Pagina-afbeeldingen
PDF
ePub

Review-Report of the West Riding Tract Society.

pays over the collection to the Local Treasurers, and the Local Treasurers to the General Treasurers. This is the principal machinery of the Society; and it appears sufficiently simple and efficient. The Rules are of two classes; the first containing the fundamental laws of the Society; the second containing regulations proposed to the adoption of the Local Auxiliary Associations. These Rules do not admit of abridgment, though perhaps they might be simplified. We shall conlude this article with giving a copy of them. We cannot however conclude without recommending the plan to the serious and dispassionate consideration of our readers; and especially of such as have the direction of our Tract Societies, and are desirous of spreading their ramifications, and of extending their benefits into the several neighbouring congregations with which a Tract Society may be surrounded.

The Report before us modestly says, "This Society has only been established about half a year: what has been done must be considered rather as • an experiment towards the formation of a Tract Society than as the proceedings of a matured Institution." The experiment is successfully begun, and we trust will be productive of extenIsive and beneficial results. The field of operation is wide and full of population. The number of Tracts distributed and sub-distributed by the Local Societies, will in a few years be considerable, and must produce a decided effect. We have already observed that the present number of Subscribers is 355. Supposing this number to be stationary (though the prospect of increase appears in the Report) and the Donations to be limited to the first year of the Establishment, yet from this number of members an annual sum of nearly £80 will arise; and if in not more than half a year upwards of twelve hundred Tracts have been put in circulation, the aggregate result in course of time must be numerically and morally very considerable.

It appears a part of the plan that a Report shall be read to the Subscribers at the "Annual Meeting of the Association of the Ministers usually denominated Presbyterian, in the West Riding of Yorkshire." This will give rise to pleasing and important discussion. The Catalogue and Rules will

603

be thus revised and improved from year

to year.

The Catalogue contains several important Works scarcely to be considered as Tracts, unless the example, of Mr. Locke and the late Bishop Watson sanction this use of the term. It presents, however, a selection and union of such useful and well-known publications, as are calculated to increase piety to God, and practical godliness; and to give just views of the character, government, and revealed will of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,

We subjoin the Rules:

"Rule 1. That the following Congregations of Protestant Dissenters in Yorkshire, be united into a Society for the distribution of Religious Tracts: viz. The Congregations assembling in St. Saviour-gate, York; Mill-Hill, Leeds; Westgate, Wakefield; Chapel-lane, Bradford; Northgate, Halifax; Lidyate; and South-End, Elland; and such other Protestant Dissenting Congregations, as may be disposed to join this Union.

"Rule 2. That this Society be denominated, A Society of Protestant Dissenters in the West-Riding of Yorkshire, for Promoting, by the Distribution of Tracts, the Knowledge of the Christian Religion, and the Practice of Piety and Righteousness.'

"Rule 3. That the Annual Meeting of this Society be held on the day, and at the place, of the Annual Meeting of the Association of Ministers usually denominated Presbyterian, in the West-Riding of Yorkshire, immediately after the close of the morning's service; when a Report of the proceedings during the past year shall be read, and a Secretary, a Treasurer, and

two Auditors of Accounts appointed for the year ensuing.

"Rule 4. That the Rev. Henry Turner be Secretary; Mr. Thomas Hollings, Treasurer; and Mr. C. H. Dawson, and Mr. George Stansfeld, Auditors, for the year ensuing.

"Rule 5. That the Subscription to this Society be limited to a penny a week, or 4s. 4d. a year; but that Donations will be thankfully received.

"Rule 6. That Tracts be allotted to the full amount of the Subscriptions, and to as large an amount of the Donations as the state of the Funds will admit.

"Rule 7. That the Depository of Tracts be at Bradford, under the care of

the Secretary. That it be open during the whole of the week following thủ second Sunday in the months of June, September, December and March: and

that all applications from Subscribers for Tracts be made at those times; and that the Secretary is not bound to give an immediate attention to applications made at any other time.

"Rule 8. That it be recommended to the Congregations above mentioned and to others which may be favourable to this Society, that, for the purpose of carrying its objects more completely into effect, the members of this Society in each Congregation form an union amongst themselves, and observe such local regulations as may appear suitable to their respective circumstances: and that where nothing of the kind is practicable, the individuals subscribing to the Society, be requested to communicate with the Depository through the medium of the nearest Congregation in which this plan is adopted.

