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bred in the lap of luxury and ease, evidently fascinate the youthful imagination at home much more than any promise of vulgar pleasures. A winter at Capua would not be more captivating than one under tents in the Crimea. The real rea

son is, the hope of glory and promotion, both of which come faster in war than in peace; and there always will be a great number of young men quite ready to stake their lives, for which they care but little, for that honour and rank which they prize above all things. . . . The inference is obvious. Give the private soldier honourable mention, orders of merit, a fair chance of a commission-in a word, as much opportunity of rising in the army as any industrious and well-conducted workman has of rising to be a master in his craft, and you will soon have an army large enough, without having recourse to a German legion, or an appeal to the 'crushed nationalities.""

This is a subject upon which a great deal more might be said, but we must not pursue it further at present. We cannot say what might have been the result had the Government, at an earlier period, showed that anxiety which they now profess for augmenting the strength of the regiments of the line. They were not so zealous. If they had been, it was their duty to have applied to the House of Commons for a vote adequate to the emergency. It would have been as easy to have taken that step last winter as now; but, as humanity was to be observed in the conduct of the war, so economy was to regulate its preparation, and the recruiting went on lazily. Now, it appears that we are resorting to the high-pressure system. Mr Sidney Herbert, the Secretary at War, stated, in the course of his speech on the night of the opening of the Session, that "we are getting men not faster than they are required, but faster than we can form them into regiments, drill them, and make them skilful and useful soldiers of their Queen and country." It is very gratifying to know this; for it shows what a spirit exists in the country, if Ministers will only encourage it, and by a well-timed and judicious liberality make the service what it ought to be. But in this, as in everything else, they dallied, proceeding as leisurely as if they considered the Czar to be quite as sluggish as themselves. In another respect, their negligence was of the grossest kind.

What ought they to have done as soon as war appeared, not inevitable, but merely probable? Assuredly their first duty was to have taken measures for raising, calling out, and rendering effective the militia throughout England, Scotland, and Ireland. It is a shameful, almost an incredible fact, that the militia acts for Scotland and Ireland were not passed UNTIL THE 11TH OF AUGUST 1854! So that the power therein taken of raising 40,000 men, who might have supplied risons at home, is utterly unavailable the place of the regular troops in garand inoperative in the present emergency! The actual force of our present militia, raised in Great Britain and Ireland, is at the present moment but 54,000; and of these only a very small portion have been trained, disciplined, and made fit for service. Who are answerable for this state of matters? Undoubtedly the Ministry, who were bound to have taken every possible precaution for putting the nation in such a state of defence that we could have afforded to dispense with the presence of the regular forces at home. But for the forethought of Lord Derby's Administration, who carried the militia act for England in June 1852, matters might have been worse than they are; but is it not scandalous that the Ministry should have postponed the passing of the acts for Ireland and Scotland until the very close of last Session ? It is now proposed that the militia shall be made available, through voluntary enlistment, for garrison service abroad. Without going into the special objections which have been taken to this scheme, we shall simply remark that it appears to be rather premature, inasmuch as the number of the militia who have received any training, is not nearly sufficient for home service; and we doubt if it ever will be, without recourse to the ballot. Militia service, under the present conditions, is not popular, and it cannot be made so. Many men would rather enlist in the line than enter the militia. If they are to be moved from place to place, even within the boundaries of Great Britain, and to suspend their ordinary occupations, they would much rather go where glory calls them, and

where they have some chance of earning honourable distinction. A purely local militia, not to be moved from the shire in which it is raised, except in case of invasion or rebellion, might be, and probably would be popular; but if a regiment or battalion of militia, raised in Edinburgh or in York, is to be liable to do garrison-duty in Dublin, men will think twice before they voluntarily subject themselves, under the penalties of martial law, to any such obligation. Look at our militia acts. They provide distinctly that, in all cases of foreign war," the militia regiments may be taken to any part of the United Kingdom. These are not tempting terms; and we greatly doubt whether it will be possible, under such a system, to bring up the militia to the proper mark. Make their services local within the shire, (except, as we have said, in cases of invasion or rebellion,) and there will be plenty of volunteers. Men will not grudge the days that are required for military training and exercise, but they will not readily offer themselves to be drafted from one end of Britain to the other, or from England to Ireland, when the consequences must be the loss of their ordinary employment, and the ruin of their business. It is all very well to talk of public duty. Men use the term freely as regards others sparsely as regards themselves. There are many public duties which never would be performed, if their performance was not made compulsory. But for the fine imposed for absence, how many jurymen would attend the sittings of our courts? If it is really necessary to have an ambulatory militia, then by all means have recourse to the ballot. The principle is, that, for the good of the nation, it is requisite that a certain number of men in each county, shire, or division, should perform a certain duty. Take volunteers by all means, so far as they will go; but, after a stated period, make up the deficiency by the ballot. Those who are drawn, who are unwilling to serve, and who can afford the means, will have no difficulty in finding substitutes, by making it worth their while to take their place. Those who cannot find a substitute must, like jurymen, act the part of good citizens, yield to the necessities of

