had fought well; and it is astonishing | powerful force against their new-found how the Army of the Loire could have enemy. Chanzy protested against this attained efficiency in so brief a time. We timid caution; urged his chief to advance quote from his report: "Our troops of the Loire and of the Garde Mobile, who, for the most part, had been in action for the first time, had behaved admirably. The artillery deserved high praise; and the cavalry had done very well, its only mistake was that it did not understand the important part it might have played at the end of the battle."

It is, in fact, not in courage, nor even in energy, but in endurance, and the power of cohesion, above all in confidence after defeat, that an improvised army like that of the Loire is so inferior to a longtrained enemy.

to the line of the Conlie, and to be ready
to assume the offensive; and especially
entreated him to attack in detail Von der
Tann, the grand duke, and Prince Fred-
erick Charles, as gathering together from
wide distances, and presenting their flanks
to their collected enemy, these generals
slowly converged on Orleans. These
counsels were beyond dispute right; and
here we see the distinction between bold
yet scientific, and mere waiting strategy.
Chanzy watched with impatience the oc-
casion that was let slip. "We ought-
and the chief of the 16th Corps insisted
upon it
to have made use of the oppor-
tunity, and to have vigorously assailed the
flank of the enemy, as . . he defiled be-
fore us to join Prince Frederick Charles."

This apparition of a victorious army, which seemed as if France could call up legions, so to speak, from the earth if she stamped her foot, perplexed the counsels It is gratifying, however, to know that of the Germans at Versailles; and it is D'Aurelle was not responsible for the denow known that the French commander feats that followed. By the close of Nomight have struck with great, perhaps im-vember the 15th and 16th Corps had been mense effect. The Bavarian detachment, not twenty thousand strong, was literally the only hostile force between D'Aurelle and the capital of France; and had that general advanced boldly with his sixty or seventy thousand men, he would almost certainly have crushed Von der Tann; very probably have defeated the Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh, who was hurriedly sent off with a few thousand men to attempt to reach his Bavarian colleague; and possibly might have raised the siege of Paris, for Von Moltke contemplated even this contingency. From the following, though the language is cautious, we see that Chanzy believed an operation possible, which Napoleon, we are convinced, would have tried. "It was perhaps possible, making good use of the enthusiasm produced by our victory, to have reached and beaten the army of Von der Tann before it could have received aid from the grand duke; to have then assailed the grand duke's force, and so to have defeated the Germans in detail before the reinforcements, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, could have arrived.

D'Aurelle, however, fell back on Orleans, his object being to make the position an entrenched camp of formidable strength, and a base for future offensive movements. This resolve is not to be wholly condemned; but it deprived France of one admirable chance; it made the attitude of the Army of the Loire feeble; above all, it permitted the Germans to collect a

reinforced by the 17th, the 18th, and the 20th; and the French army, two hundred thousand strong, filled the region around and in front of Orleans. The purpose of D'Aurelle was to await the attack of the enemy in his entrenched camp, and he has left on record his assured conviction that in this position success was probable. Gambetta, however, who believed himself as capable in directing armies as he certainly was in levying troops, having heard that Trochu was about to make a great effort to break out from Paris, insisted upon a general movement in the very teeth of Prince Frederick Charles; and for this purpose the 18th Corps was prematurely thrown forward on Beaune-laRolande, the 20th failing to give it support, while the 15th, the 16th, and the 17th were ordered to make what really was a flank march within reach of a foe at this moment all but concentrated. The 18th Corps was at once defeated; and then the prince, by a masterly movement, combined with his supports on the left, fell on the French centre, the 15th Corps, and shattered it after a brave resistance. The stroke forced Chanzy, who up to this time had gained real, though slight advantages, to fall back with the 16th on the 17th Corps; and as the German commander followed up his success with characteristic energy and skill, the result was that the 15th Corps was all but ruined as a military force; that Orleans and the entrenched camp were carried, and that the Army of the Loire was rent

