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not done, and are not doing, their duty to the country and their Sovereign; and if that be the case it really matters little whether their neglect arises from deliberate disinclination to push the war, or from absolute administrative incapacity. We are not appealing to the prejudices of a section-we are appealing to the common sense and sound British feeling of the people. Let them reflect, and that seriously, upon the position in which we are now placed, without allowing their minds to be diverted from that point by any considerations regarding the policy which has placed us there. We are engaged in a great war with a powerful enemy; we have entered his territory, and we have been besieging for eight months without a successful result the strongest of his fortresses. Doubts may be entertained as to the wisdom of the Crimean expedition; but that is mere matter of speculation. We are there; and being there, we must proceed with the enterprise. Russia has never yet given the smallest indication of a wish to retreat from the contest. On the contrary, her attitude and language are those of a resolute belligerent; and great as are the losses which she has already sustained in men, she is promptly and energetically repairing them by increased levies over her whole population. Her trade may be checked by a sea blockade, but it cannot be annihilated so long as she receives the connivance of Prussia; and if Austria can be persuaded to remain neutral, there is little chance of her European frontier being assailed. Consequently she can bring to bear upon any point which may be assailed-in the present instance the Crimea-an enormous force, even allowing for large corps d'armée in the other provinces of her empire. It is not easy to arrive at exact Russian statistics, but in Von Reden's work, Russland's Kraft Elemente, published at Frankfort last year, the strength of the Russian military force, active and reserve, is stated to amount to 1,472,242 men. And within the last ten days we have heard of the issue of an ukase ordaining a further levy of 12 out of every 1000 men throughout the Russian territory. Everything seems to indicate that the struggle will be despe

rate and protracted; and we have found at Inkermann and before Sebastopol that the Russian soldiers are no contemptible enemies. Now let us look to our own preparations. As we have already said, the force of the Allies in the Crimea is, according to the last authentic accounts, about 175,000, of which our contingent does not exceed the insignificant number of 24,000, and we have hardly any reserve to supply the inevitable losses. Those of last year, by disease alone, were frightful; and if our army is to remain much longer encamped upon a limited plateau of ground, we must, in the nature of things, expect that fever and sickness will increase. The scene, however, may be changed, and there may be a campaign in the open field. In that case we must look for losses, though from a different cause. Victories are not gained without their victims, as many a fond heart, still bleeding for the glorious death of their nearest and dearest, knows well at the present hour; but such is the necessary result of war. But are we to allow Great Britain to be drained of its last available soldier without providing any supply? Are we really in that despicable position that we cannot raise men among ourselves to maintain the British army in the field at a creditable strength? Are we to allow our allies, after all that has been done, to monopolise the glory of the campaign? That is precisely the tendency of the course which the Palmerston Ministry has been and is pursuing. They have not taken any steps to develop the warlike spirit of the country,-nay, they have been anxious to repress it, giving no encouragement whatever to the organisation of volunteer corps; and acting precisely as men would act, who were anxious, if they could, to back out of the contest, and who were so convinced that they could effect a speedy termination of the war, that they deemed it unnecessary to make any preparation for its continuance. the country look to it in time. Russia has no intention of making a present peace, except on such terms as will be claimed as a national triumph to herself, and a humiliation to those who have entered her territory; and if we desire, by deeds of arms, to conquer and dictate an effective peace,

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we must put forth the whole of our resources. It is absolutely sickening to hear noble lords and honourable gentlemen claiming credit and confidence for having sent out to their neglected soldiery proper supplies of clothing, shelter, and provisionswhich are the soldier's right, not gifts bestowed upon him—and at the same time to observe that they are taking no effective steps for increasing the army, and maintaining it at the point which our position in the scale of European nations demands. We know the feeling of the country well, and it is sound at heart. The people of Great Britain are, at this moment, writhing with indignation at the stigma which the listlessness, inactivity, or cowardice of the Ministry has cast upon them; and they only require the assurance that Government is really in earnest in the prosecution of the war, and determined to accept no compromise until an effective bridle can be put in the mouth of Russia, to exhibit to Europe the real power, energy, and enthusiasm of the Anglo-Celtic race. But these men are not in earnest. They have been dallying all along with the great means which alone can insure us victory; and they have been occupying their time-and, what is of infinately greater consequence, the time of the nation-with propositions about new arrangements regarding the different departments of the Board of Ordnance, inspectorships, surveyorships,

and such-like matters of detail, when they ought to have been appealing to the country, and enlisting the national spirit in the thorough prosecution of the war. We write strongly, because we feel strongly. We believe that a noble and gallant nation, composed of a union of three kingdoms, each of which has its separate history and renown, is at this moment in danger of being degraded in the eye of Europe-aye, of the whole world; because, from fortuitous circumstances, and from unfortunate combinations, it is governed by a body of men who have neither patriotism as their principle, nor sagacity enough to adopt the course most consonant with the feelings of the people. Away with them at once, and for ever! There is no fanatical spirit in favour of war, for war's sake, among the people of this country; but there is a very resolute determination that, when war has once been undertaken, the sword shall not be sheathed until the purpose for which it was drawn is secured. The country is ready to do its part-the obstacle lies with the Government. It is for the country, we say again, to look to it. If these men are allowed to continue in power, and to abuse their opportunities as they hitherto have done, the sooner that we abandon our vaunted position, as a first-rate European state, the better. It is for the people to decide. Let them speak out now, or never.

