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ing, you may be affured. I accepted his propofal; the walk began; and our former converfation infenfibly renewed.

BRUTUS, faid he, perished untimely, and Cæfar did no more. It was thus, as I remember, not long fince, you were expreffing yourfelf. And yet fuppofe their fortunes to have been exactly parallel-Which would you have preferred? Would you have been Cæfar, or Brutus? Brutus, replied I, beyond all controverfy. He afked me, Why? Where was the difference, when their fortunes, as we now fuppofed them, were confidered as the fame? There seems, faid I, abstract from their fortunes, fomething, I know not what, intrinfically preferable in the life and character of Brutus. If that, faid he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the fuccefs of his endeavours, but from their truth and rectitude. He had the comfort to be confcious, that his caufe was a just one. It was impoffible the other should have any fuch feeling. I believe, faid I, you have explained it.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, (it is but merely an hypothefis,) fuppofe, I fay, we were to place the Sovereign Good in fuch a rectitude of conduct, in the Conduct merely, and not in the Event. Suppofe we were to fix our Happiness, not in the actual attainment of that health, that perfection of a social state, that fortunate concurrence of externals, which is congruous to our nature, and which all have a right to purfue; but folely fix it in the mere doing whatever is correfpondent to fuch an end, even though we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer words; What if we make our natural ftate the ftandard only to determine our conduct, and place our happiness in the rectitude of this conduct alone? On fuch an hypothefis (and we confider it as nothing farther) we fhould not want a good, perhaps, to correfpond to our preconceptions; for this, it is evident, would be correfpondent to them all. Your doctrine, replied I, is fo new and strange, that though you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

Ir amounts all, faid he, but to this: Place your happinefs where your praife is. I afked, where he fuppofed that? Not, replied he, in the pleafures which you feel, more than your difgrace lies in the pain; not in the cafual profperity of fortune, more than your difgrace in the cafual adverfity; but in just complete action throughout every part of life, whatever be the face of things, whether favourable or the contrary.

BUT why then, faid I, fuch accuracy about externals? fo much pains to be informed, what are purfuable, what avoidable? It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the feas and the winds; the nature of tempefts, calms, and tides. They are the fubjects about which his art is converfant. Without a juft experience of them, he can never prove himself an artist. Yet we look not for his reputation either in fair gales, or in adverfe; but in the fkilfulness of his conduct, be these events as they happen. In like manner, fares it with the moral artift. He, for a fubject has the whole of human life: health and ficknefs; pleasure and pain; with every other poffible incident, which can befal him during his exiflence. If his knowledge of all thefe be accurate and exact, fo too muft his conduct, in which we place his happiness. But if his knowledge be defective, must not his conduct be defective alfo? I replied, fo it fhould feem. And if his conduct, then his happiness? It is true.

You fee then, continued he, even though externals were as nothing; though it was true, in their own nature, they were neither good nor evil; yet an accurate knowledge of them is, from our hypothefis, abfolutely neceffary. Indeed, faid I, you have proved it.

He continued-Inferior artifts may be at a ftand, because they want materials. From their ftubbornness and intrañability, they may often be difappointed. But as long as life is paffing, and Nature continues to operate, the moral arift

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of life has at all times all he defires. He can never want a fubject fit to exercife him in his proper calling; and that with this happy motive to the conftancy of his endeavours, that the croffer, the harsher, the more untoward the events, the greater his praife, the more illuftrious his reputation. ALL this, faid I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one circumftance there appears, where your fimile feems to fail. The praise indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his conduct; but it is in the fuccefs of that conduct where we look for his happiness. If a storm arife and the fhip be loft, we call him not happy, how well foever he may have conducted it. It is then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the defired haven. Your diftinction, faid he, is juft. And it is here lies the noble prerogative of moral artists, above all others. But yet I know not how to explain myself, I fear my doctrine will appear fo strange. You may proceed, faid 1, fafely, fince you advance it but as an hypothefis.