the State, and serve. And, in Heaven's name, let them be respectably paid for so doing. Give them, at least, a wage which would be satisfactory for the skilled operative, and let them not have to say that the country has injured their families by claiming their services as a right. We really believe that the Aberdeen Ministry have not the remotest conception of the spirit which now animates the country. Mr Gladstone seems to think that every man of us is a niggard, and that, unless he practises something like a system of cheese-paring, he will be brought to account as a prodigal. He is most miserably mistaken. If our brave countrymen whom we have sent to fight for us in foreign fields are lavish of their blood, we shall not be less lavish of our wealth. If we demand services as a matter of duty at home, from men whose labour is their capital, we are ready to pay them the full equivalent. Look to the Patriotic Fund. Does that show indifference? and can it be supposed that we are not able and willing to make a tenfold exertion to strengthen the hands of any Ministry who shall deserve the confidence of the country by their energy, forethought, prudence, and determination?

Our opinion is, that the Militia Acts are based on a wrong principle; that the militia, if voluntary, should be made local; and not liable, except in cases of extreme urgency, to be shifted from one part of the United Kingdom to another. But if this view is not deemed a sound one, then we say, make the militia enrolment compulsory, as it was during the last war; but pay the men who are selected adequately for the duty which they perform. Perhaps this cannot be done without increasing the pay of the soldier of the line. Why not increase that? Is it fair to expect men to brave death on the field of battle for wages such as a butcher's boy would spurn? Don't let us be told about the expense of our army, compared with those of Russia or Austria. We do not reckon our national wealth in that way-we do not pay our statesmen, or our judges, or our inferior functionaries in public business, according to the Russiau or the Austrian scale; is it such a great matter if, in time of war, with

all our national interests at stake, we should augment the pay of the British soldier?

Well, then, to resume. Thanks to the Aberdeen Ministry, with all the warning they have had of the designs of Russia since January 1853, we are, in January 1855, without a militia force ready to replace the regular force in our garrisons at home. But we must not forget the past in dealing with the immediate present. By noticing points which have more recently arisen, and which we were bound to notice in connection with this subject, we may have diverted the attention of our readers from the actual position in which, through gross and glaring neglect, the Ministry placed the fortunes and character of the nation after the expedition to the Crimea was determined and made. We sent, as we have said, 27,000 British troops, forming, in conjunction with our allies, the French, an army of 50,000 men. We have admitted that this force might be adequate for the first landing. But where were our reinforcements or reserves-from what depôt were we to furnish men sufficient even to replace the killed and disabled, without reference to the increased numbers which the exigency of the war (the siege of Sebastopol included) might require? The answer is a brief one-we had no reserve at all.

Well, indeed, may we lavish praises upon our soldiers and those of our brave Allies, for military annals do not contain a nobler record. In the space of little more than two hours they carried the intrenched heights of the Alma, a position so strong, that Prince Menschikoff stated to his Imperial master, that he could make it good against the Allies for at least three weeks, and that he confidently believed it would prove altogether impregnable. Yet in two hours these heights were carried, and the Russian army, computed at 50,000 strong, were in full retreat. Next came the occupation of Balaklava, and the opening of the trenches against Sebastopol, the position occupied by our armies involving the maintenance of a very long line of defence. Sebastopol itself was not, and could not be invested. Russian reinforcements had free access to it from the north, and they were also in pos