3

in twain, the 18th and 20th Corps being
driven across the river, while the 16th,
17th, and the wreck of the 15th were ral-
lied by Chanzy on the northern bank. A
succession, in short, of false movements
had inflicted a ruinous defeat on France;
neither the defensive strategy of D'Au-
relle, nor the bolder plans of his able
lieutenant, had been given a chance of
being carried out; and it is a mere mis-
take to ascribe the issue to the quality
alone of the French army. How badly
Chanzy thought of Gambetta's projects
we see from the following: "The gener-
als did all that was in their power to ex-
plain the danger of these operations.
but the general plan was treated as a pos-
itive order of the government, and we
only discussed the means of executing
it."

those of 1866, in which he had taken part, and acknowledged that these last seemed but child's play to the incessant and obstinate contest which the Germans were compelled to maintain, in order to reduce to submission a nation believed, after its disasters, to have been at the end of its resources."

The tactics of Chanzy in these actions were fine specimens of military skill. He had, no doubt, the superiority in mere numbers, but his young and lately defeated army was very inferior to the German legions. The strength of his well-chosen position enabled him to baffle the turning movements, so often successful with the German chiefs, and so formidable to immature troops; and he compelled the prince to attack in front, where the defensive has a decided advantage. But like all generals who understand war, he avoided a mere passive defence - espe cially trying to French soldiers and on every occasion that seemed favorable, he assumed a bold yet judicious offensive. An English correspondent in the German camp, with marked sympathies on the German side, wrote thus of this remarkable passage of arms: "The French have the choice of positions, and possess a general who knows how to occupy and hold a good one. The actions of the last four days have, no doubt, encouraged the French, for they have been so long unac

hopeful at not being beaten. They have been fighting altogether eight days out of ten; and troops of new formation, who can do this against veterans, and hold their own to the last, have a right to expect that fortune will turn in their favor. The Germans, on the other hand, are stupefied by this extraordinary resistance."

After the defeat of D'Aurelle - he was cruelly dismissed for a failure not to be ascribed to him—the divided parts of the Army of the Loire were separated into two bodies, the First Army, given to Bourbaki, and the Second, remaining under Chanzy. From this period we follow the career of Chanzy as a commander-inchief; and, as always happens with great men, he shone the more the higher he rose. His war-worn forces had been strengthened by the 21st Corps, moved up from the west, and by a flying column from Tours; and by the 6th of December he had placed the army between Marche-customed to victory that they will become noir, Josnes, and Beaugency, having skil fully chosen a strong defensive line, with his flanks covered by a great forest and the Loire. He was forthwith attacked by Prince Frederick Charles, who, having entered Orleans on the 4th and 5th, turned against the enemy hanging on his flank, no doubt confident of easy success; but his calculations were completely baffled. In a series of stern and sus. Chanzy's skill, however, was not more tained engagements, Chanzy for four remarkable than his confidence and tenawhole days repelled his assailant, inflict- cious energy; his presence electrified his ing on him considerable loss; and though young levies, and from this moment he the prince was reinforced from Orleans by held absolute sway over the hearts of a detachment under the Grand Duke of officers and men alike. Gambetta, too, Mecklenburgh, he made no impression on who with all his faults appreciated talent his heroic enemy, until a demonstration and force of character, thenceforward from the Loire and Blois placed a Ger- gave him his whole confidence. The folman corps on the French rear. The ter-lowing is worthy of both men, each great, rible character of these battles may be yet with a different kind of greatness: estimated from this significant anecdote : "We congratulate you on your firm attiDuring the stern days of Josnes, a Ger- tude, and have but one wish that you man officer of high rank who had been may succeed in breathing your spirit into made prisoner, made no secret of the as- those who surround you.' tonishment caused by the resistance of our young troops. He compared these battles on the plains of the Beauçe to