"Rule 9. That a Catalogue of the Tracts placed in the Depository and the prices at which they are sold to Subscribers, be forthwith printed, and that a copy be sent to each Subscriber, in order that he may select such Tracts as he prefers, to the amount of his Subscription; and that this Catalogue be revised and receive additions at each Annual Meeting. "Rule 10. In case the Local Societies neglect to claim Tracts to the amount of their contributions within three months after the Annual Meeting (notice of the amount of such claims having previously been given by the Society's Secretary to the Local Secretary, at least fourteen days before the expiration of that period,) the claim shall lapse to the Society."*

"The following Regulations are RECOMMENDED for Adoption, as far as may be deemed expedient, in the Congregations forming the Union.

"1. That the members of this Society in each of the Congregations hold a Quarterly Meeting for the dispatch of business.†

"Local Societies or Subscribers may transfer their claims, in favour of the Vestry Library or Sunday Schools, on signifying the same through the Local Secretary to the Society's Secretary."

"It is recommended that at every Quarterly Meeting some one of the Society's Tracts be read and likewise any Tracts which it may be the wish of any member to propose to the Society. And the Society's Secretary shall send a copy of each new Tract to the Secretary in each Congregation that he may circulate it amongst the members."

"Note. It is recommended to form Congregational or Vestry LIBRARIES in the respective Congregations; and also in

"2. That the first Quarterly Meeting in each Congregation, be held on the Sunday evening next following the Annual Meeting, when a Committee shall be chosen, consisting of not less than five members, for attending to the concerns of the Society within the respective Congregations.

"3. That the Committee appoint a Secretary to keep the Minutes of the proceedings of the Committee and of the Quarterly Meetings of the Members, and to correspond with the Society's Secretary.

"4. That the Secretary in each Committee shall draw up an account of the proceedings of the year in each Congregation, and shall transmit the same to the Society's Secretary, not less than fourteen days before the Annual Meeting; inserting therein any facts or suggestions appearing to deserve the attention of the Society; and that the Society's Secretary shall embody these into a general Report to be read to the Annual Meeting.

5. That the Minister be, ex-officio, a member of the Committee.

"6. That in each Congregation, for every ten members the Committee shall appoint a Collector, who shall collect their Subscriptions either weekly, monthly, or otherwise; but if otherwise than weekly, that the Subscriptions be paid in advice.

"7. That conformably to this Regulation it shall be the duty of the Collectors to bring to the Quarterly Meeting in each Congregation a Statement of the Tracts required by their Subscribers, along with the Amount of Subscriptions; and that the Secretary shall unite these into one Statement, which he shall immediately transmit along with the money to the Depository at Bradford.

8. That the Quarterly Meetings in each Congregation have power to modify these Regulations in any way that may be deemed expedient, provided there be nothing contradictory to the fundamental Rules of the Society."

ART. III.-An Essay on the Existence of a Supreme Creator, possessed of Infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness, &c. &c.

[Concluded from p. 538.]

EFORE he proceeds to the state

the Wisdom and Goodness of the Deity, Dr. Brown treats briefly of the Spirituality and Unity of God. With regard to the Divine Unity his concep

general to lend Tracts, rather than to give them; as a Tract lent is more likely to be read than one given."

Review-Brown's Prize Essay.

tions are clear and just, such as must be suggested to every enlightened mind by the contemplation of the works of creation and the study of the testimony of Scripture: nor for any thing that appears in this work is there reason to believe that the creed of the worthy Principal is burthened with the contradictory notions which generally prevail on this subject. His language is plain, decisive and unqualified:

There is only one Being to whom all the perfections already considered, and every other belonging to Deity can be ascribed. God is self-existent and infinite

Those

and the original cause of all.
qualities and attributes exclude the suppo-
sition of plurality. Self-existence extends
every where and admits no limitation.
Infinity implies both unlimited essence and
unlimited perfection, and this excludes the
supposition of two or more beings of whom
these can be predicated. The wisdom and
power of each of such beings must be
limited by the wisdom and power of the
others; and therefore they cannot all be
infinite or supreme beings. The notion of
two or more first causes is absurd in itself,
and involves contradictory notions.
supposes that there is one original to the
others, and at the same time denies this
supposition.”—P. 245.

It

There are many appearances in nature, and many occurrences in human life, which seem absolutely inex plicable upon the principle, that there is seated at the helm of affairs, a Being of infinite wisdom and benevolence, who ordains and regulates all the trains of events that happen to all creatures. And those difficulties have excited the attention of reflective persons from very early ages. The knowledge of nature which philosophy has disclosed; the just way of conducting inquiries of this kind which is now pursued, and above all the clear light of revelation, guiding the effects of intelligence and piety; have removed much of the obscurity in which this interesting and important subject was involved and in a work, to which was adjudged a prize, instituted on purpose to clear away this darkness, it was natural to expect at least a lucid and consistent statement of all that the ablest writers had advanced. Never were we mote disappointed than in this expectation. The author is always in a mist; it is only now and then that he seems to have a rapid and indis tinct glance of the only clue that can

VOL. XI.