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THE STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN.

CHAP. XXI.-THE SECOND CANNONADE.

THE oft-repeated question, When shall we reopen the fire? was at length answered. On Easter Sunday, the 8th of April, orders were given for commencing the cannonade at daylight next morning. The batteries were supplied with five hundred rounds for each gun, and three hundred for each mortar, and were fully armed, with the exception of the batteries in the advanced parallels of the English attacks, which were not ready for the reception of the guns and mortars, and which were not to be unmasked till the fire of the rest should have enabled them to open with more security from the enemy's riflemen in the pits and quarries.

The morning of the 9th broke darkly in wind and rain. At the hour of sunrise a heavy mist covered the plains, and objects were so indistinct that in traversing ground I was familiar with I lost my way for a short time, but the sound of the guns guided me towards them. The order to the artillery was to begin as soon as the objects to be aimed at were discernible; and at twenty minutes past six the English guns, as they caught sight of the opposing batteries, opened their fire, and the French soon followed. The Russians were so completely unprepared that it was twenty minutes before they began to reply.

A strong south wind drove a flood of rain and a cloud of mist across the scene of contest. At times the heavy vapour hid the view from the spectators who had issued from their camps; then the fog would lift in parts and reveal the rounded hills crowned with batteries and wrapt in the smoke of cannon, through which the red flashes incessantly darted; again, as a squall passed, the view would dissolve, and the combat seemed transferred to a world of shadows. To us, who remembered the din of the former cannonade re-echoing through the camps, the noise of the present seemed trifling, blown from us as it was by the wind; but to the inhabitants of

Sebastopol the uproar that awoke them must have been appalling. Three hundred and sixty French guns and mortars bore on the town defences and parts of the outworks; one hundred and forty English pieces on the Mammelon, Malakoff, Redan, and Barrack and Garden Batteries. The arrangements for maintaining our fire were much better now than formerly. Caves in the ravine close to Chapman's Battery formed capacious and secure magazines, from whence ammunition was drawn as required for the smaller ones in the batteries, the explosion of which would consequently be of comparatively little importance. The parapets had been heightened and strengthened, and bomb-proof chambers had been constructed in rear of them, to which wounded men were conveyed and their hurts attended to in security. The guards of the trenches were no longer stationed in the batteries, which were exclusively occupied by artillerymen, but lined the parallels, and thus did not on the first day lose a man, the enemy's fire being solely directed on the batteries.

The Russians did not commence or sustain the fire with the vigour that was expected. The dreaded Mammelon fired but few shots, and seemed to be insufficiently manned; only five or six guns from the Malakoff opened -one face of the Redan grew almost silent in a few hours while the French breached the central salient in their front, and greatly injured the Bastion du Mât.

The storm of wind and rain con tinued all day, and through it rushed as steadily the storm of shot. Each uplifting of the curtain of fog showed the same unvarying circle of eddies of smoke drifting from the allied batteries towards the Russian works. Our guns fired each about eight times in an hour, at which rate no second of time would elapse without a shot. Drenched to the skin, and standing in thick mud, the artillerymen and sailors worked their guns with admirable

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vigour. Bad as the circumstances were for them, the Russian gunners, fighting with the wind and rain in their faces, must have found the trial doubly severe. The losses in our batteries were not heavy, though the Russian fire was very well directed, and dismounted several guns. At mid-day the desultory fire of the Mammelon altogether ceased, and the work seemed to offer a tempting prize to a bold assailant. The fire of the allied guns ceased at nightfall, but that of the mortars, depending less on a sight of the object for its efficiency, was continued with great regularity throughout the night, which was filled with the roar of those great engines. The French had nearly one hundred mortars, we twenty-eight, mostly of larger calibre than theirs. Three large sca-service mortars, which threw their shells into the dockyard and arsenal buildings 4500 yards off, were unserviceable throughout the day, in consequence of the rain rendering the platforms so slippery that the handspikes could not be brought to bear on the vast beds.

Next day the Russian fire was much brisker, though by no means so formidable as in the former bombardment. Lieut. Twyford of the Naval Brigade was killed on this day.

