ATKINS. People would be safer, whether they need to be safer, may be at issue. Is there any public good that is served in your estimation by shrinking that zone from 10 miles to 2 miles? Who does it help? Who does it make safer? What does it do in the public interest to shrink that zone? Mr. PERRY. With all due respect, Congressman, we do not define the threat; we do not define the problem. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission tells us what in its judgment should be planned for; and, after the planning is done, we evaluate the plans, and we evaluate the capabilities and exercises. We have no expertise in the area of estimating or making judgments about potential threats posed by a range of potential nuclear accidents. We are told what should be planned for, and then we evaluate what emerges in the way of an effort designed to meet the threat. Mr. ATKINS. But is not the threat twofold from a nuclear plant accident? One is the actual threat of exposure; the other is the threat of people trampling over each other to get out of that expo sure. And I do not care what the NRC says the risk is; people are going to be trampling each other, and they are not going to run any less fast; and they are not going to move any differently if they think the risk is some factor lower because of some thicker containment vessel, allegedly that the NRC says-they are going to be moving. You have the expertise, and what happens when the 200,000 people in Salisbury, in Hampton, all start moving like crazy because they think their lives are in danger, with route I-95 the only major artery between the two States; and I just-for the life of me, it is beyond me to understand how does any public purpose serve whatsoever, and I think you know that the risk is the risk of people trampling on each other, and that risk is going to be the same no matter what the NRC says about the size of the containment vessel. Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts once again, Mr. Mavroules. Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are not turning it around. Chet has taken on the substantive issue, evacuation; I will take on some of the questions which I think are very important. Mr. Wingo and Mr. Perry, I have just got a couple of questions here, and then we will move on. I am sure the Chairman wants to move along with his hearing. The question I have is very simple. I understand that when FEMA evaluates the exercise of a State's nuclear power plant emergency plans, you count as deficiencies problems in problem areas for which, in your collective, professional judgment, the plans fail adequately to protect the public. As a result of the exercise, how many deficiencies did FEMA find in the February 1986, New Hampshire emergency plans? Mr. WINGO. There were 58 deficiencies observed in that exercise. Mr. MAVROULES. Is this a small number of deficiencies, an average number, or an unusually large number? Mr. WINGO. It would be on the unusually large scale in terms of experiences at other sites. Mr. MAVROULES. Is it probably the largest ever in the region group I area? Mr. WINGO. I could research that and provide that answer for the record at a later time. It certainly is one of the larger numbers in terms of-— Mr. MAVROULES. You stated 58, Mr. Wingo? Mr. WINGO. That's correct. Mr. MAVROULES. And what in the past have been the largest number in the region I area? Would maybe five be adequate? Would that be a correct figure? Mr. WINGO. I do not have that information readily available. Mr. WINGO. Certainly. Mr. MAVROULES. OK. I would appreciate that very, very much. I do not have any other questions at this point, Mr. Chairman. [Testimony resumes on p. 474.] [The following information was submitted for the record:] (1) The offsite exercise deficiencies identified by FEMA during the February 26, 1986 Seabrook exercise represents the highest number identified by FEMA at any of the FEMA Region I commercial nuclear power station (CNPS) exercises conducted since 1981. (2) The highest number of offsite exercise deficiencies, i.e., those exercise inadequacies which may result in a finding that the public health and safety could not be protected, previously identified by FEMA during any Region I CNPS exercise was 5 during the Maine Yankee exercise conducted on December 11, 1982. (3) The average number of offsite exercise deficiencies identified by FEMA for Region I CNPS exercises conducted during the period 1981-1986 is 3. Director Becton asked me to respond to your letter of September 15, 1986, The Subcommittee invited Samuel W. Speck to represent FEMA at the hearing. Since Dr. Speck returned to private sector employment earlier this month, the Director has asked me to represent FEMA. As requested, I will provide 25 copies of my prepared statement to the Subcommittee office no later than 5:00 p.m., October 2, 1986. An additional 100 copies will be available at the hearing room. In your letter of September 15, 1986, you also asked FEMA to provide written answers to fifteen (15) questions. I am pleased to enclose FEMA's response to the questions posed by the Subcommittee. In addition, as noted in several of our responses, we have also enclosed a number of attachments including FEMA guidance documents, the FEMA-NRC Memorandum of Understanding and documents relating to the Chernobyl accident. I look forward to meeting with you and the Subcommittee at the hearing on Sincerely Dave Mcloughlin Dave McLoughlin Deputy Associate Director and Support Enclosures FEMA RESPONSES TO SEPTEMBER 15, 1986 QUESTIONS FROM CONGRESSMAN EXWARD MARKEY 1) At an August 2, 1983 hearing before the House Subcommittee on Oversight from a) The existing source of guidance to State and local governments remains Revision 1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. What revisions have been made to the State and local government guidance criteria which are not reflected in NUREG-0654? FEMA and NRC completed concurrent reviews and assessments of In order to permit State and local governments more time in FEMA has issued a series of documents designated as Guidance 1 b) What revisions have been made to the NRC/FEMA formal review process since 1983? ·FEMA : No revisions have been made to the NRC/FEMA formal review process since the publication of FEMA's final rule, 44 CFR 350, on September 28, 1983. The Commission amended its regulations in July 1984 to relax the frequency of participation by State and local governmental authorities in emergency preparedness exercises at nuclear power plant sites from annual to biennial. 72-431 O - 87-9 |