4 I

605

conduct him through the labyrinth; and we are much deceived if the per plexities of a thinking mind will not be increased rather than diminished by the perusal of this Essay.

In repelling the objections against the Divine wisdom and goodness, Principal Brown proposes, p. 272, 1. To ascertain the proper notions of perfection and evil, and then to evince that the permission of this last, is not only not inconsistent with the former, but is in some measure necessary to its highest displays; that is, that the allperfect nature of God required that a certain portion of evil both natural and moral should be permitted. 2. That many evils which are produced as evidences against the wisdom of Providence, are grossly exaggerated and for the most part exist only in the irregu3. That lar imaginations of men. these evils to which the human race is exposed, could not be excluded from the wisest and best system of the world, but are so controlled and directed as to be productive of the greatest sum of good. And 4. That the present state of man is adapted to his present faculties and powers.

With regard to the nature of per fection, Dr. Brown says, p. 276:

"We call every thing perfect which possesses all that is necessary to its nature, or has been brought to a higher degree of improvement than belongs to individuals of the same kind, but in an absolute sense nothing that is subject to any defect or privation, or is circumscribed by any limits, nothing but the Divine nature can be denominated perfect."

With regard to the nature of evil, he says:

Evil has been divided into natural and moral, the one implying and caused by some derangement of the corporeal system, the other implying and caused by

some disturbance of the mental frame, considered in a moral point of view. To these two, a third species of evil has been added by metaphysicians, and has obtained the name of metaphysical evil. It' expresses the absence or privation of certain powers, faculties and capacities, and of the, felicity which these are the meaus of obtaining."

And with regard to this last he adds→→

That the permission of metaphysical evil, or of a certain deficiency in created beings, can imply nothing repugnant to the

Divine perfections, must appear on the smallest consideration. The Divine goodness suggested the communication of happiness. But without creation no happiness could be communicated. But what ever is created is limited: whatever is limited is so far imperfect. Thus, not even Omnipotence itself could prevent metaphysical evil, because it could not effect contradictions. It could not render that which is finite infinite, nor therefore create any being which should not be subject to defect. Absolute perfection it could bestow on none of its works. Metaphysical evil must therefore have existed, or the power, wisdom and goodness of God, must have remained inert, and no creation have been produced. There is then in the very nature of created being, an absolute necessity of metaphysical evil or defect."-Pp. 276. 280. 281.

motives, or in opposition to motives,
or without any motives at all."* This
is an admirable account of the doc-
trine of philosophical liberty, and we
cannot but regret that Dr. Brown was
in no auspicious moment inspired with
of it.
an equally clear and just conception

But though Principal Brown cannot define as well as some, he can assume as well as any of his predecessors and we give the following passage as a very curious and edifying example of the argument called by logicians the petitio principii.

"All beings possessed of intelligence and reason must also enjoy freedom of will. Indeed to will and to act, imply to will and to act freely. To will and to act necessarily involves a downright conAfter these observations the author tradiction, because necessity is applicable proceeds to state, that from this ne- to what is passive and cannot be predicessity of defect or of metaphysical cated of volition and action. From this evil in the very nature of every creait appears that the genuine notion of ture, we shall be gradually led to liberty consists in the power of acting or apprehend that the permission of the abstaining from action, and of electing two other classes of evil, namely, among various modes of action. A free moral and physical, is not incon-agent cannot choose whether he shall have sistent with the Divine perfections of tion is necessary, and by this he to whom For to free agency voliwisdom and goodness; that it may be it belongs is disposed either to action or proper to consider first moral evil, because natural evil proceeds in a great measure from it; and that as moral evil has been defined the abuse of free agency, it becomes necessary to shew that men are free agents and to explain and illustrate the specific nature of free agency itself. P. 286.

Its more

In doing this the learned Principal defines liberty, "the power of perceiving, choosing and pursuing some object:" and adds-"But the term liberty when used to signify the power of executing volition, is employed in a lax and popular sense. accurate meaning is that of volition and choice. Whoever wills to move or to act, is mentally as free as he who really moves or acts. His mind exercises its energy even when his body is chained." P. 290.

a

In thus making liberty consist in volition, the learned Principal differs somewhat from the libertarians who have gone before him. The liberty of a moral agent, Dr. Reid says, is " power over the determinations of his own will." And Dr. Gregory affirms that man possesses "an independent, selfgoverning, self-determining power, which he may at his own discretion exert, by acting either according to

volition or not.

to rest. In a word wherever will exists there is freedom."