On the 11th the Russian fire somewhat slackened, and our own was rather diminished, owing to several guns having become unserviceable. The Mammelon scarcely fired at all, the Round Tower only an occasional gun-one, perhaps, every ten minutes. The trenches were still deep in mire. The great ravine by which the left attack was approached was so muddy that it was a labour to traverse it, and it was filled with the reverberations of the cannonade and the sharp jar of splinters. The approaches to the advanced batteries were deep in sticky mud, and filled with pools. The night before an attempt had been made to take six 32-pounders from the first parallel to the advanced batteries; but they had stuck so fast that three hundred men were unable to move one to its destination, the drag-ropes giving way under the strain. The Russians, hearing the noise, opened fire on them, and knocked off the muzzle of one, which, with the others,

was left in the second parallel till night, when, the soil being somewhat drained, the battery was armed. Four of its guns opened on the following day, but the Russians replied with so heavy a fire as to silence them for the time. On the 13th the six guns opened again, and disabled some of the Russian pieces in the Garden Battery opposed to them. On the 14th also they continued to be worked throughout the day, though so heavy a fire was concentrated on them that the battery was greatly damaged, and the gun detachments suffered much loss. The advanced battery of the right attack had also been armed with 8-inch guns, which made excellent practice against the Mammelon and Round Tower.

The two Russian batteries on the small hills opposed to the French works at Inkermann remained silent.

During the week the Russian fire continued to decrease. Their extensive batteries, far more powerful than ours, never put forth their strength, owing, as was surmised, to the paucity either of artillerymen or of projectiles. Most of their guns were fired in turn, but at slow intervals, as if a few gun-detachments served them all; their practice was very good, and had it been as warm and sustained as it was accurate, would have occasioned us heavy injury and loss.

As the cannonade went on day after day, great impatience was manifested in the English camp. The French had been very urgent with us to begin; and it was asked, with reason, why the fire had been commenced unless to be followed by an assault; and if the assault was intended, why it was delayed when our ammunition was rapidly decreasing, and our gunners worked beyond their strength, for they passed eight hours in the batteries, then had eight hours relief, and then returned to their guns, and out of the eight hours' remission nearly two were spent in going to and returning from their camp; so that they spent ten hours on their legs, which caused many to suffer so much from sore feet that they performed their duties with difficulty. It was evident therefore that, even if our supply of ammunition had been unlimited, our fire must soon slacken.

It had already produced as much effect as could be expected-indeed, the practice was altogether excellent; and as it was impossible to destroy, or even effectually breach, the enemy's earthworks at the distance we were from them, by any amount of fire, it seemed that a few hours' more or less cannonade could not materially affect the difficulty of an assault.

However, while we had still ammunition to sustain the fire for some days longer, orders were given gradually to diminish it; and it was soon reduced to its former amount, without the attainment of any appreciable result from this expenditure of men and material.

Our approaches towards the Redan, continuing to be pushed, drew near some Russian rifle-pits, one of which stood on ground that would be included in the next night's trenchwork, and which it was therefore necessary to take. A detachment of the 77th, under Lieut.-Colonel Egerton, sallied from the advanced trench on the night of the 19th, before midnight, and, without firing a shot, drove out or killed with the bayonet all the occupants of two pits, and repulsed the troops supporting them. Captain Lempriere was killed by the enemy's fire, and, towards one o'clock, Colonel Egerton had returned into the trench bearing the dead subaltern in his arms, and was showing to some other officers a bullet which had been flattened against his own pocket-flask, when the Russians in front reopened their fire. As he hastened along the approach to the open ground, a ball entered his mouth, and, severing the vertebræ of the neck, killed him instantaneously. A man of ordinary stature would have escaped under shelter of the parapet of the trench, over which Egerton's head rose, for he was very tall, and one of the finest men in the army. The Russians, who had returned in force, opened a heavy fire on our men in the pits, by whom it was returned, as also from the advanced trench; and the enemy, after being in vain exhorted by their officers to close, retreated, leaving a good many dead. We continued to hold one pit. Next night the neighbouring one was entered, its occupants

retreating without a contest, and leaving some dead Russians in it, killed on the preceding night: this latter pit was destroyed.

As our trench-works were continued, it seemed that the design now was to advance on the place as in the siege of a regular fortress, where the operations are certain in their progress and result, which are merely questions of time. But here the case was widely different. In advancing on a regular fortress, the works of the besieger are not exposed to the fire of those bastions or salients not attacked, and his attention is directed solely on the two salients before him, and the ravelin or other outwork covering the curtain which connects them, the number of guns in which being determinate, they are always overpowered by the superior number brought against them. The sap proceeds slowly and surely till sufficiently near, when the breaching batteries or the mine open the road through the defences for the stormers.

But the fortifications of Sevastopol, far from being regular, extend along the whole length of the town and harbour. The town itself is to a certain extent isolated by the inner har bour, and the French had made there an attack as regular as the ground admitted of; but the Barrack Battery from the opposite side of the creek bore on their works, as did the Garden Batteries in rear of the Bastion du Mât. Great difficulty, therefore, attended the attempt to advance here by sap without attacking or silencing the Barrack Battery, which, in its turn, was flanked by the Redan, which was supported by the Malakoff, and so on, in a sequence of as many links as that of the House which Jack built. Thus, in a regular attack, an advance on all these points was neces sary, and thus was constituted, rather than one siege, a multitude of sieges. The capture of the Mammelon and its two flanking hills beyond Careening Bay, would have been a work of infinite labour and difficulty, carried on under heavy artillery fire, and would have been but a step towards the attack of the Redan and Round Tower, each formidable achievements, and still the town would remain for a separate siege: and this process de

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