region lying between the Uruguay, the Parana, and the Paraguay. For the accomplishment of this purpose it was neces sary, not only to gain possession of Uruguay, but also to rob Brazil of its province of Matto Grosso, and the Argentine Republic of Corrientes and Entre Rios. Impelled by such ambitious dreams, Francisco Lopez, departing from that wise abstinence from foreign complications which had been the policy of his predecessors, declared to the court of Rio Janeiro that he considered the entrance of the Brazilian army into Uruguay a casus belli, and accompanied this declaration by hostile acts. He seized the Brazilian steamer "Marquis de Olinda," imprisoned the passengers, and at first refused to the Minister of Brazil a suitable conveyance by water to his own country. Here Mr. Washburn, Minister of the United States, energetically interfered, declaring that he would close his own legation if the rights of ambassadors were thus violated; and Lopez yielded the point. He immediately invaded the Brazilian province of Matto Grosso, whose president or governor had been detained on his way to his charge, among the passengers of the captured steamer. The Brazilians complain also that the invasion of Matto Grosso was accompanied by acts of barbarity, "without any consideration of age, sex, or helplessness; entire populations being shot down like wild beasts in the rivers and forests, as they fled from the fury of the enemy." Such is the language of the pamphlet called "The Paraguayan Question." With every allowance for exaggeration, and for the acts of soldiers transcending the orders of their government, enough remains to justify serious charges against the ruler of Paraguay.

His next step, if not more criminal, was more obviously foolish. It might have seemed that one enemy such as Brazil was enough at a time; but when the Argentine government refused to allow an attack to be made on the Brazilians through its territory, Lopez turned his arms against that power, captured two Argentine steamers, invaded the Province of Corrientes and seized its capital, which bears the same name, proclaimed the annexation of the province to Paraguay, and assumed to exercise a general control over the commerce of the La Plata and its branches. This conduct united the neighbor

ing powers against him. Flores, supported by Brazil, was now in command in Uruguay, and on May 1, 1865, a treaty was signed between these two states and the Argentine Republic, by which the three parties bound themselves to pursue the war with Paraguay till the rule of Lopez was destroyed. Neither was to make peace separately; all disclaimed the intention of increasing their own territory or interfering with the independence of Paraguay, except in securing the expulsion of her ruler; but they agreed that the Paraguayan fortress of Humaitá should be destroyed, and that all arms and munitions of war found in that country should be divided among the contracting powers.

Such is the treaty with which commenced, more than four years ago, the alliance which still continues. The burden of the war has fallen chiefly on Brazil. Uruguay, the least powerful of the allies, has been distracted by factions, in whose strife the assassination of Flores has been the most tragic incident. The Argentine Republic also, which, under its President Mitre, shared largely in the earlier operations, has had its burden of domestic dissension to bear, and has of necessity withdrawn for the most part from the prosecution of the war; though now, under the Presidency of the enlightened Sarmiento, it may be expected to assume a position of more importance than it has recently held.

Great as was the provocation offered to the allied powers, we cannot but regard the absolute pledge, mutually given, to make the downfall of Lopez an indispensable condition of peace, an error. It is not well for individuals or for nations to renounce, except for the strongest reasons, their future freedom of action. Undoubtedly, the allies thought, four years from last May, that the overthrow of Lopez would be the work of a single campaign; for the population of Paraguay was exceeded sevenfold by that of Brazil alone. But this action of the allies united the Paraguayans to defend their chief, with whose authority, in their judgment, their own national honor and independence were identified. The allies did not take into account the difficulty of transporting men, provisions, and munitions of war to a distant country, while its defenders would fight on their own soil, with every advantage of local

knowledge and of plentiful supplies. They did not foresee that at one time the cholera would prostrate nearly a third of their army; nor did they, probably, do justice to the military and civil talents which, with all his errors and crimes, the adversary they denounced has so strikingly displayed. In ignorance of the future, they deprived themselves of the possibility of an honorable accommodation with their enemy. Therefore it is that, even two years since, the number of lives sacrificed in this deplorable strife was estimated at a hundred thousand. Nor is the loss of life among their soldiers the only thing to be regretted by the allies. The long continuance of the contest, and the heroic defence of the Paraguayans, have made the world almost forget the original wrong, and look with admiration and pity on the hunted race, who stand so gallantly at bay. Bolivia and Chili have seen with uneasiness a member of the Spanish-American family of states in danger of being crushed by the descendants of the Portuguese; and were it not that the conduct of Lopez towards his prisoners, his soldiers, his people, and his own family, has aroused against him the indignation of all to whom it has become known, the struggle which at first seemed so certain to end in his speedy overthrow might have resulted in the more full establishment of his power.