Dr. Brown defines necessity to be "that the contrary of which involves a contradiction, and can neither exist nor coalesce in one idea." p. 295. And this is the only necessity of which he speaks. But he adds, " Certainty of event is often confounded with neces

sity of existence, although these terms express very different notions." p. 295. tain a constant series of independent "Those," he says, p. 297, “who maincauses and effects, by which the human will is influenced without any internal principle of motion and action, maintain an eternal series originating no where" !!

"Still it is urged," adds the Doctor, p. 298, "that the will is influenced by the last determination of the understanding, and is therefore constrained. Constrained certainly it is in every attaches to the term. The last detersense which the advocate of necessity mination of the understanding is, let us suppose, that an object which it has contemplated is desirable; that no cir

* Dr. Gregory's Philosophical Essays. Sec. I. P. 3.

Review.-Brown's Prize Essay.

cumstance exists to counteract its impression; that its attainment will be productive of happiness, and that the means to attain it are within its reach. This perception and determination of the understanding places the mind in a certain condition, namely, in the state of desire and of determination to exert its power to gratify that desire. Now this peculiar condition of the mind is termed will, or volition, and the question is, whether it could probably be different from what it actually is. The state of the mind and all the circumstances remaining exactly the same, that is, an object appearing desirable and nothing occurring to counteract the impression, that the attainment of it will be productive of hap. piness, can it avoid desiring it? And perceiving the means by which it can obtain the gratification of its desire, can it avoid exerting them? If not, if the desirableness of an object must excite desire, and the consciousness that the means of attaining it are within reach inust induce the determination to excite them; then it is most obvious that volition and action are necessary in the only sense which in this controversy is meant to be conveyed by this term; that is to say, volition and action could not possibly be otherwise than they are, the constitution of the mind and the circumstances in which it is placed remaining the same.

What has led to so much confusion on this subject, is the indistinct and false notion which has been annexed to the term will. Will is nothing but a modification of desire, and therefore cannot possibly be excited by the mind itself at its own pleasure. It is induced by objects which the mind perceives to be good or evil, pleasing or painful, or imagines to be so. The mind cannot will will; but objects appearing to it pleasurable excite the desire or will to possess them, or appearing painful, induce the desire or will to avoid them: and the question again recurs, can an object apprehended to be thus painful or pleasurable, fail to induce the corresponding desire or will and the consequent action?

The whole of this controversy turns, as has been well stated by Mr. Belsham on this simple question: "Can volition take place independently of motive? meaning by motive whatever moves or influences the mind in its choice; thus including both this bias of the mind

[ocr errors]

607

itself and the end in view: in a word, comprehending every circumstance im mediately previous to the volition; and which in the least degree contributes to generate the choice. Can volition take place independently of motive as thus defined? The libertarian contends that in the same previous circumstances and with views and inclinations precisely the same, a different choice may be made. The necessarian denies this, and maintains that there can be no difference in the choice without a correspondent difference in the previous state of the mind; that is, in the judgment or inclination of the agent."* This is the simple question stated in plain and simple language; and had Dr. Brown taken the paius to understand it, he would not have written the many absurdities by which this part of his work is deformed. He would not, for example, have defined necessity to be that the contrary of which involves a contradiction and can neither exist nor coalesce in one idea." For if to the term necessity some metaphysicians have affixed the notion expressed in this definition, Dr. Brown knew, or ought to have known, that the advocates for the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity expressly distinguish between this sense of the word and that which they annex to it. Dr. Brown takes upon himself to say, p. 209, that Dr. Priestley, together with Hobbes and Spinosa and Bayle and Voltaire and Hume, has acquired celebrity by attacking the doctrines of a Divine Providence and of the freedom of the will. Was the Reverend Principal really acquainted with the writings of Dr. Priestley? Dr. Priestley has acquired celebrity by attacking the doctrine of a Divine Providence! And. this affirmation goes forth to the world with the authority of the Reverend Principal of Marischal College. To attempt to justify Dr. Priestley from the charge of attacking the doctrine of a Divine Providence were an insult to his memory and to the understanding of the reader; and with regard to his attacking the freedom of the human will, the most charitable opinion is that Dr. Brown was utterly ignorant of the writings of the man even on this subject whom he presumes thus deeply

to censure.

* Belsham's Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind. P. 230.

« VorigeDoorgaan »