session of Perekop, which allowed them to pour their forces into the Crimea. Day and night our men worked at the trenches, with hardly an hour's intermission, and that too in the fall of the season, and before they were provided with the means of shelter. No wonder if, under such trying circumstances, the health of many of them gave way. Meanwhile the Russians poured their masses into the Crimea. They were 50,000 strong at Alma,-60,000 advanced to the attack at Inkermann, and these were all new men. Besides these, there were at Inkermann, though not actively engaged, 25,000, being Liprandi's division; and during the battle 10,000 men made a sortie upon the French lines from Sebastopol, the batteries being at the same time fully served; so that the Russian force opposed to us at Inkermann was at least twice as great as that of the whole number of the Allies, who, it must be remembered, had lost many men at the Alma, besides those who had died from cholera, or were invalided. It is impossible to speak in adequate terms of the valour which both the British and the French displayed at Inkermann. The Russians came on like fiends, in vast columns, under cover of a thick fog, and for a time there were but eight thousand British to oppose them. Not more than fourteen thousand of the allies altogether were engaged, and yet these made good their ground against sixty thousand of the enemy, and forced them to retreat, leaving more than five thousand Russians dead upon the field of battle. Our loss, of course, was very great; but every man who fell there every man who fought there, should be remembered gratefully by their country; for had their valour and intrepidity been less-had they been driven from their position by the superior weight of the enemy, this great expedition must have ended in absolute ruin and defeat. Inkermann was undoubtedly the crisis of the campaign. Now, let us see what reinforcements the British army had received. It consisted originally, as we have seen, of twenty-seven thousand; and a few days after the battle of Alma, three thousand men landed at Balaklava. That number was little

more than sufficient to supply the place of those who were killed or disabled in the first engagement. Then our losses were severe at the intermediate battle of Balaklava; in fact, it entirely crippled our cavalry; and at Inkermann, when we had to defend the whole position from Balaklava to the heights above Sebastopol, not more than eight thousand men were available to meet the onset of a force, which we have estimated, according to what we consider the most reliable authority, at sixty thousand, but which Lord John Russell, who ought to have good information, is inclined to estimate at eighty thousand. We say the onset, for the arrival of General Bosquet with six thousand French, raised the number of the defenders of the position to fourteen thousand, and probably turned the scale. What human valour can do has been done. But what are we to say of the Ministry who have acted with such insane rashness, or who, at the very least, had so grossly miscalculated the extent of the Russian power, energy, and rapidity of motion? On this point we are inclined to let them speak for themselves. Hear the Duke of Newcastle :

"My Lords, that events have turned out differently from what was contemplated, in more respects than one, I have already admitted. Undoubtedly we did not expect the Russian power in reinforcing troops before Sebastopol would be so great. We did not doubt her military power we were aware of that; but undoubtedly we did not expect that an army could be moved from Odessa to Sebastopol with the marvellous rapidity with which that movement was effected; and probably some of your lordships will be surprised to hear that, through the extraordinary efforts of the Russian government, through the means they were able to command of an unlimited number of cars and cattle, that march was effected at such a rapid rate, that on one day a march of forty-two miles was actually effected. Now, I may be imprudent in making these confessions, but I wish to deal frankly with your lordships. I have said we do not profess perfection. I am ready to admit that errors, if errors they We did not calculate on the powers of the Russian government to send reinforcements to Sebastopol in time for the battle of Inkermann, and I believe, my Lords, that there are few in

are, were committed.

this country-few in any other country— who did expect it. I can only say that we did not form our opinions on any haphazard or guesswork, but we took the best opinions we were able to obtain in this country-of those who could inform forces, and the character of the country us as to the capabilities of the Russian they would have to traverse."