In 1864 the army of Paraguay is said to have numbered from 40,000 to 42,000 men. It was rapidly augmented, the enrolment including even youths of sixteen; and Lopez commenced the war with 28,000 infantry, 16,000 cavalry, and about 3,000 artillery, with 120 pieces of cannon. The Brazilian army, in 1864, numbered but 25,000 men, and neither the Argentine Republic nor Uruguay was in a condition to add immediately to its strength. The first advantages therefore were on the side of him whose ambition had brought on the contest.

The scene of that contest may best be understood by recurring to the comparison we have already used, of the Parana and Paraguay rivers with the Ohio and the Upper Mississippi. The southwestern point of Paraguay would thus be represented by Cairo in Illinois, the country around being of the same description as Southern Illinois, low and marshy. Assumption, on

the Paraguay River, may be compared in regard to situation with Alton, the access to it being defended by the fortress of Humaitá, six leagues above the junction, commanding a bend of the river, and by that of Curupayti, somewhat nearer to the junction. Nearly opposite the southern point of Paraguay is the city of Corrientes, capital of the Argentine province of that name. The Argentine Republic, roused by the taking of this city, sent General Paunero with about 1,500 men to attempt its recovery; but they were obliged to retreat before a superior Paraguayan force. Lopez then marched across the province of Corrientes, crossed the Uruguay into Brazil, occupied San Borja, which had been deserted by its inhabitants, and possessed himself by siege of Uruguayana. He was, however, in turn compelled to retreat; his garrison in Uruguayana surrendered to the allies, commanded by the Emperor in person; and the war was soon transferred to the territory of Paraguay.

The campaign of 1865 closed, not with the approach of winter, but with that of summer; the seasons being reversed in the southern hemisphere. The allied army indeed, in December, took possession of Corrientes; but the excessive heat, and the lowness of the rivers, prevented any further advance until the month of March, 1866; and meantime the army suffered severely from its position among the marshes by which the rivers are bordered. The Paraguayan army was encamped in the neighborhood of Itapiru, a strong fortress on the Parana. After several unsuccessful attempts upon this fort, accompanied with great loss to the allies, they at length obtained possession of it. The two armies now encamped among the esteros, or lagoons, which abound in the southern part of Paraguay, the invaders suffering from disease much more than the natives. On the 2d of May, at noon, while the forces of Brazil and Uruguay were enjoying their siesta, Lopez suddenly attacked them at Estero Bellaco, and at first gained an advantage; but Flores, with great energy, succeeded in rallying his Orientals, and, with the arrival of fresh Brazilian troops, the fortune of the day was changed. A general engagement took place on the 24th of May at Tuyuti. The Paraguayan loss was the greater; but the allies were obliged to desist from the attempt to advance on Humaitá by land, and intrenched

themselves in a new position. To quote a playful line of Moore's, which becomes sober earnest in those southern latitudes,

"June had now

Set in with all its usual rigor";

and the allies, relieved by the cold weather from the unhealthiness of the climate, waited for re-enforcements from their respective states.

It was now determined to force a passage to Assumption by the Paraguay River. It was thought that Curupayti and Humaitá were the only obstacles; but the Brazilian vessels were unexpectedly attacked by a new battery at Curuzu, still lower than these. On the 2d of September this was taken, though not without heavy loss. The next object of attack was Curupayti; but in the assault on this point, September 22d, the disadvantage of an alliance appeared in divided counsels and enfeebled authority. President Mitre, the commander-in-chief, had arranged for a combined attack, — on the west by the Brazilian squadron, on the south by his own forces and those of the Brazilian Porto Alegre, and on the east by the Brazilians under Polydoro and three hundred cavalry under Flores. But Tamandaré, fearing for his vessels, kept at a respectful distance, and Polydoro contented himself with drawing up his army in order of battle. The Argentines and the Brazilians who were with them met thus the whole force of the enemy, intrenched in his strong fortress; and as they endeavored in vain to clear away the abatis of thorny trees which had been erected by the Paraguayans, they were mowed down by the cannon. Six thousand killed and wounded - more than a third of the whole force were left on the field. Here and there the shrubs caught fire, and the Paraguayans issued from their intrenchments to save their fallen enemies from being burnt to death.

This repulse was followed by bitter recriminations among the allies; Mitre complaining of the commanders who should have supported him, while they accused him of attempting to exercise despotic authority. Brazil, however, changed her officers; Polydoro being superseded by the veteran Marquis de Caxias, and Tamandaré by the Admiral Ignazio. Mitre was recalled, with the Argentine army, by an insurrection at