Natural Resource Subsidies: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, May 14, 15; and June 6, 1985
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985 - 670 pages
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Page 517 - Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export subsidies are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives and do not intend to restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and other important policy objectives which they consider desirable.
Page 599 - Without import controls the domestic wellhead price would fall from $3.30 per barrel to about $2.00, which would correspond to the world price. Although we cannot exclude the possibility, we do not predict a substantial price rise in world oil markets over the coming decade.
Page 408 - ... the countervailing duty law is justified by proponents of natural resource legislation as a way to restrain the behavior of foreign governments by limiting them to actions taken by private businesses. The assumption made is that only one market strategy is available to a private company — that of maximizing short-term profits. In fact, this assumption is often wrong. In forcing governments to pursue short-term profit maximizing strategies as the only way in which downstream products can "fairly...
Page 517 - In particular, signatories, when drawing up their policies and practices in this field, in addition to evaluating the essential internal objectives to be achieved, shall also weigh, as far as practicable, taking account of the nature of the particular case, possible adverse effects on trade. They shall also consider the conditions of world trade, production (eg price, capacity utilization etc.) and supply in the product concerned. 3. Signatories recognize that the objectives mentioned in paragraph...
Page 581 - COOPERATIVES 9-85 IMPLICATIONS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCT IMPORTS FOR US AGRICULTURE WHEREAS, US Agriculture must have uninterrupted access to equitably priced petroleum fuel supplies; WHEREAS, since 1973 two oil disruptions have demonstrated that agriculture, at the end of petroleum supply lines...
Page 517 - ... to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of certain sectors, especially where this has become necessary by reason of changes in trade and economic policies, including international agreements resulting in lower barriers to trade.
Page 517 - SUBSIDIES OTHER THAN EXPORT SUBSIDIES 1. Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export subsidies are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives...
Page 612 - America represents the independent petroleum marketers who are members of these state and regional trade associations: Alabama Oilmen's Association Arizona Petroleum Marketers Association Arkansas Oil Marketers Association, Inc. California Independent Oil Marketers Association Colorado Petroleum Marketers Association Independent...
Page 517 - Article, may cause or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry of another signatory or serious prejudice to the interests of another signatory or may nullify or impair benefits accruing to another signatory under the General Agreement, in particular where such subsidies would adversely affect the conditions of normal competition.