The Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate ("Committee") has petitioned this Court, pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Local Rule 3-6(3), for an order authorizing disclosure of (1) documents in the possession or control of the United States Department of Justice ("Department") and (2) memoranda prepared by Department of Justice personnel which relate to its investigation of the uranium industry. The petition siates that the Committee seeks this information in order to fulfill its proper legislative and oversight responsibilities. The Justice Department, which initially declared that it took no position on the question of whether the Committee had made the proper showing to receive the documents, now asserts that it would not object to the grant of the petition. The strongest objection to release of the materials, particularly grand jury transcripts and Justice Department memoranda containing excerpts from these transcripts, now comes from nadied and unnamed individuals, (hereinafter "witnesses") each of whom testified before the grand jury investigating the uranium industry. Alternatively, some of the "witnesses" seek orders protecting the confidentiality of certain sensitive documents and testimony. 1. From May, 1976 until May, 1978, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice conducted a grand jury in canned apponiastely 200,000 45ou can end met é from approximately 90 witnesses, but it was dischalted without an indictment being sought. The Department did, however, file a criminal information in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania charging Gulf Oil Corporation ("Gulf") with a violation of the Shertian Act. United States v. Gulf Oil Corporation, Crim. No. 78-123 (W. D. Pa.). On June 2, 1978, Gulf entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lone misdemeanor charge against it. The uranium investigation and the fact that only the single action against Gulf emerged from this extensive investigation was the subject of questioning by the Committee during its larch 26, 1979 hearing about the Antitrust Division's overall perío: cance. The Comittee was apparently concerned by reports that Justice Department steif assigned to the uranium investigation had recommended that felony indictments be brought against Gulf and other companies suspected of furthering the uranium cartel. At the hearing the Committee questioned Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield about his decision to file a misdemeanor information against Gulf rather than seek an indictment with felony counts, and Er. Shenefield responded in a somewhat guarded fashion, suggesting that the policy of grand jury secrecy forbade more frank discussion. The Antitrust Division has offered within the bounds of Rule 6(e) to supply the Committee with further information about the uranium investigation, but the Committee has not been satisfied with the nature of the information it has either received or been offered. Committee maintains that what it needs can only come from a review of the memoranda prepared by the various Department The will be better able to carry out its oversight function, proceed with its authorization process wore knowledgeably, and be in a better position to recommend substantive changes both in the antitrust laws and possibly in the structure of the Antitrust Division itself, in addition to enabling it jo conduct an in-depth review of the Department's handling of the uranium investigation. The Committee argues that this need for the materials satisfies the "particularized need" standard of Rule 6(e), especially because the rationale for secrecy in this case has dissipated with the discharge of the grand jury and the lack of any further prosecutions. The Committee goes beyond this, in fact, to argue that it need not even demonstrate a particularized need because it is acting within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Because it is so expowered, the Committee continues, the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution limits judicial inquiry into congressional need for grand jury materials. The Committee arques in conclusion that production of the material sought does not even raise an issue of grand jury secrecy because it is being sought for its own sake, rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury. According to this Jogic, since the materials sought are not, strictly speaking. "matters occurring before the grand jury," they are not embraced by Rule 6(e) and its accompanying restrictions. Then 1- The Gact nature of the Committee's request became clear only at the tide of the hearing on the petition. Initially the Committee phrased its request generally so that it could encompass both the memoranda and the transcripts. it limited its request to memoranda. But it apparently returned to its initial position at oral argument by alluding to transcripts as part of its request, though admitting that release of actual transcripts posed a more difficult legal hurdle. Thus this memorandum is primarily concerned with the question of disclosure of the actual transcripts of the grand jury proceedings and excerpts thereiron. |