"In time for the battle of Inkermann!" Does this estimable nobleman mean to insinuate that, on the 5th of November, Lord Raglan intended to attack the Russians? Was Inkermann a proclaimed tournament like the gentle passage of arms at Ashby-de-la-Zouch? "We did not calculate on the powers of the Russian government to send reinforcements!" Who supposes that they did? Meanly as we think of their abilities in matters of this sort, we should be very sorry to bring against the Aberdeen Ministry so heinous a charge as that of having wilfully exposed the British army to an attack in which the enemy outnumbered them, for hours, in the proportion of eight or ten to one. What we do charge them with, is the ineffable folly of estimating the military genius and ability of the Emperor of Russia by their own. Why, what was the defence of the old Austrian generals whom Napoleon defeated through superior energy in the earlier part of his career, more than this, that they "did not calculate on his powers?" There are two classes of men who never calculate on the powers of any who are opposed to them. The first class is that of the Drowsyheads, who, being incapable of action themselves, cannot suppose it as the attribute of others. The second class is that of the official Clerks, who have bustle enough, and no end of arrogance and conceit, but who consider genius in every department as something to be viewed with scorn, and who are quite as ready to undertake the conduct of a war as the direction of a sewerage-in either case with most lamentable results to the public. To one or other of these classes we are sorry to say that the great majority of the present Cabinet belongs.

The Drowsyheads think that all is right if the general in command will undertake the expedition with such number of men as, between their fits of slumber, they

have exerted themselves to send him, and thereupon they wash their hands, and believe that they are free from all further responsibility. The Clerks know all about Russia, have read various volumes of Travels in the Crimea, and consider Nicholas an impostor. Minor mistakes we could pardon readily-the more willingly, because the whole speech of the Duke of Newcastle is an admission of mistakes-but we cannot and must not pardon them for having entirely misapprehended the power of Russia, and the eminent military genius and resolution of the Czar, who, if fighting a perilous game, is, without any exception, the ablest gamester in Europe. Let us be just to our enemy. Intellect, genius, capability-are not on our side. What man would venture to compare Nicholas with Lord Aberdeen ?

A fifth rate Russian diplomat would undertake to cast dust in his eyes. "Ce bon Aberdeen," is the highest encomium that was ever passed upon him by his astute colleagues of the Holy Alliance; and we greatly doubt whether even that limited testimony to his merits can be fairly inscribed upon his monumental marble. The gist of the whole matter lies in this. The expedition to the Crimea was planned for the purpose of taking Sebastopol, and destroying the Russian fleet in the harbour of that fortress. Expecting to encounter formidable resistance, we sent out, in conjunction with the French, a force which might fairly be deemed sufficient to effect a landing, and to make its way to Sebastopol ; but it was not sufficient to meet the force that could be brought against it, and at the same time to press the siege so energetically and incessantly as to preclude the possibility of a protracted resistance. The position of Sebastopol, as will be seen from a glance at the map, is very peculiar. We do not pretend to be critical in the art of war; still there are principles quite intelligible to non-combatants; and all military writers concur in holding that one of the essentials for success in the attack of fortified places, is the superiority, in point of numbers, of the besiegers. Let us extract a few sentences from Yule's work on Fortification, a trea

tise which has the great merit of simplicity and clear arrangement, and which ordinary readers may consult with advantage, when they find themselves perplexed by the repetition of technical terms. We quote from the chapter entitled, "Mode of Attacking a Fortress."

"The first step of the besieger is to invest the fortress; that is, to post troops on every side of it, so as to preclude the garrison from communication with the exterior, and to debar them from all aid in men, food, or ammunition. The investing army will strengthen their position by field-works, &c., as in any other case, according to the judgment of the general; and if the hostile power has an army in the field so strong as to be formidable to the investment, it will be necessary to have a sufficient force to watch and check them, called an army of observation."

Now, observe this, that, in the case of Sebastopol, there has been no investment. The Russians have kept open the access to the town, and have the power of reinforcing and supplying the garrison. Besides this, the enemy had in the field at Inkermann an army which numerically doubled the whole force of the besiegers. And the consequence has been that we are both besiegers and defenders: on the one hand we are battering the fortifications of the town-on the other, we are defending an intrenched position of great extent against the attacks of a force which is not only numerically superior to ours, but which is in constant and unbroken communication with the garrison. The first error of Ministers lay in their having entirely miscalculated the real power and available resources which Russia could bring forward. That we understand to be admitted even by themselves, so it may be unnecessary to comment upon it further. But far worse and more inexcusable is their other blunder, in having omitted to provide a sufficient reserve force in the Mediterranean, to strengthen our army as soon as the siege of Sebastopol was begun. They failed in doing this; and the consequence has been that the Allies are not able to push the siege for lack of men and material; but have been compelled to construct intrenched lines for their own defence. Let us, however,

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