The astonishing efforts made by Chan. zy once more disconcerted the strategists of Versailles. The great sortie from

Paris had, no doubt, failed; but it had | Gambetta would hear of nothing else. cost the Germans thousands of lives, Accordingly Chanzy resolved to ascend and the proud city still defied its enemy. So, too, D'Aurelle had succumbed with Orleans; but a fresh army had arisen from the wreck, and it had found a chief who could make it accomplish feats that seemed impossible to professional soldiers. The position of the invaders became again perilous; and this telegram, from an English source at Berlin, shows what was thought at the Prussian War Office of the situation at this conjuncture: "The military position of affairs is deemed critical in well-informed quarters. Uneasiness is felt as to the final issue of the contest."

from the Loire, towards the capital, by the north-west; and for his immediate purpose drew off his army to the Loir, an affluent of the great river. His retreat across the plains of the Beauce might have been made perilous by a daring enemy; but it was conducted with remarkable skill; and the Germans were very much exhausted. By the 13th of December the French army was in position around Vendôme, having scarcely been molested on the way. Chanzy remarked with truth: "The retreat of the Second Army from Josnes to Vendôme, under the conditions of bad weather, fatigue, and dangers which attended it, was most honorable to the troops. It had sufficiently imposed on the enemy to prevent him from disturbing it, and availing himself of chances of destroying it, which might have presented themselves had he known how to seize them."

The object of the movement is thus described: "By its establishment on the Loire, the army threatened the flank of the enemy, if he descended from Orleans on Tours, without going far away from Chartres, in which place it was possible to move by Châteaudun, remaining thus upon one of the chief lines which it would be necessary to follow, in order to begin again operations towards Paris, as soon as these should become possible."

The superiority of Chanzy will at once be evident, if we compare his conduct with that of Bourbaki. The First Army had not suffered more than the Second in the defeats round Orleans; it had not been molested in its retreat; and it had had some days to recruit its strength. Yet while Chanzy was making his heroic stand, exposed to the whole weight of his enemy's force, Bourbaki literally did nothing, and declared that he could not detach a man from his quarters at Bourges to aid his colleague. This unpardonable remissness enabled the Germans to make the movement along the Loire which, as we said, endangered the flank of Chanzy, when it had been found impossible to break his front. From the following we see what his feelings were, and what On the 15th, Chanzy was attacked doubtless he thought of the conduct of a again, Prince Frederick Charles having man who, though an accomplished sol- rightly judged that he was the foe to dier, was utterly unfit for chief command. strike down at all cost. The French "The movement which is possible, and made a gallant resistance; but on the indispensable to restore the situation of second day their right wing was turned, affairs, is this: whatever the risk, to and shattered by an attack in flank. march from Bourges to Vierzon; to press Chanzy decided on a retreat to Le Mans, forward the main body of the First Army a strong position upon the Huisne, and a by Romorantin upon Blois; and to take a strategic point of no little value, his obposition between the Loire and the Cher,ject being still to attain Paris. He drew in order to interrupt the communications of the enemy between Orleans and his troops near Tours, and to cut these last from their base of operations. If this be done, I promise that I will hold my own on the right bank of the Loire."

The hostile movement in Chanzy's flank compelled him to leave his position on the Loire. This retreat, however, was in no sense retiring before a victorious enemy; it was a purely strategic move, with important ulterior plans in view. The great object of the French government was to direct a relieving force on Paris, already besieged for four months; and whether this project was best or not,

off his army without difficulty: "The Second Army had again effected a retreat as difficult as the preceding ones, and which was as honorable to it. The enemy, kept back on all points, had become less and less enterprising; it was easy to perceive that, no more than our own, were his troops able to resist their fatigues; they were besides demoralized by the continuation of a struggle which they had thought ended, but which was perpetually being kept up."