THUS, then, continued he-The end in other arts is ever diftant and removed. It confifts not in the mere conduct, much lefs in a fingle energy; but in the just result of many energies, each of which are effential to it. Hence, by obftacles unavoidable, it may often be retarded: nay more, may be fo embarraffed, as never poffibly to be attained. But in the moral art of life, the very conduct is the end; the very conduct, I fay, itself, throughout its every minutest energy; becaufe each of thefe, however minute, partakes as truly of rectitude, as the largest combinations of them, when confidered collectively. Hence, of all arts this is the only one perpetually complete in every inftant, because it needs not, like other arts, time to arrive at that perfection, at which in every inftant it is arrived already. Hence by duration it is not rendered either more or less perfect; completion, like truth, admitting of no degrees, and being in no fenfe capable of either intention or remiffion. And hence

too, by neceffary connection, (which is a greater paradox than all,) even that Happiness or Sovereign Good, the end of this moral art, is itself too, in every inftant, confum. mate and complete; is neither heightened nor diminished by the quantity of its duration, but is the fame to its enjoyers, for a moment or a century.

UPON this I fmiled. He afked me the reafon. It is only to obferve, faid I, the courfe of our inquiries. A new hy. pothefis has been advanced: appearing fomewhat ftrange, it is defired to be explained. You comply with the request, and in pursuit of the explanation, make it ten times more obfcure and unintelligible than before. It is but too often the fate, faid he, of us commentators. But you know in fuch cafes what is ufually done. When the comment will not explain the text, we try whether the text will not explain itself. This method, it is poffible, may affift us here. The hypothefis which we would have illuftrated, was no more than this: That the Sovereign Good lay in Rectitude of Conduct and that this good correfponded to all our preconceptions. Let us examine, then, whether, upon trial, this correfpondence will appear to hold; and for all that we have advanced fince, fuffer it to pa's, and not perplex us. Agreed, faid I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

RECOLLECT then, faid he. Do you not remember that one preconception of the Sovereign Good was, to be accommodated to all times and places? I remember it.. And is there any time, or any place, whence Reitude of Conduct may be excluded? Is there not a right action in profperity, a right action in adverfity? May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable behaviour, not only in peace, in power, and in health; but in war, in oppreffion, in fickness, and in death? There may.

AND what shall we say to those other preconceptions; to being durable, felf-derived, and indeprivable? Can there

be

be any Good fo durable, as the power of always doing right? Is there any good conceivable, fo entirely beyond the power of others? Or, if you hefitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what circumftances may Fortune throw a brave and honest man, where it shall not be in his power to act bravely and honeftly? If there be no fuch, then Rectitude of Conduct, if a Good, is a Good indeprivable. I confefs, faid I, it appears fo.

BUT farther, faid he: Another preconception of the Sovereign Good was, to be agreeable to rature. It was. And can any thing be more agreeable to a rational and focial animal, than a rational and social conduct? Nothing. But Rectitude of Conduct is with us Rational and Social Conduct. It is.

ONCE more, continued he: Another preconception of this Good was, to be conducive not to mere being, but to well-being. Admit it. And can any thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to the well-being of a rational, focial animal, as the right exercife of that reason, and of those focial affections? Nothing. And what is this fame exer cife, but the highest Rectitude of Conduct? Certainly, HARRIS.

CHAP. III.

ON CRITICISM.

-AND how did Garrick speak the foliloquy last night? Oh, against all rule, my lord, moft ungrammatically! betwixt the fubftantive and the adjective, which should agree together in number, cafe, and gender, he made a breach thus,-ftopping as if the point wanted fettling;and betwixt the nominative cafe, which your lordship knows fhould govern the verb, he fufpended his voice in the epilogue a dozen times, three feconds, and three fifths by a ftop-watch, my lord, each time.-Admirable gram marian!

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