The invaders, in fact, had immensely suffered; and needed rest as much as their foes. The following from Gambetta is overdrawn, but it was an exagger

2

ation only of truth: "You have decimated
the men of Mecklenburgh; the Bavarians
have ceased to exist; the German army
is already disquieted and worn out. Let
us persist and we shall drive these
hordes empty-handed out of France."

Having been reinforced by a Breton
detachment, Chanzy reached Le Mans on
the 20th of December. During three
weeks of incessant fighting he had held
the main German army at bay; he had
baffled completely its most brilliant chief;
he was nearer Paris, his real objective,
than when he had assumed the command
on the Loire. A great general only could
have done these things; and he still held
the capital steadily in view. "It was now
within the power of the Second Army, if
it were ready for the field, and had not
too strong an enemy in its front, to as-
cend the Huisne rapidly, as if to menace
Chartres-this place was held in force
by the Germans and then, having
masked the town, to move northwards to
throw its left upon the Seine, on the line
of Mantes, in order to assail a flotilla
charged to revictual Paris, to threaten
Versailles, and to make a combined effort
with the defenders of the capital to break
through the investment."

men were required to hold Paris and the communications with the Rhine; there were probably not one hundred and fifty thousand available for operations elsewhere; and their chiefs had been compelled to send for large reinforcements still far distant. On the other hand, Paris was still able to resist, and had a powerful army within its walls; Faidherbe in the north had become menacing; Bourbaki on the Loire was giving signs of life; Chanzy in the west was at the head of forces which every effort had failed to subdue; and it was not impossible that three hundred thousand men might be directed to the relief of the capital, where a single victory might accomplish wonders. How Chanzy perceived the true state of affairs appears in a long despatch to Gambetta, which proves that he was no mean strategist. We have space only for a few sentences: "The resistance of Paris has a limit known to you; the time is pressing; and the great effort we must make can only succeed if all our forces co-operate skilfully according to a carefully arranged plan. . With the advantages he possesses the enemy evidently tries to attack successively, and in force, each of our armies; he manœuvres with great ability, and we are not well informed as to his principal movements, which he masks with remarkable skill.”

Chanzy had soon established his army on the Huisne, throwing out posts to the Braye and the Loire. Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles had fallen back, hold- The following was the plan proposed by ing a long line from Chartres to Orleans, Chanzy for the relief of the capital. It his worn-out troops being in sore distress. may be left with confidence to judges of A pause in the contest now occurred; and war: "It is indispensable that the First the belligerents on either side prepared and the Second Armies, and that under the to repair their forces, and to renew the command of General Faidherbe, should struggle. A glance at the situation shows march simultaneously; the Second from that if Germany was still, on the whole, Le Mans to establish itself on the Eure successful, the position of France was between Evreux and Chartres; the First very far from hopeless. The invaders, from Châtillon-sur-Seine in order to hold no doubt, still invested Paris; they had positions between the Marne and Seine, hitherto been able to defeat or keep back from Naquet to Château Thierry; the the vast armed masses directed against Army of the North from Arras to place them, with untiring energy, from many itself from Compiègne to Beauvais. In points; and they had the advantages of a addition to these three main operations, central position, of interior lines on the and to aid them, the divisions from Cherwhole theatre, of a master of war in su- bourg would advance and cover the left of preme command, and of troops very supe. the Second Army. . . . Once our three rior to their foes. Nevertheless, imposing principal armies shall have attained these as seemed their attitude, they were ex- positions, we must communicate with posed to peril of no ordinary kind, for Paris and combine our efforts to reach they were thrown for leagues round a the common objective, the Army of Paris buge fortress, liable to fierce attacks from making at the same time vigorous sorties. within and without; they were plunged in... By these means the enemy may be the depths of a hostile country, a whole nation rising in arms against them; and at this moment they were outnumbered in the field, since three hundred thousand

driven from his lines; and then renewed efforts by the united armies without and within Paris, may lead to the deliverance of France from the invaders."

Conjecture is useless whether this plan | them with unabated confidence. He had would have been attended with success or still, perhaps, 90,000 men against 60,00 not. Von Moltke, moving on shorter or 70,000 Germans; but as his troops lines, might perhaps have maintained his were not to be compared to their foes, he grasp on the capital, and driven the armies was very inferior in real force. The atof relief back; or he might at some point tack began on the 10th of January, but have been defeated, with consequences, the decisive effort was made next day; in that event, momentous. What can, and the prince struck home with his full however, be fairly said is, that Paris being strength. The defence, however, was the main objective, the plan of Chanzy stern and sustained; the tenacity of was admirably laid: it contemplated a Chanzy and his strong positions made up great concentric movement against the for the defects of his soldiers; and after forces covering the siege, especially aim- ten hours of desperate fighting the French ing at Prince Frederick Charles; and it were still in possession of their lines. had the special merit of securing a retreat | Chanzy thus described the results of the on every line in the event of defeat. In battle: had he been in the place of the an ill-omened hour, however, for France, sluggish Bazaine, how different might Gambetta rejected this judicious scheme, have been the fate of Gravelotte! "The and adopted the fatal and wild project of action continued along the whole line up detaching the First Army far to the east, to six o'clock. The night had arrived; in order to raise the siege of Belfort, and we had remained masters of all our posito reach the German communications | tions, both on the plateau of Auvours and with the Rhine. This movement, even on the right bank of the Huisne. The in theory false, and in existing circum- only serious check we had sustained was stances as foolish as that which ended in the evacuation of Auvours for a moment, the ruin of Sedan, was opposed by Chanzy, but this had been brilliantly and quickly in an able paper; but his protests might repaired by the fine conduct of General have been more vehement; and he might Goujard at the head of a part of his have recollected how the youthful Bona- Breton division, and of the troops of the parte had refused to attempt an operatiou 17th Corps which he had rallied. The of the kind, which would have marred the enemy had made great efforts against the immortal campaign of Italy. Yet we must whole front of our lines from the Tertre not forget that, on two occasions, before Rouge to the left of the 21st Corps. If Orleans, and at Le Mans, Chanzy gave our losses had been serious, his had been counsels which, if followed, might have even more considerable, owing to the admade the issue of the war different; and vantage of our positions and the preparahe had not the authority nor, we must tions we had made for defence." add, the unscrupulousness of the warrior of 1796. He wrote thus to Gambetta: "I wished to make a last effort to prevent this operation. I insisted for the adoption and execution of the plan I had proposed."

The eccentric movement which sent off Bourbaki to destruction amidst the snows of the Jura, freed Prince Frederick Charles from an enemy on his flank, and enabled him to turn his whole forces against the one chief he had found invincible. Drawing together his army and that of the grand duke-they had received considerable additional strength- the German commanders, in the first week of January, began to move towards Le Mans and the Huisne, approaching each other from Chartres and Orleans. The advanced posts of Chanzy were gradually driven in, though not without a tenacious resist ance; but his trust was in his positions on the Huisne, which he had strengthened with remarkable skill, and he fell back on

A sudden attack, made after nightfall, unexpectedly by a German corps, discomfited, however, the Breton levies, and placed a hostile force upon Chanzy's flank. Scenes of confusion and panic followed too characteristic of a raw army; an effort to drive the enemy away failed; and Chanzy, in order to avoid a disaster, was compelled to make a general retreat. The movement, however, was no rout; the Germans, in fact, were, for several hours, unaware of the real state of affairs, and of the great success they had gained; and though part of the French army disbanded, and several thousand prisoners were made, it was in tolerable order within two days. By the 20th, having been scarcely pursued, so heavy had been the loss of the Germans, Chanzy was once more in a good position, around Laval and upon the Mayenne; and having been joined by a new corps, he was still formidable and with unbroken force. Calm, stern, and self-possessed as ever, he still